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 This research proposes a new theoretical concept of reimagined territory for 
application in the study of terrorism and other forms of political violence.  Geographic 
theories of space and place, geopolitics, and multidisciplinary terrorism studies provide 
the theoretical framework for this dissertation.  A mixed-method approach comprised of 
computer-aided content analysis, manual content analysis, cartographic visualization, and 
geographic narrative analysis is applied to ISIS’s Dabiq magazine as a case study of the 
reimagined territory of a terrorist group.  The results demonstrate the utility of the 
theoretical concept of reimagined territory in examining the ideology and goals of a given 
terrorist movement.  A second case study of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire 
magazine validates the methodology and the general applicability of the theoretical 
concept.   
 The computer-aided content analysis generates a list of terms sorted by frequency 
(high to low) and alphabetical order from each issue of Dabiq magazine.  The manual 
content analysis extracts all geographic place names from the lists of terms and 
categorizes them into one of four categories based on geographic scale.  The cartographic 
visualization then charts the geographic place names in a series of maps from each of the 
scale categories.  Finally, the results from each previous stage inform the geographic 
narrative analysis, which also considers the original text of the magazines in explaining 




the world to be when it has achieved its goals emerges from the narrative analysis as its 
reimagined territory. 
 This research underscores the importance of considering the territoriality of terror 
groups and movements.  The primary conclusions of this research are: 1) ISIS’s 
geographic goal (reimagined territory) is the establishment of a Muslim state based on the 
territorial expanse of early Islamic caliphates and current Muslim lands; 2) AQAP’s goal 
is the establishment of a Muslim state centered on the Levant and eventually expanding 
to include all Muslim lands; 3) the methodology employed in this study and theoretical 
concept of reimagined territory applies to any terror group seeking to control space.        
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 In the summer of 2014 a swift, brutal, and staggeringly effective brand of 
religious terrorism emerged from the rubble at the crossroads of the Syrian civil war and 
the failing governance of the Iraqi state.  Leading the Sunni insurgency in northern and 
western Iraq since 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi transformed the dying religious/political 
entity of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into a more efficacious terror group known as the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI) (Ibrahim 2010; Nevins 2015).  After a period of successful insurgent 
operations in western Iraq, al-Baghdadi provided resources and manpower for the fight 
against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.  This territorial expansion of ISI’s influence 
inspired al-Baghdadi to change his faction’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) in March 2011 (Hashim 2014).  A string of continuous tactical victories followed 
in the power vacuums of eastern Syria and western Iraq, allowing ISIS to seize and 
maintain a significant geographic footprint in the region.   
On June 29, 2014, however, al-Baghdadi’s insurgency evolved from a regional 
threat into an international terror campaign via a single speech delivered from a balcony 
at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, Iraq.  Al-Baghdadi anointed himself leader of 
all Muslims by claiming the divine appointment of caliph, declared all existing 
governments of Muslim countries invalid and apostate, and announced the caliphate’s 





Baghdadi  2014).  The military victories coupled with the establishment of the caliphate 
gave this group of Islamic terrorists something which, to date, no other group of Islamist 
terrorists had enjoyed to this extent—autonomous geographic space.  The initial 
successes of ISIS were grossly underestimated by the global community.  Six months 
before ISIS declared itself a caliphate, President Obama reassured the New Yorker that 
ISIS had limited capabilities: “The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is 
accurate, is if a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe 
Bryant” (Remnick 2014).  Yet, at the two-year anniversary of the establishment of the 
caliphate there has been limited progress in slowing ISIS’s ideological advance in the 
Middle East.   During this same period, scholars have largely avoided any empirical or 
theoretical analyses of the terror group, perhaps due to the lack of publicly available data.   
The meteoric rise of ISIS and its ability to expand geographically demonstrate the 
pressing need to better understand the causes of terrorism, the motivations of terror 
groups, and their ultimate geographic objectives at both the theoretical and the 
practical/policy levels. 
 The systematic study of terrorism has grown considerably in several academic 
disciplines in recent years, especially since the attacks in New York and Washington, DC 
on September 11, 2001 (Pape 2009; Baghat and Medina 2013).  The resulting body of 
literature has provided a myriad of theoretical approaches to understanding the 
phenomenon of terrorism, but curiously few studies have focused on the geographic 
dimensions of terrorism.  The discipline of geography is uniquely equipped to lead the 
academic examination of ISIS, which will require advances in geographic theory and 





Like any terrorist group, ISIS cannot be understood without comprehending its 
ideological goals which are innately geographic.  Building on Medina and Hepner’s 
(2013) theory of aspirational geography, this dissertation proposes “reimagined territory” 
as a new theoretical concept within the subfields of the geography of terrorism and 
geopolitics.  The examination of reimagined territory reveals how terrorists conceptualize 
current political borders as part of their ideological narrative.  It also describes and 
visualizes the way in which terror groups envision future borders and territorial expanse.  
One powerful data source for such conceptualizations is a terror group’s propaganda 
publication, such as ISIS’s Dabiq magazine, which can be analyzed to construct or 
geovisualize a narrative of reimagined territory.  The proposed theory of reimagined 
territory lies at the intersection of various geographic theories of space/place and 
geopolitics.  The importance of reimagined territory lies in its uniquely geographic 
approach to terrorism studies.  It addresses the spatial aspects of terrorists organizations’ 
ideologies and goals—an approach which is largely ignored in today’s body of research. 
 
1.1  Theories of Space and Place in the  
Geography of Terrorism 
 Scholars and policy makers have struggled to agree on a single definition of 
terrorism.  Laqueur (1999) pointed out that more than one hundred definitions of 
terrorism have been offered by those who study the phenomenon.  Without discounting 
the many nuanced differences in these definitions, Hoffman (1998, 43) argued that the 
definition of terrorism can be simplified to “the deliberate creation and exploitation of 





perhaps due to the political nature of terrorism that political geographers have taken the 
lead in terrorism research within the discipline. 
 This dissertation approaches the geographic concepts of space and place primarily 
from political geography’s theoretical vantage point.  John Agnew (1987) established that 
place has three essential elements: locale (setting for social interaction), location 
(geographic area), and sense of place (the perceived connection between people and 
place) (Shelley 2003).  Because “territorial states are made out of places,” the key to 
understanding a territory lies in understanding its places (Agnew 1987, 1).  This concept 
also applies to the study of nonstate entities which control territory.  The application of 
this theory is particularly relevant to the development of reimagined territories of terrorist 
groups because sense of place and ideological narratives are inseparably intertwined.  
The establishment or practice of an ideology in a place necessarily shapes and defines its 
sense of place, which is further reinforced by reimagined territory.  
 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) proposed five spatial elements of political 
space which are of central importance to studying conflict: scale, place, network space, 
positionality, and mobility.  Although each element applies directly to the study of a 
terrorist group’s reimagined territory, positionality is an especially salient link between 
spaces of conflict and reimagined territories.  Positionality as defined by Leitner et al. 
(2008) is a “socio-spatial” location within a conflict space which denotes unequal 
relationships of power.  Thus, as different terrorist groups vie for power and influence 
within the political spaces in which they operate, their positionality ebbs and flows.  For 
ISIS to succeed the caliphate’s ideological discourse must provide sufficient socio-spatial 





significant power to location of diminished power.   The analysis of ISIS’s reimagined 
territory will reveal how aspirational geographies simultaneously echo the ideological 
narrative and strengthen ISIS’s positionality within the Islamist terrorist network. 
 Another important theory of place which supports this research is Yi-Fu Tuan’s 
(1977) conceptualization of an individual’s attachment to a “homeland.”  He showed that 
groups of people view their homelands as the center of the world, and because the 
homeland is at the center, the location (or place) has “ineluctable worth” (Tuan 1977, 
149).  Most terrorist groups claim a homeland which is integral to the cause, yet typically 
control a relatively small portion of that territorial homeland.  Tuan’s homeland concept 
still applies to these groups because the intrinsic worth of a place is constructed by the 
collective sentiment of the people, not by physical possession of the territory.   But ISIS 
is different from other Islamic terrorist groups in this regard.   The announcement of the 
caliphate was also the declaration of a Muslim homeland, not just for the Sunnis of Syria 
and Iraq, but for the entire Muslim nation (ummah).  Tuan’s theory of attachment to 
homeland is directly linked to ISIS’s reimagined territory. 
  
1.2  Geopolitics in the Geography of Terrorism 
 The field of geopolitics has evolved from its deterministic, contentious beginnings 
into a relevant, analytical discipline which addresses the interaction of dynamic 
geographic and political processes (Cohen 2003).  While geopolitics is generally 
interested in how political states act and react in relation to other states, the geopolitics of 
the twenty-first century must also focus on nonstate entities because they “...utilize and 
attempt to change geographic structures for political ends” (Flint 2005, 198).  A central 





power.  Mackinder (1904) argued that political power for any given place could be 
measured as a function of the geographic situation (economic and strategic) and the 
opposing groups of people (relative number, will of the people, equipment, and 
organization).  Because each of the components of the formula is dynamic, the balance of 
power oscillates from location to location as geopolitical circumstances change (Parker 
1982).   
While some of Mackinder’s geopolitical prognostications missed their mark, his 
formula for determining the balance of power is directly applicable in the geography of 
terrorism.  Framing the relative power of a terrorist faction in terms of its geographic 
situation and people (including its opposition) is very useful in determining the group’s 
capabilities and intentions.   This dissertation will explore the ways in which ISIS 
attempts to advance its ideology and bolster its ranks through circulating its geostrategic 
message in Dabiq.  The analysis will show that by reimagining state and regional 
boundaries, ISIS seeks to shift the balance of power by manipulating its geopolitical 
situation. 
Robert McColl (1969) theorized that national revolutions evolve through three 
stages (mobile, guerilla, and regular war) leading to the establishment of an insurgent 
state.  He described an insurgency’s “territorial imperative” as the initial movement to 
seize and maintain control of a territorial base to provide a safe haven, demonstrate the 
ineptitude of the existing state government, collect and distribute resources, and give 
legitimacy to the insurgency (McColl 1969, 614).  If applied to the case of ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria, McColl’s theory of insurgent states aptly explains the current geopolitical 





government.  The geopolitical tactic is the attrition of government control over specific 
portions of the state itself” (McColl 1969, 614). 
 In each of the examples of national revolutions cited by McColl, the insurgent 
group’s ambitions were limited to existing state borders.  Insurgents achieved victory 
when they attained complete political control within the boundaries of the state.  But ISIS 
is neither a national revolution, nor confined to the boundaries of a single state.  Which 
geographic boundaries would signify victory for the insurgents?  At first glance it seems 
the insurgent state theory cannot account for international revolutions which ignore state 
borders.  However, the connection between victory and controlling geographic territory 
still applies to international insurgencies. Rather than assuming the existing state borders 
to be the limits of the insurgency’s objective, researchers must analyze a terrorist group’s 
reimagined territory to determine the geographic goals of the movement.  This 
dissertation connects McColl’s territorial imperative to the concept of reimagined 
territories of terrorist factions through analysis and visualization of the places names as 
presented in Dabiq magazine. 
 
1.3  Analytical Approach to Understanding 
Reimagined Territories 
 Drawing from the theoretical framework of space and place as well as geopolitics, 
this dissertation introduces the new theoretical concept of reimagined territory which 
extends the idea of aspirational geography outlined by Medina and Hepner (2013).  The 
research focuses on the first ten issues ISIS’s Dabiq magazine as a case study for 
reimagined territory.  Two methods are used to extract, visualize, and analyze the place 





 The first approach utilized in this dissertation is content analysis which can be 
defined as “...as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text 
into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler 2014, 1).   
Content analysis allows researchers to make inferences about trends, patterns, themes, 
and authorship by systematically and empirically detecting specified features of the text 
(Holsti 1969).  D. W. Moodie (1971) suggested that content analysis holds the analytical 
power to integrate the empirical and the theoretical in geographic research.   
Content analysis is used to extract the geographic place names from the text of 
Dabiq magazine.  The research employs the software program R: A Language and 
Environment for Statistical Computing (2013) to read in the text files for each magazine 
issue and create document matrices to order and store the results.  The frequency of 
occurrence for each word in the magazine issue is tallied, and the terms are sorted in 
order of frequency.  The functionality of R also allows for the exploration of summary 
statistics such as histograms (displays change of usage for a single term over the span of 
ten magazine issues) and visualization tools such as content clouds (depicting a cluster of 
the most frequently used terms; font size denotes frequency) for each issue.  
Computerized content analysis allows the researcher to systematically reduce large texts 
into manageable categorical information.  This is most efficient and accurate way to 
account for and organize each word used in the magazine issues.     
Cartographic visualization is the second method applied in this research.  When 
the textual data are categorized and quantified, the results can be explored visually to 
determine how features are arranged spatially (Hallisey 2005).  Kraak (1999) described 





proportional symbol mapping to display quantitative attributes.  But the presence of 
quantitative attributes does not equate to quantitative analysis.  Pavlovskaya (2009) 
argues that computer-aided visualization also belongs in the category of qualitative 
geographic information systems (GIS) techniques and mixed methods approaches.  This 
dissertation maps the textual data (place names in Dabiq) and their associated frequencies 
to visualize the geography and reimagined territory of ISIS via qualitative GIS 
methodology.   
The final method employed in this research is narrative analysis.  The traditional 
application of this approach focuses on analyzing the major elements of a story (Kwan 
and Ding 2008).  A geographic approach, however, analyzes narratives for three specific 
elements: action/interaction, time, and space (Clandinin and Connelly 1999).  The 
narrative’s meaning is explained when analyzed in terms of these three elements.  For 
each place name (space element) in the narrative, the analysis will examine what actions 
are taking place and who is interacting in the places (action/interaction element).  Place 
names will also be examined for the time element—whether a place name used in Dabiq 
is a past, present, or future reference to a location.   The maps resulting from the 
cartographic visualization combined with the corresponding narrative analysis will reveal 
the geographic components of the terrorist group’s ideology and construct a clear vision 
of the ISIS’s reimagined territory. 
To validate the applicability of the conceptual model developed in this 
dissertation the study will apply the methods and procedures outlined above to a different 
group’s publication: al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.  The first five issues of Inspire will be 





The second data source (Inspire magazine) will demonstrate the utility of the analytical 
concept of reimagined territory when applied to another terrorist organization and its 
official publications. 
 
1.4  Research Objectives and Questions  
 This dissertation addresses four objectives in proposing the theoretical concept of 
reimagined territory.  The research: 
(1) develops and positions the theoretical concept of reimagined territory at the 
intersection of geopolitics and theories of space and place; 
(2) analyzes the content of the first ten issues of Dabiq magazine for place names, 
their frequencies of use, and their contexts; 
(3) visualizes the data by applying qualitative GIS techniques to choropleth and 
proportional symbol mapping; 
(4) analyzes ISIS’s conceptualization of current political borders and future 
political borders via narrative analysis based on the results of the content analysis; 
The first objective is to propose the theoretical concept of reimagined territory 
using the case of ISIS as evidence.  This objective relies on the successful completion of 
the remaining three objectives which extract, visualize, and analyze the geographic data 
contained in Dabiq magazine.  The results show that ISIS reimagines borders as a 
geopolitical tool to advance its ideology and legitimize the movement.  By using archaic 
place names with specific meanings, ISIS creates a sense of place by infusing history and 
prophecy, strengthens its positionality in the global Islamic terror network by asserting 
control of territory, and establishes a homeland for Muslims wherein religious narratives 





imagined future territorial expanse, the control of which signifies a complete victory for 
the insurgency.  The results of this objective suggest that examining a terrorist group’s 
reimagined territory is a viable means of understanding that group’s geographic and 
ideological goals. 
The second objective involves analyzing the content of the first ten issues of 
Dabiq magazine with specific emphasis on geographic place names.  Each of the issues is 
converted from Portable Document Format (.pdf) to Plain Text File (.txt) then imported 
to R for analysis.  A term frequency matrix is then generated for each issue of the 
magazine.  The matrix includes every word that appears in the text as well as the number 
of times each word appears.  Place names and corresponding frequencies are then 
extracted from the list of terms within the matrices and collated in a master list of 
geographic terms.  This empirical approach can be easily replicated either with R or with 
another text mining software program.  The successful accomplishment of this objective 
is critical to the research as it generates the data required for the remaining objectives. 
The third objective is to visualize the data by mapping the place names and their 
frequencies of occurrence.  To facilitate the mapping process, geographic terms are 
characterized according to one of four place name categories: region, country, 
state/province, or city/village.  It is imperative that every term is assigned to a single 
category only.  Shapefiles for each category are then created to store and display the 
place names and their frequencies in an easy to comprehend format.  The regions, 
countries, and state/province categories are represented with choropleth mapping while 
the cities/villages category is represented with proportional symbols mapping.  The 





references scattered across hundreds of pages of text can be displayed on a single map or 
a series of maps.  A simple list of place names has no spatiality, but viewing the same list 
displayed as a map allows the reader/viewer to infer distance and proximity relationships 
of these terms with respect to ISIS.  
The final objective is to analyze ISIS’s conceptualizations of current political 
borders and future political borders.  This process involves the examination of the place 
names in context as they appear in Dabiq.  It also involves understanding the historical 
and ideological context of the obsolete geographic terms used by ISIS.  Theories of 
geopolitics and space/place are used as a framework for this narrative analysis, which 
serves as the basis for the development of reimagined territory as a theoretical concept.  
This objective is qualitative in nature.  The results of this analysis reveal which places are 
ideologically important to ISIS’s narrative. 
The objectives of this dissertation attempt to answer several research questions. 
Firstly, can the method of content analysis be applied effectively in geographic studies of 
terrorism? If so, which place names appear in the first ten issues of Dabiq magazine and 
how many times does each place name occur?  Secondly, how can the place names be 
visualized using a map?  More specifically, how can the data be categorized and how can 
the categories be represented on the map? What spatial relationships are revealed by 
mapping the results of the text mining? Thirdly, how does ISIS conceptualize current 
international borders?  How does ISIS envision future international borders?  What would 
constitute victory for ISIS in terms of territory controlled?  Finally, can the proposed 
theoretical concept of reimagined territory explain the ideological narrative of ISIS and 





By combining the methods of content analysis, cartographic visualization, and 
narrative analysis, the strengths of each method can be harnessed and synergized to 
provide a more complete geographic analysis of the place names used in Dabiq 
magazine.  The sum of these methods as applied in this study is greater than the result of 
a single methodological approach, as each approach contributes different, complementary 
layers of meaning.   
 
1.5  Research Contributions of this Dissertation 
 Although ISIS can trace its origin to 1999, it has published and circulated Dabiq 
only since July 2014.   Accordingly, few scholars have addressed any aspect of Dabiq, 
and none has attempted to analyze the magazine from a geographic perspective.  Recent 
(not peer-reviewed) studies related to Dabiq magazine include David Skillicorn’s (2015) 
semantic model which he developed to quantify levels of propaganda contained in three 
terrorist publications and Harleen Gambhir’s (2014) examination of the strategic message 
of ISIS via a qualitative content analysis of the first two issues.  Other peer-reviewed 
studies have employed content analysis in studying extremist and terrorist group 
websites, but none has focused on the magazines of terrorist groups (Qin et al. 2007; 
Gerstenfeld et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2005).  This dissertation is the first geographically 
focused content analysis of Dabiq.   
 Outlining future areas of research in the geography of terrorism, Flint (2003) 
called for geographic studies to focus on the role of religious influence in creating a sense 
of place and geopolitical vision.  To date few geographers have pursued this “vitally 
important” research agenda in the context of Islamic fundamentalism (Flint 2003, 163).  





specific emphasis on the place names which advance the religious ideology of the 
terrorist organization.  The original research is the first of its kind to link the use of 
geographic place names in a terror group’s official publications to the construction of 
religious identity and sense of place. 
 Finally, this dissertation proposes a new theoretical concept for understanding 
terrorist groups, their ideologies, motivations, and goals.  Building upon Medina and 
Hepner’s (2013) concept of aspirational geography, this research offers the theory of 
reimagined territory which views terrorist groups’ conceptualizations of current and 
future political borders as part of their ideological narratives.  Understanding how 
terrorist organizations perceive places and borders leads to greater understanding of the 
ideologies and goals of the groups.  This is a new theoretical concept situated at the 
intersection of political geography and geopolitics.  However, because terrorism always 
has a geographic component, the theory can augment any future research within terrorism 













 This dissertation draws on several geographic theories to provide a framework for 
developing the concept of reimagined territory.  This chapter provides an overview of 
those theories and their applications in selected past studies.  It also reviews the methods 
employed in the research.  There is a short section reviewing the previous publications on 
ISIS and Dabiq as well.  Finally, this chapter provides an historical background and 
overview of ISIS. 
 
2.1  Theories of Space and Place 
 Within the realm of human geography there are many competing (and often 
overlapping) definition of place.  For Yi-Fu Tuan (1977, 18), places are “centers of 
value” which become real to a person through experiencing them.  Nicholas Entrikin 
(1991, 3) defines place as both “situatedness” in the world and an analytical concept.  He 
argues that to understand place one must both experience it directly and study it from an 
objective (detached) position (Entrikin 1991).  Denis Cosgrove (1989, 104) contends that 
“places are physical locations imbued with human meaning” but not necessarily inhabited 
by human beings.  The list of definitions of place offered by geographers is quite 





across a broad spectrum of geography subdisciplines and other social sciences, will 
proceed with John Agnew’s conceptualization of place. 
 
2.1.1  John Agnew’s Definition of Place 
 For Agnew (1987) place is a multidimensional concept consisting of three 
components: locale, location, and sense of place.  Locale is the setting in which people 
interact.  These settings can be either institutional (like a courtroom) or informal settings 
(like a coffee shop).  Location is the geographic position and extent of the locale, or as 
Dennis Pringle (2003, 608) describes, “...the relationship between a place and other 
places.” Sense of place is the sum of human perceptions based on the lived experience or 
socially constructed images and sentiments of a place, which could be positive, neutral, 
or negative.  Because human experiences and perceptions are integral to place, it is a 
dynamic concept that changes over time.  A warm, inviting place may become cold and 
foreboding.  In Agnew’s (2003, 612) words, “Places are thus made by the people who 
inhabit them at the same time that the places help to make them.”  Thus, when examining 
a place, it is essential to consider each of the elements of locale, location, and sense of 
place. 
Using Agnew’s (1987) conceptualization of place as context, one means of 
examining place-making is through the political ideology of nationalism.  Benedict 
Anderson (1983) posits that nations are imagined political communities that are 
inherently limited and sovereign.  Nations are imagined because one person simply 
cannot know and interact with every other individual in the political community.  Thus, 
because one cannot know all, the sense of belonging and cohesiveness has to be 





Finally, sovereignty guarantees the political community freedom to exist without the 
threat of foreign interference.  Anderson traces the roots of nationalism to religious 
communities and dynastic political powers in premodern times.  In Europe during the 
Dark Ages, religious communities were bound together by a common sacred text (the 
Bible) and a common sacred language (Latin), despite the fact that there were many 
vernacular languages for use in everyday affairs across the pre-Westphalian political 
landscape of Christendom.  For Anderson, the advent of print capitalism led to the demise 
of the church community and gave way to the rise of nationalism.  Because of the 
printing press and capitalism, novels and newspapers became readily available for daily 
reading in the local vernacular language across Europe.  As the influence of the church 
waned, people could imagine themselves as part of a national community, which was, for 
the first time, based on their own language in their own place.  Anderson argues that in 
the modern state, nationalism perpetuates itself through the census (which not only 
numbers people, but allows them to identify their nationality), maps (which reinforce the 
spatial extent of the nation), and museums (which preserve the relics and narratives of the 
national past). 
 Anthony Smith (2000), on the other hand, traces the origins of nationalism to 
ethic identity, cultural bonds, and a shared history rather than to the advent of print 
capitalism.  He rejects (as does Anderson) the primordialist view of nationalism which 
holds that nationalism is inherent in human nature.  He also rejects the perennialist view 
which sees nationalism as a process of existence, death, and rebirth—nationalist 
sentiments occurred in ancient times, died out, and were reborn at different periods in 





development, uneven distribution of resources, and capitalism) is also insufficient.  
Rather, Smith argues that while nationalism as a political ideology may be modern (post-
Treaty of Westphalia), its roots are in nations whose cultural roots and histories must be 
traced through long periods of time.  He suggests that nationalism originates in shared 
common myths of national origin, common ancestry, shared sacred texts, languages, rites, 
rituals, and customs.  Because of amount of time that has passed, or because of the lack 
of historically verifiable information, many of the national myths are contested.  Thus, 
the meaning of the cultural symbols and national identity are interpreted and re-
interpreted by the social elites and intelligentsia, and the new meanings become a source 
of cohesion for the people and (re)inform their collective identity. 
 Regardless of the contested origins of nationalism as an ideological movement, it 
is clear that in the modern world-system, nationalism has become a powerful means of 
creating a sense of national identity and fostering social cohesion within political groups.  
And while religion remains a viable, cohesive element in place-making across the world, 
nationalism has become a mainstay in the process of making place at the state and 
international levels of political interaction. 
 Another means of examining place-making is via borders and territoriality.  
Robert Sack (1986) describes territoriality as the attempt to control people, things, and 
relationships by exerting control over bounded geographic area.  He argues that 
territoriality is a geographic strategy to maintain order and maintain the geographic 
context through which people experience the world.  Sack views territoriality as a social 
construct rather than an innate human instinct (in contrast to Robert Ardrey’s (1966) 





maintain control over territory as biological instinct).  Thus, territory becomes the spatial 
expression of political power.   
Central to the concept of bounded political space is the border itself, which David 
Newman (2006) sees as an essential element in the creation of identities.  For him, the 
process of bordering is more important than the border itself.  It is the process of 
demarcating and delimiting space which creates categories, and in turn, informs identities 
based on those categories.  With borders, people can conceptualize what makes those 
inside the boundaries different than those outside the boundaries.  Charles Tilly (2003) 
also sees the process of boundary-making as an integral element of creating the “us vs. 
them” dichotomy which can take many specific forms via race, ethnicity, gender, class, 
or religion.  According to Tilly, people have many identities based on a variety of 
boundaries, and that unique social situations help determine which identity a person or 
group of people will activate. 
 Juliet Fall (2010) challenges the concept of “natural” boundaries by channeling 
Agnew’s notion that there is nothing natural about boundaries—they are all human 
impositions on the world.  She demonstrates that regardless of the shape of boundaries 
(squiggly lines that follow “natural” features such as rivers, mountains, or coastlines vs. 
straight lines drawn without regard for language, ethnic or other divisions), all are 
products of social interaction.  She maintains that boundaries have merits and demerits, 
and their meanings must constantly be weighed and reweighed.  Anssi Paasi (1999) 
demonstrates that boundaries, as social constructs can mean different things depending on 
context.  Citing the international borders of Finland, Paasi shows that the boundary with 





the border with Sweden.  The feel of the Russian border is therefore much different than 
the feel of the Swedish border, making each a different type of place for the Finns who 
transit them. 
 Thus, in terms of making a place, the construction and perpetuation of borders are 
essential.  Because territorial states are made up of places (Agnew 1987), the making of 
places begins with delimiting territory.  Peter Taylor (1994) expands on Anthony 
Gidden’s (1987) concept of the state as a power container.  He discusses four ways in 
which the state is a container.  First, the state contains the power to wage war.  This is an 
important function in the making of place because defense of territory is integral to 
maintaining sovereignty, and the power to enforce political power beyond state borders 
solidifies international political clout (hearkening to Weber’s state which maintains a 
monopoly of violence within its territorial expanse).  Second, the state contains the power 
to manage the economy.  This is the mechanism which can harness the power of natural 
and human resources both within the state and beyond its borders.  Third, the state 
contains culture, and therefore has the power to define cultural narratives, draw on 
nationalistic sentiments, and reinterpret cultural symbols, artifacts, and histories.  Finally, 
the state contains the power to manage social programs such as schools, public safety, 
and transportation networks. 
Through these power mechanisms, the state creates and perpetuates the national 
place.  State boundaries, in conjunction with cultural norms, social processes, and 
political ideologies, create national identities which are rooted in and have contextual 
meaning in place.  Newman (2006) suggests that transition zones or borderlands, 





In places along the French-Spanish border, people freely cross the border and the 
exchange is conflict-free.  Conversely, in Israel the borderlands are disputed places of 
exchange.  The Israeli wall project, in which the border is reified, deepens the divide 
between Israel and Palestine.  The variance of interaction in different places can be 
attributed to different social and cultural factors unique to those places.  Each place must 
be examined in the context of human interaction and meaning specific to that place. 
Place-making, then, is a socio-political process which is inseparably connected to 
boundaries, identities, territory.  While aspects of place are unchanging (e.g., location), 
places are ever-changing because they are given meaning through human processes 
which change over time.   
 
2.1.2  Spatial Components of Contested Space 
 Using the structure of Agnew’s conceptualization of place to frame the research, 
it is then possible to focus on specific kinds of activities which make places.  Helga 
Leitner, Eric Sheppard, and Kristin Sziarto (2008) propose a spatial template which can 
be applied to the study of contentious politics, a broad category of political activity which 
includes terrorism.  They offer five interconnected spatial elements which comprise 
conflict spaces: scale, place, networks, positionality, and mobility.  Scale, as described by 
Leitner et al., denotes geographic levels of representation such as local, regional, 
national, or global (Smith 2000).  Conflict may occur at more than one scale 
simultaneously, underscoring the importance of viewing the ways in which levels of scale 
interact. 
 Places are sites where people live, work, and socialize, but they also have distinct 





shape human interaction, giving a place the power to restrict or grant access, include or 
exclude people, or segregate space.  Terrorist organizations often attempt to 
“...strategically manipulate, subvert and resignify places...” to reinforce their ideologies 
and (re)create locations in which their narratives can take place (Leitner et al. 2008, 161).  
 Social movements require networks (nodes and links) in order to propagate their 
alternative narratives and ideologies.  Leitner et al. (2008) contend that these networks 
have topological spatiality in that they span geographic space, not cover it.  Such 
networks allow terrorist organizations like ISIS to connect sympathizers across the globe 
with the central structure of the organization as well as other individual members. This 
connectivity not only prevents the containment of ideas in a central location, it allows the 
ideology to flow without spatial restrictions.   
 Positionality is a “socio-spatial” location within a network, hierarchy, or structure 
of power (Leitner et al., 163).  Nancy Hartsock (1987) explains that a person’s (or 
organization’s) positionality directly shapes how he/she understands the world.   
Furthermore, positionality implies a relative relationship, meaning that without the 
context of other people/actors/groups, the socio-spatial location would lose significance.  
Consequently, positionality necessarily involves a negotiation for power within a given 
network or structure.  A major component of those negotiations for power involves the 
formation of alliances which can change positionality within the power structures.  
Smaller, weaker organizations can increase their power by allying themselves with other 
like-minded organizations.   
 The final spatial component of contentious politics is mobility, which “...refers to 





and between places” (Leitner et al. 2008, 165).  Examples of mobility include protests, 
rallies, demonstrations, and even terror attacks wherein social movements hope to change 
the existing power structures.  The shared act of being in motion with other members of a 
group fosters collective experience and understanding which can then be harnessed for 
cooperative action (Leitner et al. 2008).    
 
2.1.3  Place as a Homeland 
 Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) demonstrates that attachment to a homeland can be deep and 
powerful.  He explains that humans tend to consider their homeland as the center of the 
world, which creates a sense of worth in that place composed of its people, landmarks, 
and landscape.  A homeland could be a city, countryside, nation, or region.  Tuan argues 
that religion can either fuse a people to their homeland, or liberate them from it.  Both 
seem to be the case with ISIS.  For the disenfranchised Sunni peoples of Iraq and Syria, 
the cause of ISIS was born in their homeland, binding the insurgency to the land.  Yet for 
tens of thousands who have left their homelands and flocked to fight with ISIS, the 
establishment of the caliphate freed them from non-Muslim or apostate lands.   
Tuan does not reference Islam in any of his examples of homeland, but his 
generalization rings true: “In antiquity land and religion were so closely related that a 
family could not renounce one without yielding the other” (1977, 154).  Inseparably 
connected to place, Islam requires its adherents to make a pilgrimage once in their lives 
to the homeland of Muhammad to visit the ultimate landmark—the Kaaba.  But ISIS goes 
beyond this Islamic doctrine in declaring that emigration to the new homeland of the 






2.2  Geopolitics 
 By the end of World War II, geopolitics had become an “embarrassment” in 
political geography circles and to the entire discipline (Taylor and Flint 2000, 50).  The 
prevailing narrative conflated geopolitics and Nazism’s bloody quest for lebensraum to 
the extent that the two ideas became inextricably fused (Atkinson and Dodds 2000).  
Richard Hartsthorne (1954, 176) perfectly encapsulated the sentiment of the day in 
declaring that geopolitics is “intellectual poison.”  Despite the seemingly insurmountable 
disdain for geopolitical thought, a recent resurgence has shifted geopolitics towards the 
mainstream of political geography discourse, despite the existence of counter narratives.  
As Taylor and Flint (2000) point out, Saul Cohen recognized the importance of 
geopolitical ideas within the discipline, and worked to preserve the intellectual traditions 
through the decades of marginalization.  He argues that geography still “...counts in a 
strategic and tactical military sense, a political sense, and culturally defined territorial 
sense, and it counts in terms of the spatial distribution of resources, peoples, and physical 
systems” (Cohen 2003, 3).  This dynamic view of “spatial possibilism” drives the study 
of state and nonstate actors within the field of geopolitics today (Starr 2013, vii).  
 
2.2.1  Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory 
 In 1904 British geographer Halford Mackinder presented a holistic theory of the 
balance of global power based on geographic considerations in “The Geographical Pivot 
of History.”  He argued that the geographic exploration of the globe was a limited 
endeavor nearing its final stages, and that when Europe could no longer expand beyond 
its colonial reaches, conflict would arise in Europe (Mackinder 1904; Heffernan 2000).  





“pivot” area or heartland, which was a landlocked fortress from which to dominate the 
world (Mackinder 1904, 435).  Surrounding the heartland were the inner and outer 
crescents comprised of the coastlands, islands, and peninsulas of Western Europe, Africa, 
South and Southeast Asia, and North and South America.  These areas could compete 
with the heartland due to the mobility afforded by access to oceans and navigable rivers 
(Parker 1982).  Revised and refined by the experiences of the First World War, Heartland 
Theory was summarized by its author as: “Who rules East Europe commands the 
Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-
Island commands the World” (Mackinder 1919, 194). 
 Despite later revisions and erroneous predictions (such as development of the 
railroad in central and eastern Russia), Mackinder’s theory survives because of its 
“practical utility” and its holistic view (Taylor and Flint 2000, 55).  Furthermore, 
Mackinder built his premise upon the concept of the balance of power.  He stressed that 
the balance of power was the product of “geographic conditions” (strategic location and 
natural resource situation) and the human element comprised of the total population, 
motivation and resolve of the people, equipment, and organization of the opposing sides 
(Mackinder 1904, 437).  Because the human environment changes continuously, the 
balance of power is dynamic at every scale.  This concept is critical in studying the ways 
in which terrorist organizations attempt to influence the balance of power. 
 
2.2.2  Robert McColl’s Insurgent State 
 Robert McColl (1969) developed a theory to describe the progression of national 
insurgencies based on the control of territory.  Insurgency is defined as “...a violent 





the ruling authority to alter or replace existing power relationships” (Lohman and Flint 
2010: 1154).  McColl’s novel approach was the first to characterize insurgent movements 
as spatial processes that evolve through three stages over time (Lohman and Flint 2010).  
He argued that a common feature of national revolutions was the need for insurgents to 
capture and control territory within the state, and that capturing the territory allowed for 
the establishment of an insurgent state.  Control of territory is valuable to an insurgency 
because it provides a safe haven for the leadership, demonstrates the existing 
government’s inability to govern, becomes a personnel and resupply center, and creates 
“...at least an aura of legitimacy to the movement” (McColl 1969, 614).  The 
establishment of the insurgent state is achieved in three stages. 
 The first stage, mobile war, begins when the government removes a group’s 
ability to openly oppose political structures by labeling the group “rebels or bandits” and 
forcing the movement underground (McColl 1969, 614).  The revolutionaries must then 
move from place to place in the countryside to avoid detection and capture by the 
government.  It is during this time of mobility that the insurgent group begins to search 
for a location for a permanent base of operations.  According to McColl, an ideal area for 
permanent camp(s) meets specific criteria.  First, an area with previous experience in 
opposing the government is preferable.  Next, local political instability aids the 
establishment of counter-government movements.  The area should also have sufficient 
access to military and political targets as well as transportation networks and resources.  
Areas with proximity to provincial or international borders, economically self-sufficient 





insurgent base should be located in a place where insurgents can maintain control 
(McColl 1969). 
 The second stage is guerrilla war which begins when the insurgency establishes a 
permanent base in its “core area” (McColl 1969, 621).  As support and success allow the 
resistance to grow, the insurgents must either establish a larger core area or establish new 
areas of support outside the core.  The expansion of controlled areas affords the 
insurgents more opportunities to target the existing government and consequently, gain 
more territory.  Boundaries develop in the countryside, marking the extent of government 
influence.  In the boundary zones, the population must remain neutral as either the 
government or the guerillas could show force at any moment.   
 The final stage, equilibrium or regular war, begins when the insurgency has 
attained enough military power to force the national troops into the cities, engage in open 
battle with the government troops, and successfully defend the territory seized from the 
government.  The revolutionaries now enjoy several advantages over the existing 
government: a supported cause, a guerilla army, core areas, control of large areas and 
their people and resources, and discrete boundaries between control zones.  But success 
brings its own issues.  The focus must now shift from military efforts to the political.  In 
addition, the insurgency must coordinate between the core areas to ensure political unity 
and loyalty.  The creation of a unified political structure allows the insurgent government 
to administer services in its areas of control.  One of the bases becomes the capital and 
the “liberated areas” and other bases become the “states” (McColl 1969, 626).  The 





administrative and military structures in place, the insurgency can prepare for the final 
push to topple the government and assume complete national control.      
 
2.3  Multidisciplinary Terrorism Studies and  
the Geography of Terrorism 
 In its modern form, terrorism emerged as a violent extension of politics hundreds 
of years ago, yet the study of terrorism is only decades old (Laqueur 1999).  Robert Pape 
(2009) categorizes the academic effort to understand terrorism in two phases.  The first 
phase began in the 1970s and lasted through the 1990s.  The second phase began after the 
terror attacks on September 11, 2001 (Pape 2009).  Among the most influential scholars 
of the first phase were Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman, whose contributions in 
terrorism research laid the foundation for future studies.  
 Walter Laqueur’s historical approach to terrorism established him as one of the 
founders of terrorism studies (Duyvesteyn 2004).  In The New Terrorism (1999) Laqueur 
predicted that terrorism would shift from nationalistic and political motivations to fanatic 
religious motivations.  He outlined the new dangers of readily available weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of religious terror organizations, arguing that fundamentalists 
were more likely than nationalist or ethnic groups to use nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons.  He warned of the relative ease of access that cyberterrorists would enjoy 
should they choose to target infrastructure, government agencies, and military activities.  
Laqueur’s scholarly work in terrorism studies stressed the importance of understanding 
the causes of terrorism and the motivations of terrorist groups. 
 Bruce Hoffman studies terrorism from the vantage point of political science.  His 





approach that Laqueur favored, albeit from a more political perspective.  Hoffman, like 
many other scholars including Laqueur, attempted to address the problems associated 
with defining terrorism before offering a definition of his own (Laqueur 1999; Jackson 
2008; Smyth et al. 2008).  As previously mentioned, Hoffman defines terrorism as “the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in 
the pursuit of political change” (1998, 43).  This definition is compelling for a number of 
reasons. First, it purposely omits the creators of terror, allowing for state and nonstate 
actors.  Second, it distinguishes between violence and the threat of violence, but 
incorporates both in the element of fear.  Finally, Hoffman’s definition identifies the end 
purpose of terrorism—to effect political change.   
 The second phase of terrorism research has produced an impressive volume of 
books and other studies in a short period of time.  Andrew Silke (2009) pointed out that 
in a seven-year period following the attack on the Twin Towers, 2,281 nonfiction books 
with “terrorism” in the title were published, while only 1,310 books meeting the same 
criteria had been published prior to September 2001.  The area of research also expanded 
from its political science and historical roots across a multidisciplinary spectrum 
including criminology, psychology, and information studies (Reid and Chen 2007; Pape 
2009).  But the concepts of place and the importance of geographic context were either 
lacking altogether or largely underdeveloped in these studies of terrorism—a gap in the 
scholarship ideally addressed by the discipline of geography. 
Unlike political scientists and sociologists, geographers study political violence in 
its geographic context.  The intricacies of political behavior are fused to place because all 





goal of terrorism (and by extension, all forms of political violence) is to gain power 
where there is none, or seize power where there is little.  In order for a group to exercise 
political power, it requires a place in which or over which to exert that power.  
Consequently, studying the concept of power outside of the context of the place wherein 
the power is applied risks losing the contextual meaning of that power.   
Charles Tilly, a sociologist, attributes the outbreak of political violence to the 
onset of social uncertainties (as opposed to underlying hate), usually in the form of the 
government’s lack of ability to enforce prior agreements or maintain security at the 
border (2003).  He views violence as a continuum ranging from small acts of aggression 
such as barroom brawls to horrific acts like genocide.  While he cites the creation of 
boundaries as the source of categorization which leads to the formation of identities, his 
examples of race, religion, gender, and class (among others) lack the essential element of 
place, and are therefore decontextualized.  The nongeographic approach to violence fails 
to explain why a group of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims in one place facilitates the rise 
of ISIS, while another group of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims does not resort to 
violence. 
Political scientist Ted Gurr (1970) argues that political violence is caused by 
feelings of deprivation.  Building on the frustration-aggression theory, Gurr explains that 
in order to understand political violence, it must be viewed in terms of deprivation, a 
group’s justification of violence, and a group’s capability to fight weighed against the 
government’s capability to counter or respond to the violence.  For Gurr, deprivation 
occurs when a person or group compares what he/she/they have with what he/she/they 





political power, basic necessities, or a myriad of other reasons.  The scope and magnitude 
of the violence are a function of the level of deprivation.  While the concept of 
deprivation is useful in understanding why some groups may be incited to violence, 
Gurr’s (like Tilly’s) analysis ignores geographic factors which influence group identities.  
He does not explore the relationship between place, boundaries, and identity and how 
they could influence perceptions of deprivation. 
Geographers, on the other hand, have readily recognized the indelible link 
between place and political violence.  Stuart Elden (2009) provides a more nuanced 
approach to terrorism which challenges the dominant discourse that terrorism has become 
de-territorialized.  While acknowledging the deterritorialized, fluid nature of terror 
groups like al Qaeda, Elden argues that these groups are still bound by aspects of 
territory.  For example, terror groups require bases for training, schools for 
indoctrination, and logistics depots.  In order to effectively operate these aspects of their 
organizations, terror groups need either full permission or complicity from an entity 
which maintains sovereignty within the bounds of a territory.  Additionally, terror groups 
have territorial goals themselves—aspirations of controlling political space (usually a 
homeland).  Any state response to terrorism, be it in the form of homeland security or 
offensive attacks against terror groups, is also necessarily territorial.  The threat must be 
imagined in spatial terms (Elden 2009; Flint 2003). Without understanding the territorial 
goals of a terror group, a researcher cannot fully explain the violent group in question nor 
the conditions in which the political violence arose. 
The interdisciplinary approach of geography is also much more likely to involve 





view the Kashmir conflict strictly in political terms, and thus overlook the historical and 
geographic contexts of the region.  Murphy (1990) demonstrates that territorial disputes 
often have roots in historical claims to territory wherein the disputed area was “illegally” 
taken from its original owners.  For India, Kashmir rightfully belongs to India because 
the rules of partitioning dictated that the governor of the province would determine in 
which country (Pakistan or India) the province would be incorporated.  At that time 
(1947), the maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh (a non-Muslim), chose India for a variety 
of complicated reasons, but mostly because Pakistan threatened to invade and take 
Kashmir by force (Mohan 1992).  From the Pakistani perspective, Kashmir should have 
acceded to Pakistan because of the dominant religious/cultural make-up of the 
population.   Thus, each country had an historic claim to the area, and therefore, each 
could justify engaging in violence based on rightful territorial claims.  It is at the 
intersection of politics, geography, and history that the intricacies of place, identity, and 
violence coalesce in the case of Kashmir. 
Although the growing body of literature (even among geographers) describes a 
borderless world brought about by globalization, communication, and 
“informationalization” (Toal 1999; Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999; Taylor 1994; Eva 
1999), territorial expressions of power by state actors are not obsolete.  Recent events in 
Western Europe and Ukraine have underscored the viability of the state as a decisive 
enforcer of sovereignty, despite the scholars who have (prematurely) sounded its death 
knells (Paasi 1999).  In the face of international opposition (in the form of the United 
Nations and NATO), under the guise of support for separatists, Russia invaded Ukraine 





control over geographic space was met with a very different international response 
(economic sanctions) as compared to Iraq’s invasion Kuwait in 1990 (international 
counter-invasion and subsequent destruction of Iraq’s military power).  Furthermore, in 
response to waves of Syrian (and other groups) immigrants in Europe, Austria exerted 
territorial control by sealing its borders to those seeking asylum (Huggler 2016).  When 
faced with (perceived) outside threats to its sovereignty, a democratic state with 
membership in an open economic union (European Union) fiercely protected its borders. 
These recent examples demonstrate that while globalization and communication 
have created processes that transcend borders, states will not hesitate to interfere with 
these processes by exerting control of their territories—a political act that is inherently 
geographic in nature.  As long as political power and conflict occur in geographic space 
(and they must be), geographers will be better equipped to explain the phenomenon of 
political violence.  Simply stated, without the perspectives of geographic analysis, the 
concept of political violence can only be viewed out of context.   
Uniquely suited to studying terrorism, geographers, like their social sciences 
colleagues, also began to explore the various aspects of terrorism during the aftermath of 
al Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington.  One of the earliest broad-scope efforts 
by geographers was The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism (Cutter et al. 2003).  
This volume spans the discipline with essays which address geographic aspects of 
emergency response efforts, the root causes of terrorism, the use of geospatial data and 
geographic information systems in emergency response and security realms, societal risk, 
biological warfare, and security vs. openness debates.  The wide research net cast by that 





 Geographers have since approached the geography of terrorism in vastly different 
ways.  Harm de Blij (2005) proposed that the core areas of Islam (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
Sudan) have a tendency to be more fundamental while the periphery of Islam (Indonesia, 
Turkey, Morocco, Sengal) tends to be more moderate.  He argued that much of the 
terrorism-based conflict in the international community today can be found along a 
border between predominantly Muslim countries and their non-Muslim neighbors, or 
within Muslim countries themselves (de Blij 2005).  At the other end of the spectrum, 
Marie Smyth, Richard Jackson, and others call for a critical reading of terrorism studies 
because they believe the “...conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically 
challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented” (Jones and Smith 2009, 301). 
 Colin Flint has emerged as a leading researcher within the geography of terrorism.  
His works have emphasized that terrorism and counterterrorism occur within geopolitical 
structures which have locational and scalar attributes (Flint 2005; Flint and Radil 2013).  
Additionally, he has examined how religious and political motives that drive 
fundamentalist terrorists can be intertwined and unrestrained by international boundaries 
(Flint 2003; Flint 2005). Flint (2005; Flint and Radil 2013) also provided a geohistorical 
interpretation of David Rapoport’s (2004) classification of modern terrorism into four 
waves.  He suggested that the first wave (1880-1920) of terrorists focused on the scale of 
the nation-state.  The second wave (1920-1960) also focused on the nation-state, but in 
the context of decolonization and a “shared sense of victimhood” between terrorist 
organizations in areas of colonial rule (Flint and Radil 2013, 152).  The third wave (1960-
1990) saw the internationalization of terrorists’ causes enhanced by cross-border 





present) introduced a new religious terrorism with an interest in saving souls, not 
controlling the state’s territory (Juergensmeyer 2003). 
 Finally, Richard Medina and George Hepner (2013) introduced the concept of 
aspirational homelands for terror organizations.  They suggest that controlling geographic 
space is a necessity for survival of the terror group, and that the land(s) these groups 
target for control have historical value or ideological meaning for the cause.  In the case 
of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden envisioned an eventual caliphate spanning the Sunni 
Muslim world (Haynes 2005).  However, he made specific reference to Iraq, Palestine, 
the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt (Medina and Hepner 2013).  These areas 
represent the historical origins of Islam, the currently contested regions surrounding Iraq, 
and the home country of bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  In other words, these 
lands represent al Qaeda’s aspirational geography. 
 This dissertation seeks to further develop the conceptual model of aspirational 
geography by situating reimagined territory at the intersection of place theory and 
geopolitics.  The analysis will show that the place names used by ISIS simultaneously 
create a sense of place, advance the apocalyptic ideology, and legitimize the cause.  
Examining the ways in which a terrorist organization envisions and articulates place 
names reveals the territorial goals.  Knowledge of these territorial goals (which are 
extracted from a group’s communications in any form) is not only a crucial aspect of 
understanding their political objectives, but it could also serve to inform anticipatory 







2.4  Content Analysis 
 Content analysis has been defined as a systematic research method employed to 
generate an objective and quantitative description of the content of textual and other 
forms of communication by reducing large volumes of text into categories (Berelson 
1952; Stemler 2014).  The empirical rigor of content analysis has attracted scholars from 
many fields of research.  It has been applied to a vast range of topics including nutrition 
education messages in the media, Twitter as an information source for journalists, and 
analyzing judicial opinions (Kondracki et al. 2002; Lasorsa et al. 2012; Bruns 2012; Hall 
and Wright 2008).  Content analysis also offers powerful capabilities to researchers in 
any discipline interested in Big Data (Lewis et al. 2013). 
 In today’s research environment content analysis typically involves the use of 
computers to manage and process large amounts of data.  Some scholars, however, have 
found that relying on software alone can miss many of the more nuanced meanings 
within texts (Conway 2006; Linderman 2001; Lewis et al. 2013).  The solution to this 
problem is to employ a hybrid method of content analysis which combines the strengths 
of automated processes to code (or categorize) manifest content with the interpretation 
capabilities of human researchers to code the latent content (Lewis et al. 2013; Sjøvaag 
and Stavelin 2012).     
 Terrorism research has not exploited the method of content analysis to the same 
degree as other disciplines.  Yilu Zhou, Edna Reid, Jialun Qin, Hsinchun Chen, and 
Guanpi Lai (2005) employed content analysis to study the ways in which United States 
domestic extremist groups use the internet to distribute their messages, communicate, 





methods to discover how terrorist organizations based in the Middle East are using the 
internet (Qin et al. 2006).  Another study analyzed web site content of 157 hate groups 
(domestic and international) for ideological messages, links to other groups, 
communication, and similarity to other groups (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003).  To date, no 
scholarly works have attempted a geographic content analysis of terrorist publications.  
This dissertation is the first study to employ this method to a terrorist organization’s 
periodical literature. 
 
2.5  Qualitative GIS Analysis Through 
Cartographic Visualization  
 Sarah Elwood and Meghan Cope (2009, 3) assert that GIS should be understood 
as a fusion of technology, methodology, and “situated social practice.”  This 
conceptualization essentially liberates GIS from the (now fading) stereotype that GIS 
research is rooted in positivism and shackled exclusively to quantitative methodologies 
(Lake 1993).  Since the mid-1990s scholars have demonstrated that GIS is more than a 
tool for positivism or quantitative studies (Sheppard 1995, Schuurman 2000; Kwan 2002; 
Sheppard 2005).  These advancements and innovations created the environment for 
mixed methods research using GIS (Pavlovskaya 2009). 
 Marianna Pavlovskaya (2009, 22) contends that “visualization is arguably the 
most powerful and widely used function in GIS.”  When scholars use a GIS to visualize 
their data, they merge the power of maps with the capabilities of technology to create a 
representation of spatial information which is “immediately accessible” to human minds 
(Pavlovskaya 2009, 22).  A textual list of place names in tabular format cannot produce 





data.  Alan MacEachren (1995) and Elaine Hallisey (2005) each stress the significant 
impact cartographic visualization has on understanding geographic data.  Thus far there 
have been no published studies related to visualizing the ways in which terrorist 
organizations envisage political boundaries.  Using data derived from Dabiq magazine, 
this dissertation will apply qualitative GIS methods to map the reimagined territory of 
ISIS. 
 
2.6  Research on ISIS Through Dabiq  
 At the time this research was initiated, the current iteration of ISIS was less than 
two years old.  Consequently, the body of scholarly research on ISIS is predictably small 
when compared to terrorist organizations with longer histories.  Haroro Ingram (2014) 
published a study on ISIS’s information operations (IO) campaign which is 
multidimensional, uses several platforms, and targets both sympathizers and enemies of 
the organization.  He concludes that the sophistication of ISIS’s IO efforts surpasses other 
terrorist IO campaigns, and this should be a central concern for Western 
counterinsurgency forces which have often failed in their own IO engagements (Ingram 
2014). 
 Harleen Gambhir (2014) provided an overview of the first two issues of Dabiq 
shortly after their release.  Her summary outlined the strategic plan of ISIS as presented 
in the magazine, noting the differences between Dabiq and Inspire (al Qaeda’s 
propaganda magazine).  She concluded that Dabiq is more than propaganda because it 
articulates ISIS’ strategic vision, complete with religious justification for the cause.  In 
another study of Dabiq, David Skillicorn (2015) developed a semantic model to quantify 





language used in the magazines as informative, imaginative, deceptive, jihadist, and 
gamification.  The level of propaganda could then be determined by examining the 
amount of language in each category.  Skillicorn concluded that Dabiq had the smallest  
amount of deception language and scored the highest in the propaganda model. 
 In a final study of note, Anthony Celso (2014) analyzed the world view of ISIS, 
noting the apocalyptic elements of the ideology.  He argued that while the military, state-
building, and economic strategies are rational, the driving ideology is not.  His analysis 
highlighted the connection between hadith (prophetic sayings of Muhammad) and the 
strategic goals of ISIS (Celso 2014).  However, as in the other studies mentioned 
previously, Celso’s focus does not include geography or the geographic elements of ISIS’ 
strategic vision.  This dissertation will connect the places mentioned in hadith (and 
quoted in Dabiq) directly with the ideology of ISIS and demonstrate how using these 
place names reinforces ISIS’s legitimacy as a caliphate and creates a sense of place 
evoking a Muslim homeland within its borders. 
 
2.7  Overview of ISIS 
 The following sections provide an overview of ISIS including its origins as a 
terrorist organization which date to the early 2000s.  ISIS is also discussed in terms of 
characterizing its motivations in one of three categories of terror organizations as outlined 
by Medina and Hepner (2013). The section also briefly examines ISIS’s social, political, 
ideological and geographic goals (which will receive full treatment in Chapter 4).  ISIS’s 
organization, structure, and sources of support are also discussed as an introduction to the 






2.7.1  Introduction to the Islamic State 
 The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham emerged in Iraq amidst a volatile, multi-
group insurgency aimed at destabilizing the fledgling Iraqi government.  However, the 
roots of that organization stretch beyond the war in Iraq.  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 
Jordanian jihadist and convicted criminal, allied himself with Abu Muhammad al 
Maqdisi, whom he met in Afghanistan at the end of the Soviet occupation. Inspired by 
Maqdisi, Zarqawi plotted against Jordan’s government and was imprisoned for his crimes 
(Fishman 2014; Michael 2007). Upon his pardon in 1999, Zarqawi relocated to 
Afghanistan again where he established a group called Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) 
in Herat Province (Hashim 2014; Michael 2007).  It was during this period in 
Afghanistan that Zarqawi became acquainted with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, who 
sent Zarqawi and his group into the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq following the US 
invasion of Afghanistan (Vidino 2006).  Two years later, the Zarqawi-led JTJ emerged as 
one of five major Sunni insurgent groups that rose to prominence in the political vacuum 
created by the deposition of Saddam Hussein (Hashim 2014). 
 After numerous successful terror attacks from 2003 to 2004, Zarqawi formally 
pledged his group’s allegiance to al Qaeda and changed its name to Tanzim Qaidat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or more commonly, al Qaeda in Iraq (Associated Press 2004).  
From that point on the terrorist group operated in Iraq as a branch of al Qaeda.  The 
central leadership of al Qaeda soon grew uncomfortable with Zarqawi’s brutal tactics, 
especially those aimed at fellow Muslims (al-Zawahiri 2005).  His extreme views and 
actions even earned him the nickname of al Gharib (the Stranger) within al Qaeda circles 





Central continued to widen until an American airstrike killed Zarqawi in June of 2006 
(Burns 2006).  The new leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayub al-Masri and Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi changed the name of the group again to Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), but failed 
to gain any traction with the Sunni population in northern and western Iraq.   
By 2010, ISI’s message fell on deaf ears in the Sunni areas of Iraq, and most of its 
leaders were either dead or in hiding.  In April of that year, a joint Iraqi-US attack killed 
al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, leaving the terrorist group in shambles and without clear 
successors to the fallen leaders (Ibrahim 2010).  However, a series of regional and local 
events and circumstances set the ideal conditions for a rebirth and rebranding of ISI’s 
ideology.  The Syrian civil war and (former Iraqi President) Maliki’s discriminatory 
governmental policies combined to form the perfect breeding ground for ISI’s revamped 
pro-Sunni message in the politically marginalized, poor, Sunni-majority areas of northern 
and western Iraq and northern Syria (Hashim 2014; Ingram 2014).  The new (and also 
current) leader of ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was reportedly radicalized while being held 
in the US Army’s Camp Bucca prison from February to December 2004.   Drawing on 
his acquaintances and connections made inside the prison, al Baghdadi rose through the 
ranks to the top of ISI (Nevins 2015).  With strategic goals in mind, al Baghdadi 
redesigned the organizational structure of ISI and proposed an alliance with the Syrian 
jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).  He then declared himself the rightful caliph 
(successor of Mohammad) of the newly formed Islamic State under the name of ISIS on 
June 29, 2014 (al-Tamimi 2014; al-Baghdadi 2014). 
Despite the growing list of atrocities committed by the ISIS fighters, the 





the group’s relatively brief history.  In his first speech, al-Baghdadi claimed the title of 
caliph, denounced all Muslim governments, and announced the caliphate’s intent to 
conquer the world (Wood 2015; al-Baghdadi 2014).  The fact that the vast majority of 
Muslims in the world reject the theology of ISIS is, for the moment, irrelevant.  The 
disenfranchised Sunni populations of Syria and Iraq tolerate, and in some cases, 
champion ISIS. Moreover, a breathtaking number of foreigners (at least 20,000) have 
flocked to either join the armed ranks or find religious salvation within the borders of the 
caliphate (Berlinger 2015).  With an apocalyptic agenda, the perfect climate of political 
unrest, and an ever-flowing stream of new recruits, an unopposed ISIS could be poised to 
take over a large portion of the Middle East in a relatively short amount of time.  
Understanding the origins, structure, systems of support, and goals of ISIS is an essential 
element in crafting an effective response which not only ends ISIS, but also ends the 
conditions which made ISIS’ rise to power possible. 
 
2.7.2  Defining ISIS and its Goals 
 There are three general categories which define the motivations of terror groups 
(Medina and Hepner 2013).  ISIS falls squarely within the cultural/religious category of 
terrorist organizations. It has clearly stated short-term and long-term religious goals.  It 
has a central religious authority figure (al-Baghdadi) who demands strict allegiance to the 
caliphate.  Born from the ideological heritage of al Qaeda, ISIS’s roots are firmly 
anchored in the Salafi-jihadist brand of the more broad and nuanced Salafist approach to 
Islam, which calls for a strict interpretation of the Koran and hadith, as well as a return to 
the “pure” form of Islam practiced precisely as the adherents did during the days of 





wide, however, including a range of manifestations from purists who believe in changing 
individuals through peaceful education to jihadists who believe in enforcing their outlook 
with the sword (Wiktorowicz 2006, Stemmann 2006).   
ISIS’s version of Salafi-jihadism positions the West as the source of conflict in 
the Muslim world.  For ISIS, the West promulgates violence against Islam and prevents 
Muslims from practicing their religion in its purest form.  This theological message 
appeals to some of the politically disenfranchised Sunnis in Iraq and Syria who witness 
daily the effects of this violence. Thus, the establishment of a legitimate caliphate could, 
in time, provide a Muslim identity and homeland for the devoutly religious across the 
globe.  ISIS also has enjoyed tacit acceptance (and in many areas, open support) from the 
Sunni peoples of northern and western Iraq and northern Syria.  This community support 
for ISIS’s ideology is also spreading to volatile areas such as Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and 
Egypt (Lefevre 2014; Khachaneh 2015). 
 Over the course of several years, ISIS has plainly articulated its social and 
political goals. First, the group seeks to eradicate the occupying armies of Iraq and 
establish governance in both Iraq and Syria (Lewis 2013).  This governance necessarily 
includes the declaration of a caliphate and the establishment of Sharia law in the occupied 
territories (Figure 2.1).  The next step is to overtake apostate sectarian governments in all 
Muslim lands in preparation for the destruction of the earth (by Allah) that coincides with 
ISIS’s version of the apocalypse. Along the way, ISIS intends to fight against the army of 
Rome (Christians) at Dabiq, Syria to fulfill the prophecies laid out in the hadith, which 
also articulate the conquests of Constantinople (sic) and Rome following the massive 










reflected in the slogan “remaining and expanding” which appears frequently in the pages 
of Dabiq.  Along the way, ISIS plans to spread monotheism and cleanse the earth of 
polytheism by converting, subjugating, or killing all nonbelievers.  These goals are 
intermediate steps which ISIS views as required precursors of the impending 
apocalypse—an event it hopes to usher in through its actions and its enemies’ actions 
which are intentionally provoked from among the nations of unbelievers (Wood 2015).  
 An indispensable component common to each of these goals is al-Baghdadi’s 
aspirational geography.  The self-anointed caliph cannot maintain legitimacy as ruler of 





and maintaining control in Syria and Iraq.  When these areas have been (relatively) 
stabilized under ISIS control, the caliphate will seek to enlarge its geographic footprint to 
include all Muslim nations.  The recent ISIS activity in Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and 
Afghanistan demonstrate ISIS’s progress in realizing its geographic goals. When ISIS 
unites the Muslim world under its black banner, the caliphate will attempt to hoist its 
standard over Constantinople (Istanbul) and Rome (Dabiq Issue #4).   
For ISIS, short-term victory may be defined as maintaining and expanding the 
caliphate first in Syria and Iraq, then drawing in the army of “Rome” (which according to 
ISIS means the Christians of Europe and their colonies) to defeat the unbelievers at 
Dabiq, Syria in fulfilment of an apocalyptic hadith (Wood 2015; Celso 2014).  The defeat 
of the infidels at Dabiq would then set the stage for ISIS’s long-term victory:  to expand 
the caliphate to the entire Muslim world in preparation of Allah’s cleansing of the earth.  
Although the last two stages of ISIS’s geographic expansion plan certainly seem 
unattainable in the current geopolitical climate, the group was able to expand its control 
in Iraq and Syria relatively quickly, and several countries in the Middle East (Lebanon, 
Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, and possibly Saudi Arabia) are ripe for further expansion 
(Stansfield 2014). 
 
2.7.3  ISIS: Organization, Structure, and 
Sources of Support 
Opposing the recent trend of decentralized organizational structures of terrorist 
factions, ISIS maintains a centralized, hierarchical structure with al-Baghdadi at the head.  
Directly under him (yet still considered the highest level), a council of advisors acts in 





believed that al-Baghdadi had two deputies, Abu Ali al-Anbari (also known as 
Abdulrahman Mustafa al-Qaduli) and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who governed all 
administrative affairs of Syria and Iraq, respectively (Thompson and Shubert 2015).  
However, both men were killed and presumably replaced by March 2016, but their 
successors in those positions are unknown (Schmidt and Mazzetti 2016).  Directly under 
this level are the three elements of ISIS’s first echelon: the Shura Council, the Military 
Council, and the Security and Intelligence Council.  The Shura Council is composed of 
al-Baghdadi and his deputies as well as an additional nine to eleven other voting 
members, who, in theory, can remove the caliph from power if he fails to uphold his 
sacred duties.  This council is second in authority.   
The Military Council includes a head and three additional members.  This body 
directly oversees the Iraqi commanders of the ISIS combat battalions.  Although the 
commanders enjoy some regional autonomy, the Military Council does not act without 
approval from the Shura Council and al-Baghdadi (Thompson and Shubert 2015).  
Equally important is the Security and Intelligence Council.  This organization is 
composed of an unknown number of former military and intelligence officials of the 
Hussein regime.  They are responsible for a wide range of duties including the personal 
security of the caliph, compliance with law, communication, carrying out sentencing 
(e.g., executions, fines, etc.) and counterintelligence (Hashim 2014).  Under this first 
echelon of command there are several second-tier entities including the Finance Council, 
Leadership Council, Legal Council, and Foreign Fighter Assistance Council (Thompson 
and Shubert 2015).  The most influential second-tier organization is the finances entity, 





2014).  To date this organizational structure has enabled ISIS to establish and maintain 
governance in Iraq and Syria, finance a two-front war, bolster its ranks through 
international recruiting, and repel military pressure from Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), and competing Syrian rebel factions.  While this hierarchical organization 
was instrumental in achieving initial success, financing the establishment of the caliphate 
was no less important. 
 Initially ISIS gained funds by kidnapping (ransom), robbing banks, and charging 
tolls, fees, and taxes along roads in areas it controlled.  Now with a greatly expanded 
geographic presence, ISIS controls oil fields in Syria, operates a broad network of 
extortion across Syria and Iraq, and collects donations from private citizens across the 
Middle East (al-Tamimi 2014).  Currently, the vast majority of ISIS funding comes from 
selling/smuggling oil from occupied fields in Syria and Iraq for as little as $25 per barrel 
at the Turkish border.  Some US government estimates place the income at $1 million per 
day (Windrem 2014).  To supplement the oil income, ISIS receives relatively small but 
consistent individual contributions from wealthy Sunni Arabs in the region, mostly from 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Windrem 2014).  Perhaps most 
interestingly, ISIS has successfully levied taxes on the populations which it controls 
(Shapiro and Jung 2014). This development demonstrates that ISIS has obtained state-
like powers of taxation, and it provides services (security, health care, housing, etc.) in 
return for taxation.  As long as the occupied population continues to pay taxes, ISIS will 
enjoy at least some capacity to finance the operations of the state, even if it cannot 
expand its military operations into new territory.  





anti-Sunni policies of the Maliki administration in Iraq, and the waning influence of al 
Qaeda under Zawahiri’s leadership. The convergence of these dynamics left fertile 
recruiting grounds in their wake. Initially the recruits came from the disenfranchised 
Sunni populations of politically and economically neglected areas of Syria and Iraq. 
Former Hussein regime officials who were seeking a return to authority were also drawn 
to ISIS. With the declaration of the caliphate, recruits have been streaming in from all 
over the world.  An estimated 20,000 foreign fighters have joined the ranks, hailing from 
90 countries, and 3,400 of those combatants came from the West.  Tunisia boasts the 
highest contribution of more than 3,000 fighters (Berlinger 2015).  To reach this wide 
foreign audience, ISIS exploited various social media outlets such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and Diaspora through its media wing, Al Hayat.  In less than one year ISIS also published 
ten digital issues of its official magazine, Dabiq, which shares news, theology, and 
messages from important Islamist scholars in several languages (Ingram 2014).  Released 
in July 2014, the first issue called for all faithful Muslims to assemble in the newly 
announced caliphate.  A crucial aspect of ISIS’ ability to recruit and receive new 
followers is the composition of its support community. 
ISIS rose from the ashes in the poor, politically marginalized Sunni minority areas 
of Syria and Iraq.  For those people who had been ignored by Assad and Maliki, the 
promises of free housing, education for their children, free healthcare in the communities, 
and low-cost bread were very attractive (al-Tamimi 2014).  These state-building efforts 
of ISIS show al-Baghdadi’s ability to adapt and learn, as the earlier versions of ISIS 
seeing the downfall of the United States, Shiite regimes, and Israel also comprise failed to 





beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq.  Affluent foreign investors interested in seeing the 
downfall of the United States, Shiite regimes, and Israel also comprise the greater 
community of support for ISIS.  These foreign communities have been instrumental in 
both recruiting and financing, but the real power base remains amongst the 
disenfranchised Sunni poor across the Middle East.  The ongoing civil war in Libya has 
created conditions favorable to the expansion of the ISIS movement in North Africa. 
Similar situations exist in Yemen, Egypt, and Algeria. The common ingredients of 
poverty, marginalization, and political instability allow ISIS to gain leverage in Sunni 
communities from North Africa to Afghanistan. 
Also included in its community of support are the terrorist organizations affiliated 
with ISIS.  To date more than 35 jihadi organizations from Algeria, Sudan, Philippines, 
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Russia, and Lebanon (Figure 2.2) have pledged 
their allegiance to or announced their support for al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State 
(IntelCenter  2015).  (Note: Figure 2.2 shows only countries which house terrorist groups 
which are sympathetic to ISIS, and should not be interpreted as the territorial expanse or 
influence of those groups.) The most notable of these is Boko Haram, a Nigerian terrorist 
organization whose brutality rivals that of ISIS.  A long time al Qaeda affiliate, Boko 
Haram is responsible for thousands of deaths in Nigeria and neighboring countries, and 
poses a significant regional threat to stability (Giroux and Gilpin 2014).  The recent 
alliance between ISIS and Boko Haram affords ISIS another foothold in Africa while 
potentially giving Boko Haram access to additional resources and training to be even 



















































province when Abubakar Shekau pledged his group’s allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 
(Zenn 2016).   
Declaring provinces outside of ISIS’s direct area of control has become standard 
practice for the terror group.  According to the Institute for the Study of War, ISIS has 
declared provinces in Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and in the Russian republics in the Caucasus Region in addition to the 
provinces which it controls within Syria and Iraq (Gambhir 2016). By means of an 
expanding international network of support, defending its territory in Iraq and Syria, and 
declaring provinces abroad, ISIS legitimizes its caliphate as it eclipses al Qaeda as the 
leading global jihadist group (Lister 2014). 
 
2.7.4 Conclusion 
 ISIS is a cultural/religious terrorist group with clearly defined goals, a potentially 
steady source of income, and a Salafi-jihadist ideological appeal to disenfranchised Sunni 
Muslims. Through brutal terror attacks ISIS has gained control over significant portions 
of Iraq and Syria.  The group’s geographic goals include gaining control over all Muslim 
nations and eventual expansion to rule the world under Sharia law as administered by the 
caliph.  The threat posed by ISIS is real, but if ISIS controls no territory, its cause loses 
legitimacy as a viable caliphate.  However, if ISIS can garner support in areas outside of 
its current span of geographic control, it can maintain the appearance of “remaining and 











 The overarching research objective is to develop the new theoretical concept of 
reimagined territory which can be applied to the study of any terrorist or other extremist 
organization.  In order to demonstrate the analytical power of reimagined territory, a case 
study of ISIS’s propaganda publication, Dabiq, is presented.  Two methodological 
approaches are used to extract place names data and cartographically visualize ISIS’s 
agenda.  First, content analysis methods (computerized and manual) are used to process 
the text of the magazine, sort and categorize the individual terms, extract the geographic 
place names, and categorize the place names into one of four scale categories.  Second, 
qualitative GIS methods are employed to map the results for further analysis.  Finally, 
utilizing the results of the two previous methods, narrative analysis is applied to link the 
place names used by ISIS to its ideological goals.  Figure 3.1 depicts a conceptual flow 
chart of the analytical processes of this research.  When the analysis of Dabiq is 
complete, the methods and analytical processes are applied to a sample of al Qaeda’s 
Inspire magazine to validate the conceptual model of reimagined territory. 
 Four objectives guide this study designed to advance the theoretical concept of 
reimagined territory.  As outlined in the introduction, the research: 
(1) analyzes the content of the first ten issues of Dabiq magazine for place names, 






Figure 3.1 Conceptual flowchart of reimagined territories 
 
(2) visualizes the data by applying qualitative GIS techniques to choropleth and 
proportional symbol mapping; 
(3) analyzes ISIS’s conceptualization of current political borders and future 
political borders via narrative analysis based on the results of the content analysis; 
(4) develops and positions the theoretical concept of reimagined territory at the 
intersection of geopolitics and theories of space and place. 
Figure 3.2 provides a visual overview of the objectives and the methodologies 
which support the achievement of each objective.  The tools and techniques associated 
with each method are also listed in Figure 3.2.  The objectives and methods are discussed 
in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Section 3.1 provides an overview of the data used in this analysis.  This section 
also includes a discussion of the steps that were taken to prepare the data for the 






Figure 3.2 Methodology flowchart 
 
this study.  This process includes both computer-aided and manual content analysis.  
Section 3.3 discusses the process of visualizing the data extracted from the magazine 
issues via qualitative GIS techniques.  A description of the mapping tools and the steps 
required to generate the maps is included in the discussion.  Section 3.4 outlines the 
process of narrative analysis which investigates the historical and theological contexts of 
place names in the magazine issues in order to further understand the ideology of the 
terrorist organization.  Lastly, Section 3.5 positions the theoretical concept of reimagined 
territories amidst three geographic theories of place, the concept of a global balance of 
power, and McColl’s (1969) theory of national insurgencies.  A case study of Dabiq 
magazine provides the empirical example which can be applied to other terrorist 





3.1  Data 
 The primary data source for this dissertation is Dabiq magazine, published 
electronically by Al Hayat, the media wing of ISIS.   Although the production location 
and method of distribution are unknown, several unaffiliated websites maintain copies of 
the magazine issues in Portable Document Format (.pdf) after ISIS releases them to the 
public.  The Clarion Project (www.clarionproject.org), a nonprofit organization (based in 
Washington, DC) dedicated to studying Islamic extremism, is the source of all the Dabiq 
issues utilized in this study.  Table 3.1 summarizes the publication information for the 
first ten issues of Dabiq. 
To prepare the magazine issues for processing in R, the files are first converted 
from .pdf format to Plain Text File (.txt) format.  This is accomplished in Adobe Acrobat 
Reader using the “Save As Other” function which allows the user to save a file in plain 
text format.  Both versions of each issue are saved for future analysis.  The .pdf files are 
used for the manual coding portion of the content analysis and the .txt files are used for  
 
Table 3.1 
Issues of Dabiq Magazine 
Issue  Hijri (Islamic) Date Gregorian Date Length (pages) 
1 Ramadan 1435 July 2014 50 
2 Ramadan 1435 July 2014 44 
3 Shawwal 1435 August 2014 42 
4 Dhul-Hijjah 1435 October 2014 56 
5 Muharram 1436 November 2014 40 
6 Rabi' Al-Awwal 1436 January 2015 63 
7 Rabi'Al-Akhir 1436 February 2015 83 
8 Jumada al-Akhirah 1436 March 2015 68 
9 Sha'ban 1436 May 2015 79 






the computer-aided coding.  To accommodate the computer-aided coding in R, several 
adjustments to the .txt files are necessary to ensure the most accurate results. 
 A test run was conducted with no adjustments to the .txt files in which they were 
imported into R and coded by individual terms.  Several problems arose with Romanized 
characters and punctuation.  For example, sometimes “Dabiq” appears in the text spelled 
with an “a” for the first vowel sound.  In other places in the same magazine, the word is 
spelled “Dābiq” with the special character, “ā.”  When coded in R, the software 
recognizes each version of Dabiq as a unique result, thereby creating two entries for the 
same word.  This occurs anytime a special character is used in place of a standard letter.  
Additionally, words that were immediately adjacent to parentheses, brackets, or curly 
brackets were also counted as unique entries, as R recognized the punctuation mark as a 
standard letter.  As a result, it is necessary to change and/or remove the symbols and 
punctuation marks that cause conflicts in word recognition. 
 In order to alleviate the special character and punctuation discrepancies, the 
following procedure is applied to each issue of the magazine.  First, the text file is opened 
in Microsoft Notepad.  Next, the “Replace” function from the “Edit” menu is opened, and 
the first symbol is copied in the Replace window.  For all special characters that are 
letters (e.g., ā, ī, ū), the standard letter (e.g., a, i, u) replaces the special letters using the 
“Replace All” function.  The parentheses, brackets, and curly brackets are simply deleted 
and the space which that character occupies is also deleted.  This is accomplished by 
leaving the “Replace With” option blank.  The en-dashes and hyphens are replaced with a 
blank space to ensure that adjacent words do not become conjoined.  The special 





space.  All other punctuation marks (periods, commas, question marks, exclamation 
points, etc.) remain at this stage of the processing, as R recognizes and removes them 
during the computer-aided coding procedure.  After each character is replaced, the 
updated .txt file is saved for further processing.  Table 3.2 shows each character or 
punctuation mark requiring adjustment from the original text. 
 
3.2  Content Analysis 
 A combination of computer-aided and manual content analysis is employed in this 
research.  The computer-aided content analysis allows for large amounts of data to be 
condensed quickly and efficiently.  In this study, each magazine issue is processed and 
sorted into individual words (terms) and their frequencies via a process described 
hereafter.  To check for context, however, this research employs manual content analysis.  
Moreover, unknown terms and their contexts are discovered during the manual 
verification steps which are also described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 3.2 
Adjustments to special characters and punctuation marks 
Character or Punctuation Mark Adjustment 
ā Replaced with “a” 
ī Replaced with “i” 
ū Replaced with “u” 
( ) Replaced with blank space 
[ ] Replaced with blank space 
{ } Replaced with blank space 
“  Removed (no space added) 
‘ Removed (no space added) 
’ Removed (no space added) 
- Replaced with blank space 
– Replaced with blank space 






 The computer-aided content analysis is powered by the text mining package (tm) 
in R.  In addition to the tm package, three supplementary packages are also required for 
the content analysis in R: RColorBrewer, which provides enhanced graphic options; 
wordcloud, which operates the term cloud functions; and SnowballC, which implements 
the word stemming algorithm used in creating the term list for each document.  Each 
package (tm, RColorBrewer, wordcloud, and SnowballC) is loaded in R prior to 
performing any text mining functions.  Appendix A lists the R code utilized in this study. 
  As previously mentioned, each magazine issue is converted to Plain Text Format.  
A separate folder is created for each text file and given the name of the corresponding 
issue (e.g., the “Issue 1” folder contains only one file: islamic-state-Dabiq1.txt).  This 
separation is necessary because all files stored in a folder would be combined into a 
single corpus (object which stores a text document) in R.  To examine the place names 
issue by issue the respective corpora must remain separate objects in R.  However, to 
examine the first ten issues as a single entity, all issues of Dabiq are also copied and 
stored in a single folder and imported into a single corpus in R. 
 After reading the first magazine issue into R as a corpus, the processing begins by 
running a function to remove all numbers from the text.  This function removes number 
symbols from the text as a means of condensing and decluttering the corpus.  If a number 
is spelled out, it remains in the text as a term with an associated frequency.  The next 
processing function is designed to remove all punctuation from the text.  Leaving the 
punctuation as part of the text would cause issues with term frequency.  For example, R 
would consider the words “crusader” and “crusader,” as separate terms since one has an 





 Next all white space is removed from the body of the text.  White spaces are any 
blank spaces before and after words.  This process is necessary for the same reason that 
punctuation marks are removed—to reduce duplicate entries and improve accuracy.  
Following this procedure, all remaining text in the corpus is converted to lower case 
letters only.  This also prevents duplicate entries based on capitalization differences such 
as “Iraq” and “IRAQ.”   These occur frequently in different features of the magazine such 
as titles, captions, and lettering as part of images or nontextual graphics.  
The corpus is now prepared for the final few adjustments prior to sorting the terms.  Next, 
all stop words are removed from the text.  Stop words are natural language terms that 
occur frequently throughout text such as “the,” “and,” “or,” “an,” etc.  Removing the stop 
words allows for faster computation times and it reduces the clutter in the final term list.  
No geographic place names are included in the stop words list, thus ensuring that no 
relevant terms are inadvertently discarded during this process.  Lastly, the stemming 
process collapses words to their stems such that “walks,” “walked,” and “walking” are all 
stemmed to “walk” in the final body of text.  This process allows for a more accurate 
count of term usage throughout the document.  As no place names can be reduced to a 
stem, this process has no effect on the geographic terms. 
After all text preparation processes run their courses, R converts the text into a 
Term Document Matrix, which lists the terms as rows of a matrix and the documents as 
columns of a matrix.  In each individual issue’s case, there is only one document, 
resulting in a matrix with a single column and many rows.  Various data exploration 
techniques are now applied to the matrix, such as querying the most frequent terms and 






Figure 3.3 Sample word cloud of Issue #1 
 
the first issue of Dabiq.  The frequency is depicted by font size and color, with the largest 
font equating to the highest frequency of occurrence.  In the above sample, the minimum 
frequency is set to 15, which means that only terms appearing 15 times or more in the 
text appear in the visual output.  The term cloud presents vast amounts of data—in this 
case an entire magazine issue—in a simple, intuitive format which is an effective way to 
explore data visually.  Finally, the term document matrix is exported in Comma 
Separated Values (.csv) file format for further analysis in Microsoft Excel. 
 The entire process of reading in a text file, processing and adjusting the text, 
creating a term document matrix, and exporting a .csv file applies to each issue of the 
magazine.  The results yield ten .csv files which become the data input for the manual 
content analysis.  In order to view usage of place names over the entire body of text 
which spans ten issues, a single corpus containing all ten issues is created.  The same 





corpus draws all ten text files from a single directory and stores them together in one 
object in R.  This corpus is then processed exactly like the other corpora as previously 
outlined.  After all numbers, punctuation, white space, and stop words are removed, and 
all terms are converted to lower case, the term document matrix is created.  Annex B 
contains the code for these operations.   
A .csv file for the entire body of text could also be generated and exported if 
required, but examining the terms by issue is more efficient and provides frequencies by 
issue as opposed to a single value for total number of occurrences.  Therefore, in this 
study only the individual issue matrices are exported for manual content analysis.  Using 
the all-issues matrix, place name frequency bar plots (using issue numbers as marks along 
the x-axis) are generated and exported as images.  As an alternative, bar plots can also be 
produced in Microsoft Excel using the frequency data from R.  Figure 3.4 displays a 
frequency bar plot for “Iraq” as it occurs in each issue. 
 
 

































 After the computer-aided content analysis is completed, the manual content 
analysis begins by opening the first .csv file in Microsoft Excel and saving it as a 
worksheet (.xlsx) file format.  This change in format allows for full functionality in 
Microsoft Excel.  A second spreadsheet (PlaceNames.xlsx) is required to store all 
manually extracted place names.  This spreadsheet records the place names and 
frequencies by issue number.  In addition to the ten issue columns, the spreadsheet also 
stores the place names in one of four categories based on geopolitical division and 
geographic scale.  The largest scale category is region, defined by entities including more 
than one political state (or parts of more than one state), entire continents, seas, or rivers.  
The next scale category is country, defined by a single political state (regardless of 
physical size) in the current geopolitical environment.  The next category is 
province/state, defined by either a subnational administrative division such as provinces, 
states, districts, and governates or an area within a given country’s territory.  The final 
category is city, defined by cities, battle sites, specific mountain peaks, or other point 
place names.  There is also a total place names column that sums the place names and 
frequencies from the ten issue columns, combining the ten frequencies for a single total 
value.   
With the proper file structure in place, the manual extraction of place names from 
the issue matrices ensues.  The terms are sorted by highest frequency first, then 
alphabetically in the output files from R.  Each term is read and evaluated.  If the term is 
a geographic place name, the term and its frequency are copied and pasted into the 
PlaceNames spreadsheet under the corresponding issue column.  In the output 





signify the name has been copied to the master list, and to provide ease of finding the 
term again.  When the manual coding is complete for a single issue, the place names 
extracted from that issue are then copied into their appropriate category column in the 
master spreadsheet.  The frequency numbers in these columns are a running total for each 
place listed.  The names and frequencies are also added to the master place name list 
(sorted by total frequency, not by category) in the PlaceNames spreadsheet.  When the 
matrices from all issues are manually coded, the final results are tallied in the master 
place list and the results are compared to the four category columns to check for accuracy 
in the frequency totals for each place name.     
In each issue of Dabiq, many words appear which are not translated into English, 
but appear in the context of an English sentence.  For example, the phrase listed after 
each use of Muhammad’s name (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam, which means peace be 
upon him) remains in Romanized Arabic throughout the text of each issue.  (Later issues 
began to use the symbol representing “peace be upon him” instead of spelling out the 
phrase).  Other examples include bayah (pledge of spiritual allegiance) and taghut (to 
rebel).  Because numerous Arabic words occur in each issue, it is necessary to check each 
term in its sentence context to determine the English meaning, and whether or not the 
word is a place name.  Many of the terms are defined in the text by stating the English 
meaning in parentheses following the Arabic word.  Those which are not defined in the 
text are easily defined using an online Arabic-English dictionary.  The most important 
distinction lies in determining if an Arabic word is a place name or not.  This is easily 
determined by manually inspecting each term in the original .pdf file.  Because the 





term is obviously a place name or not.  As an integral part of the manual coding process, 
each nonplace name definition is recorded with the corresponding Arabic term in the 
Arabic dictionary.  It should be noted that if this dictionary were to be used for other 
purposes, the translation of each term would need to be verified by an Arabic specialist.  
Furthermore, because of the differing methods of Romanization, the spellings of 
Arabic place names vary, even within the same issue.  Each spelling is researched in an 
effort to capture all place names.  Although the term document matrix records different 
spellings as separate terms, the manual content analysis ensures that multiple spellings 
are grouped under a single place name.  One example of this phenomenon is the Syrian 
city of Raqqa.  In some places Dabiq spells the city “Raqqa” and in other places it 
appears as “Raqqah.”  As a quality control measure, every Arabic place name therefore is 
searched in the original .pdf file to verify usage and context. 
Manual content analysis is also very valuable in identifying places that have more 
than one name, such as the United States of America.  Dabiq refers to the “United States 
of America,” “United States,” “America,” “USA,” and “US,” all of which appear as 
distinct terms in the R output files.  Manual content analysis compensates for this 
discrepancy by combining multiple terms into a single place name in the PlaceNames 
spreadsheet.  Some place-names, however, are not combined even though they refer to 
the same absolute location.  An example of this is the use of both “Afghanistan” and 
“Khurasan” in Dabiq.  Although each refers to roughly the same place, the term 
“Khurasan” refers to an area that includes more than Afghanistan, and has an ideological 





phenomenon is an integral element of reimagined territory and is analyzed in depth in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Another benefit of manual content analysis is the ability to discern meanings of 
place names by context.  For example, the computer recognizes “Washington” as a single 
term, when in context it may refer to two different places.  Manual coding allows the 
researcher to validate the term in context to determine if “Washington” refers to the 
capital city of the United States, or if it refers the US state in the Pacific Northwest.  This 
example underscores the necessity of manual coding in order to preserve empirical rigor 
in the study.   
At the end of the manual content analysis, every term from all ten issues is 
verified, and all place names are tallied and categorized in the master spreadsheet.  The 
combination of computer-aided and manual content analysis ensures that all place names 
are captured, proper context is substantiated, and duplicate references are combined.  
Because this content analysis considers every word of every issue of Dabiq, the problem 
of possible sample bias has been eliminated.  The ten issues of the magazine are the 
entire body of work, not a sample.  Furthermore, this approach can easily be duplicated 
by using the issues of Dabiq and the R code provided in Appendices A and B. 
 
3.3  Qualitative GIS 
 The next phase of analysis is the cartographic visualization of the results of the 
content analysis.  As previously stated, the place names are categorized in one of four 
scale categories: regions, countries, provinces/states, or cities.  Maps are generated for 
each of the categories.  The Global Administrative Area (GADM) administrative 





layers.  Natural Earth’s (naturalearthdata.com) “Gray Earth” and “Ocean” shapefiles are 
combined to form the background image for the final versions of each map created.  A 
geodatabase with the WGS 1984 geographic coordinate system is created to store the 
feature classes and other map layers. 
The regions category is the first to be mapped.  The world country administrative 
boundaries shapefile is loaded into ArcMap.  The countries included in a given region are 
selected using the “Select” tool, then exported as a feature class and added to the map.  
For example, “Arabian Peninsula” appears in the text of Dabiq.  For this region, all 
countries on the peninsula are selected and exported as the Arabian Peninsula feature 
class.  For the purposes of this study, references to entire continents are included in the 
regions category.  When all regions from the PlaceNames spreadsheet are built in this 
manner, the resulting shapefiles are merged using ArcMap’s “Merge” function, creating a 
single regions feature class.   
Some of the place names occurring in Dabiq, however, are antiquated references 
which refer to historical places or boundaries which have either changed or no longer 
exist in the current geopolitical environment.  The previously mentioned term 
“Khurasan” is one example.  This historical region included areas of modern-day 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  In 
such cases, the spatial data are digitized in ArcMap from .jpg images of existing 
historical maps.  In other cases, Dabiq may refer to cultural regions which do not enjoy 
political autonomy in the current nation-state system.  One example is Kurdistan, a 
cultural region that includes areas of Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.  For these cases, 





digitized, they are combined with the other regions into a single feature class.  Finally, a 
frequency field is added to the regions feature class and the frequency totals from the 
PlaceNames spreadsheet are assigned to their corresponding polygons.  Graduated colors 
are used to display the frequency results. 
A similar process is used to compile the countries feature class. Once again, the 
world country administrative boundaries shapefile is loaded into ArcMap.  The country 
names from the PlaceNames spreadsheet are selected and exported as a feature class, then 
added to the map.  In the new countries feature class, a field is added to store the 
frequencies.  The same graduated colors are used to display the country place name 
frequency results. 
Province and state place names require a different administrative boundaries base 
shapefile from that used for the regions and countries maps.  For this step, the global 
administrative boundaries (district level) shapefile is loaded into ArcMap.  Next, the 
select function is used to highlight all districts (or similar subnational divisions) occurring 
in the text of the magazine.  The selection is then exported as a feature class.  A 
frequency field is added to the feature class data table and the corresponding frequency 
numbers are entered from the PlaceNames spreadsheet.  Once again, the same graduated 
colors are used to display the province name frequency results. 
The city place names data are treated differently in this study.  A new spreadsheet 
is created to record the city name, X-Y coordinates, and the frequency of occurrence.  
The city names are imported from the finalized version of the PlaceNames spreadsheet.  
The coordinates for the city place names are verified in and retrieved from Google Maps 





new city spreadsheet.  Finally, the frequency values from the PlaceNames spreadsheet are 
copied into the city spreadsheet.  The new city spreadsheet is then saved as a .csv file and 
converted into a geodatabase table using ArcMap’s “Table to Table” conversion tool.  
The new geodatabase table is then added to the map and X-Y data are displayed.    
Finally, the data are exported as a feature class with WGS 1984 coordinates and added to 
the map.  In this case, graduated symbols display the difference in city place name 
frequencies. 
The resulting maps of place names at four geographic scales present the spatial 
data extracted from Dabiq in a visual format that is immediately intelligible to the 
viewer.  The cartographic visualization of the data informs the narrative analysis of 
ISIS’s ideology and conceptualization of current political borders, future borders, and 
goals. 
 
3.4  Narrative Analysis 
 After all place names are extracted from the pages of Dabiq and cartographically 
visualized on a series of maps, the narrative analysis can proceed.  Traditionally, methods 
of narrative analysis have focused on studying the five elements of a story’s structure: 
setting, characters, events, problems, and resolution (Kwan and Ding 2008).  Other 
approaches have analyzed the theme of narrative as a way of understanding the story of a 
people (Creswell 2012).  Clandinin and Connelly (1999), however, developed a 
geographic approach to narrative analysis that informs this dissertation’s approach to 
interpreting the results of the content analysis.  They suggest that narratives should be 
analyzed for three elements: action/interaction, time, and space.  The action/interaction 





present, and future.  The space element includes the physical places of the narrative 
(Clandinin and Connelly 1999). 
 In the case of this study, the narrative is a combination of the message of Dabiq 
and the story told by the place names used by ISIS.  To uncover this narrative’s meaning, 
the place names (space) need to be viewed in terms of their corresponding elements of 
actions/interactions and time.   The analysis examines who is acting or interacting at a 
given location mentioned in Dabiq.  References to past, present, or future places are 
examined in their context of the magazine and compared to historical places and future 
(prophetic) places of Islam.  Thus, understanding who is acting where in which context 
allows a researcher to analyze the overarching narrative of all the place names in each of 
the magazine issues and how they relate to ISIS’s apocalyptic ideology and agenda for 









Narrative analysis represents the final step in the analytical process.  This step 
relies on multiple data inputs from the previous stages of the analysis.  Table 3.3 shows 
each method, the input required for that method, and the data output as a result of the 
application of the method.  The computer-aided content analysis method takes the 
magazine issues and coverts the text to a term document matrix.  This matrix becomes the 
input data for the manual content analysis method, which transforms the raw term 
document matrix into a categorized list of place names by checking the context of the 
terms.  The next analysis step, cartographic visualization, maps the results of the manual 
content analysis.  The narrative analysis then examines the original text, the categorized 
list of place names, and the mapped results to articulate a cartographically visualized 
conceptualization of political borders viewed in historical and theological contexts—the 
terrorist group’s reimagined territories.  
At this stage of analysis, it is necessary to examine three former empires which 
provide historical context to the expansion of an Islamic caliphate.  The historical place 
 
Table 3.3 
Narrative analysis data inputs 
Method Input Output 
Content Analysis 
(computer) 




Term document matrix; 
magazine issues 




List of place names Categorized maps 
Narrative Analysis List of place names; 
categorized maps; magazine 








names of Dabiq are compared to their original historical settings which span the 
Rashidun Caliphate (632-661 CE), the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 CE) and the 
Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 CE) (Bishai 1968; Belyayev 1969; Hawting 2000).  The 
place names from these times and circumstances provide valuable insight into the 
geopolitical aspirations of ISIS.  Thus, the results of the narrative analysis yield a 
reimagined territory in which the place names of Dabiq (in their dual historical-modern 
context) are simultaneously the way in which ISIS views the world and the way it wants 
the world to be viewed in the future.   It is a futuristic vision based on prophetic sayings 
rooted in an idealized past.   
 
3.5  Reimagined Territory’s Place in 
Geographic Theories of Place 
 This dissertation proposes the new theoretical concept of reimagined territory as 
an analytical approach to the ways in which terrorists conceptualize current political 
borders and geographic goals (future borders).  These conceptualizations both advance 
and reinforce the organization’s ideology by creating a specific sense of place, which 
Agnew (1987) argues is an essential element of any place.  The conceptualizations also 
affect a terrorist organization’s positionality in the global political system, either 
demonstrating legitimacy and thereby gaining position, or undermining their own causes 
and thereby losing position in the network of international actors (state and nonstate 
entities) as outlined by Leitner et al. (2008).   
Finally, the terrorist organization’s conceptualizations of geographic boundaries 
seek to create a sense of homeland for the followers—a place that unites the people 





light on the ways in which terrorist organizations seek to manipulate place in an effort to 
gain influence in what Mackinder (1904) calls the global balance of power.  If terrorist 
acts are political in nature, pursuing power and control for a group which had little or 
none previously, they are also geographic in nature.  The political power which terrorist 
organizations pursue must be exerted in geographic space—it must literally take place.  
 It is at the intersection of these three geographic theories of place and 
Mackinder’s (1904) balance of power that the concept of reimagined territory is 
positioned to describe the ways in which terrorist groups view the world.  McColl’s 
(1969) stages of insurgency are also interconnected to theories of place and reimagined 
territory, and consequently important to this study.  For McColl, the insurgency achieves 
its ultimate goal when it controls the state’s territory.  But international terrorist 
organizations may not be limited to sovereign state boundaries.  Thus, examining the 
group’s conceptualization of territory more fully reveals the desired geographic outcome.   
A case study of ISIS serves as an empirical example of the utility of reimagined 
territory.  In this case, the propaganda magazine is the data source for place names.  
Other studies, however, might find social media, official group communication, or news 
articles as the source(s) for stated or unstated geographic aspirations.  Regardless of the 
data source material, a content analysis yields place names that can be mapped and 
analyzed in the historical and ideological context of the terrorist organization.  The 
resulting narrative analysis—based on sense of place, positionality, and homelands—
provides an outline of the group’s geographic goals. 
 This theoretical advancement has the potential to provide analysts and policy 





organization’s ultimate objectives.  Understanding a group’s reimagined territory could 
reveal the group’s short-term, intermediate, and long-term geographic goals.  The 
counterterrorism efforts could be consolidated and concentrated on specific objectives, 
making the process more efficient and effective.  Furthermore, understanding the ways a 
terrorist organization conceptualizes place as a recruiting tool can lead to more effective 
counter-recruiting efforts.       
 
3.6  Conceptual Model Validation 
 Another data source is needed to validate the methodological approach and 
resulting theoretical concept of reimagined territories proposed in this dissertation.  To 
this end, the methods and analysis will be applied to a second publicly available data 
source: al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.  A sample of Inspire issues is processed and 
analyzed, and the results are compared to those achieved from the Dabiq data source.  
The results reveal the ways in which al Qaeda conceptualizes territorial boundaries, and 
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 In Section 4.1, the results of the computer-aided content analysis are presented, 
and world cloud and bar plot visualizations of the data are explored.  This section 
represents the quantitative portion of the mixed-methods approach employed in the 
dissertation.  Section 4.2 presents the results of the manually-coded place names 
extracted from the term matrices produced in the computer-aided content analysis.  This 
section is qualitative in nature, using predefined categories based on geographic scale to 
group place names in one of four classes.  Section 4.3 presents the results of the 
cartographic visualization of the data.  Results are mapped by category using choropleth 
symbolization for area (polygon) place names, line width for river place names (wider 
line represents higher frequency), and graduated symbols for point place names (cities, 
airports, specific mountain peaks, etc.).  Section 4.4 presents a narrative analysis of the 
places names contained in Dabiq magazine in the context of the geopolitical narrative of 
ISIS.  This section also demonstrates the utility of the reimagined territory conceptual 
model using ISIS as a case study.  Finally, Section 4.5 validates the methods employed in 





magazine, Inspire.  This section demonstrates that the concept of reimagined territory is 
not limited to a single terrorist group, but can be applied to any violent group seeking 
power, political control, or sovereignty. 
 
4.1  Results of the Computer-Aided  
Content Analysis 
 After the magazine issues were converted to text format and prepared for 
processing as outlined in Chapter 3, the computer-aided content analysis successfully 
reduced each issue’s text into a term document matrix containing list of individual terms 
and their frequencies of occurrence.  The terms are sorted by frequency from highest to 
lowest, then alphabetically when frequencies were the same.  The average number of 
unique terms per issue was 2,690.8, with 3,351 terms (Issue 7) as the maximum value and 
1,702 terms (Issue 1) as the minimum value.  By far, the most frequently used term over 
the span of ten issues was “Allah” with 2,067 individual occurrences.  Table 4.1 shows 
the number of unique terms (excluding stop words) that occurred in each issue. 
 
Table 4.1 
Number of unique terms and highest frequency terms in Dabiq 
Issue Length (pages) Unique Terms Highest Frequency Term Frequency 
1 50 1,702 Allah 104 
2 44 2,043 Allah 106 
3 42 2,222 Allah 129 
4 56 2,715 Will 227 
5 40 2,149 Allah 120 
6 63 3,323 Allah 204 
7 83 3,351 Allah 313 
8 68 2,852 Allah 264 
9 79 3,221 Allah 253 





With the data in term document matrix format, the functionality of R allows for 
visual exploration of the terms and their frequencies.  An interesting way to view the 
most frequently used terms in each of the issues is via word clouds, which “have evolved 
as a core technique of information visualization that is applied in many contexts” 
(Heimerl et al. 2014: 1833).  While static, single-term word clouds used in this research 
cannot provide context for the terms, they can visually summarize the text in an intuitive 
format which is easy to interpret (Cidell 2010).  The minimum frequency for the Dabiq 
issues visualizations is set to fifteen, meaning that any word used less than fifteen times 
in the text does not appear in the word cloud.  This value was selected solely for aesthetic 
purposes and plays no role in the later analysis (as many important terms would be 
omitted if the minimum frequency were set to fifteen).  For comparison and continuity 
across all issues, a single minimum frequency value that yielded visually desirable results 
for every issue had to be selected.  After experimenting with a few values, it became clear 
that fifteen was the best fit for all issues.   
 The most frequently occurring terms (highest percentile using natural breaks 
classification) in each issue not only appear in larger font (bigger words = higher 
frequency), they also appear in blue font.  The remaining terms (which meet the 
minimum frequency value) appear in green font.  As Table 4.1 demonstrates, earlier 
issues tend to have lower total term counts.  As a result, the word clouds for those issues 
are less dense and include fewer terms than the more dense, longer issues.  As no manual 
coding has been applied to the term document matrix at this point in the analysis, several 
“stemmed” words appear in the clouds.  For example, the word “people” has been 





with the letter “y” to “i” such that “army” has become “armi” and “many” has become 
“mani” in the clouds.  Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 include the word clouds for all ten 
issues of the magazine.   
The longstanding assumption in textual content analysis is “the higher the 
frequency of a word, the more central it is to the content” of the text in question (Philip 
2012, 93; Krippendorf 2004).  With this assumption in mind, the first obvious visual 
pattern that emerges is the recurrence of the high-frequency words “Allah,” “will,” 
“Islam,” and “State” across all issues.  (In the majority of cases “Islam” has been 
stemmed from “Islamic”).  The term “Islamic State” is (not surprisingly) used frequently 
throughout the issues.  It should be noted here that despite the inclusion of a geopolitical 
term (state) in the terror group’s name, this research treats “Islamic State” as the name of 
political organization, not a place name.  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself caliph 
and established the Islamist caliphate in Iraq and Syria, but the term “Islamic State” (or 
IS, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) refers to the spiritual, religious, and political entity embodied in 
the caliphate, not a geographic location.   
Two contextual evidences for this argument emerge from the text of Dabiq.  First, 
throughout the text, ISIS refers to its organizational apparatus and form of theocracy as 
the “Islamic State.”  Second, any mention of territory associated with the Islamic State 
mentions a specific location such as Iraq or Syria, not just the “Islamic State” by itself.  
The geographic context of “where” is always required when referring to the organization 
in a given location.  Thus, the context of usage in Dabiq demonstrates that references to 
































In the cases where “Islamic State” is used in conjunction with a geographic place name, 
the place name is counted, but Islamic State is not counted. 
The second noteworthy item from the word clouds is the presence of several 
geographic place names among the second tier of higher frequency words (green font in 
the figures).  Those appearing include Dabiq, Iraq, Sham, Syria, Yemen, Turkey, and 
Libya.  Although the context of these place names cannot be discerned from the word 
clouds, the relative importance of place names to the body of text can be assumed.  Still, 
the word clouds are an effective way to view a summary of the most frequently used 
terms in the body of text.  The analytical value of the term document matrices, however, 
is greatly increased when combined with manual coding and categorization. 
 
4.2  Results of the Manual Content Analysis 
The data input for the manual content analysis is a combination of the term 
document matrices generated in the previous stage and the original magazine issues.  In 
many circumstances, computer-aided categorization is efficient and accurate.  Content 
analysis software programs have the capability to assign meanings (categories) to words 
based on their context in the document (Al Fawareh et al. 2008).  Other research has 
shown that machine learning methods (artificial intelligence) can produce similar 
accuracy results when compared to manual extraction and classification methods 
(Sebastiani 2002; Nahm and Mooney 2002; Mooney and Bunescu 2005; Pang and Lee 
2008).  However, in most cases, the software requires either a robust logic database, a set 
of precoded documents (created by manual coding), or other types of predetermined data 





As this dissertation is the first research of its kind, there are no preexisting data 
dictionaries or precoded documents for use in computer-aided content analysis.  
However, during the manual coding process, a dictionary of Arabic terms and names 
(including non-Arabic names) was created to aid in efficiency of term recognition in 
subsequent issues.  While this list of terms served its intended purpose during the manual 
coding stage, it could also be used as a data dictionary in further research of Islamist 
terror groups’ correspondence.  After coding the terms from ten issues of Dabiq and five 
issues of Inspire, the final dictionary contains 1,723 Arabic terms and names. 
The first stage of the manual coding is determining if a term is a place name.  
Many of the words are obviously not geographic place names, but many are ambiguous 
outside of context.  For every known place name, every unknown proper noun, and every 
unknown Arabic term or name, the term was located in the original text using the find 
function of Adobe Acrobat Reader.  Using the textual context of the term, each unknown 
word is classified as either a place name, or not.  If a term is determined to be a place 
name, it is copied along with its frequency to the PlaceNames spreadsheet and pasted in 
the corresponding issue’s column.  Furthermore, each place name is verified using 
Google Maps and OpenStreetMap, which are instrumental in retrieving the geographic 
coordinates for the terms in the cities category. 
Several place names appear in the text of Dabiq in more than one form.  For 
example, the Syrian city of Aleppo is sometimes referred to as “Aleppo” and sometimes 
as “Halab.”  Further examples include the United States being listed as “US,” “USA,” 
“United States,” and “America;” and Iran being listed as either “Iran” or “Persia.”  For  





such that the final column of place names for any given issue (as recorded in the 
PlaceNames spreadsheet) could include more than one name for the same place.  The 
multiple names are combined in the following stage (discussed hereafter).   
Usage of the term “US” presents a particular challenge in the manual coding 
process.  As the script in R removes all capital letters to facilitate the frequency count, 
there is no differentiation between the plural pronoun “us” and the political state “US” in 
the term matrix.  Thus, each instance of the letters “u” and “s” in succession are 
examined in the original text.  The find function in Adobe Acrobat Reader is not case 
sensitive, however, and a search for “us” yields every instance in the entire document 
regardless of case, position in words, and so forth.  A note with the total number of 
references to the United States is then made next to the “us” entry in the term document 
matrix.   
Table 4.2 shows the total number of place names per issue along with the highest 
frequency place name and its corresponding frequency.  The average number of place  
 
Table 4.2 
Number of place names and highest frequency places in Dabiq 
Issue Length (pages) Place Names Highest Frequency Place Frequency 
1 50 63 Dabiq 35 
2 44 63 Dabiq 24 
3 42 62 Sham 35 
4 56 79 Iraq 38 
5 40 48 Arabian Peninsula 25 
6 63 87 Dabiq 45 
7 83 98 Dabiq 75 
8 68 96 Dabiq 47 
9 79 116 Yarmouk 55 






names per issue is eighty-one.  The maximum number of place names in any issue is 116 
(Issue 9) and the minimum number is forty-eight (Issue 5).  The most frequently 
mentioned place name is Dabiq, with 430 instances.  Figure 4.5 shows the eleven highest 
frequency place names (three are tied at fifty-five for ninth most) occurring in Dabiq. 
 The frequency totals displayed in Figure 4.5 represent the sum of all place names 
and their variants.  After all place names from each individual issue had been identified 
and copied into the PlaceNames spreadsheet, the categorization of each term could 
commence.  To accomplish this task, the first term in the first issue is inserted into the 
find function in Excel, which locates each occurrence.  The frequency value of the place 
name is summed from all ten issue columns and totaled in the appropriate geographic 
category.  For instance, the term “Jerusalem” is categorized as a city.  If a place name has 
a known alternate name, that term is also searched in conjunction with the first term.  If,  
 
 






























however, a place name has an unknown (to the author) alternate name (al Quds and 
Baitul Maqdis for Jerusalem), the frequency of the alias is added to the original term’s 
total in the appropriate category when the alias is discovered either later in that issue or in 
other issues.  This method ensures that terms are not double-counted, not used in separate 
categories, nor plotted as two different places.   
Additionally, the context of each term is verified in the text of the magazine to 
distinguish between places which could fall into two or more categories.  An example of 
this is “Raqqah,” which could refer to either the Syrian province or its capital city.  If the 
frequency for Raqqah in a given issue totals 15, each occurrence is located in the 
magazine and categorized appropriately according to its usage.  Furthermore, as the term 
document matrix counts only single words as opposed to groups of words, compound 
place names are searched and verified in the original text.  For example, “America” might 
have a frequency of 15 in one of the issues.  Unless each instance is verified in the 
magazine text, a modifying term such as “North” or “South” could be overlooked and 
counted along with the other uses of “America.”  Thus, place names like “Asia” and 
“Africa” are searched in the magazine to discover any modifying terms such as “Central” 
or “South,” and those distinctions are recorded as separate place names in the final list of 
terms and their frequencies.   
The manual coding process of categorizing all places names into one of four 
geographic categories results in a final count of 353 distinct places.  There are twenty-
five place names in the regions category, sixty-two in the countries category, seventy-
three in the provinces category and 193 in the cities category (See Appendices C, D, E, 






Number of place names and highest frequency places in Dabiq by category 
Category Place Names Highest Frequency Place Frequency 
Regions 25 Sham 277 
Countries 62 Iraq 236 
Provinces 73 Waziristan (Pakistan) 52 




along with each category’s most frequently occurring place name and its associated 
number of occurrences in the first ten issues of Dabiq. 
 The majority of the place names mentioned in Dabiq have a relatively low 
frequency.  Of the 353 terms, 247 (70%) appear less than five times over the span of ten 
issues.  Two hundred (57%) place names occur two times or less throughout the text.   It 
would be of little value to visualize bar plots of frequency by issue for these low-
occurrence terms.  For higher frequency terms, however, it is useful to visualize changes 
in place name usage across all issues via bar plots.  The eleven highest-frequency place 
names are selected for bar plot visualization (the same terms which were listed earlier in 
Figure 4.5).  Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 display bar plots for these terms along with trend 
lines (dotted lines) for reference.  The general trend is increasing over time for the 
highest-frequency place names.  Of the places plotted in these figures, only Iraq has a 
decreasing trend from Issue 1 to Issue 10.   
 To further explore the data, the dates of the two deadliest terror incidents which 
are first, within the timeframe covered by the first ten issues of Dabiq, and second, 
claimed to be perpetrated by ISIS are compared to frequency bar plots for the locations of 







Figure 4.6 Bar plots of the four highest frequency place names occurring in Dabiq issues 









Figure 4.7 Bar plots of the fifth through the eight highest frequency place names 








Figure 4.8 Bar plots of the ninth highest frequency place names (three places had a 
frequency of 55) occurring in Dabiq issues 1-10.  The dotted line is the trend line for each 








where gunman killed more than twenty tourists, many of whom were European 
(Kirkpatrick 2015).  The second incident occurred just two days later in Sanaa, Yemen 
where suicide bombers coordinated attacks on Shiite mosques, killing more than one 
hundred thirty worshippers (Kalfood et al. 2015).   
One interesting question to ask of these data is whether or not the text of the 
magazines contains an increase in place name frequency prior to an attack.  In other 
words, can researchers narrow down possible locations for upcoming attacks by detecting 
increasing frequencies of place names in the most current issues of the magazine?   A 
similar phenomenon was reported by US intelligence agencies which experienced an 
increase in electronic “chatter” in the months and weeks leading up to the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 (Zegart 2005).  In the case of the two 
deadliest attacks during the time period covered by these issues, however, there appear to 
be no predictive indications (via frequency or context) of pending attacks. 
 Both attacks occurred at the end of March 2015, which coincides with Issue 8.  As 
both attacks are mentioned by name and with images of the aftermath in Issue 8, it is 
clear that the issue was published after the attacks occurred.  In viewing the frequencies 
from Issues 6 and 7 (roughly coinciding with January and February 2015), there is no 
increase in either “Tunis” or “Tunisia” prior to the attacks (see Figure 4.9).  Furthermore, 
both terms combined only garner three mentions in the first seven issues.  In the case of 
Sanaa, Yemen, there are only two occurrences in the first seven issues, and none in Issues 
6 and 7.  Yemen’s highest frequency occurs in Issue 6 (29 mentions), bolstered by an 
article focusing on why al-Zawahiri and al Nadhari of al Qaeda are mistakenly opposed 






Figure 4.9 Bar plots of the two locations of the deadliest terror attacks during the time 






Yemen four times.  For these two attacks, the evidence suggests that the magazine is not 
a reliable indicator of attacks to come, but serves as a means of publicizing the group’s 
successful endeavors.   The most mentions of “Tunis,” “Tunisia,” and “Sanaa” each occur 
in Issue 8, which was published immediately following the attacks.  
 In an effort to validate this pattern using one of the more infamous terror 
operations conducted by ISIS, the Paris attacks were investigated, despite their 
occurrence outside of the time period covered by the issues of Dabiq in this study.  The 
Paris attacks were carried out by three teams of ISIS militants who killed more than 100 
people in different locations in the city on November 13, 2015 (Nossiter et al. 2015).  The 
date of the attack coincides with Issue 12, which dedicates the cover and the foreword 
section to the attack.  Paris is mentioned seven times in the first 10 issues (once in Issue 
6, five times in Issue 7, and once in Issue 8).  The spike in Issue 5 is attributed to the 
commentary focusing on the Charlie Hebdo attacks (which were claimed by al Qaeda) of 
January 7, 2015 (Callimachi and Higgins 2015).  There is no further mention of Paris in 
Dabiq until Issue 12.  Once again, the magazine does not appear to tip ISIS’s hand for 
future attacks.  To date, it seems to have been used only as a medium to advertise 
successful attacks after the events.  However, as more violent event data become 
available at finer spatial and temporal resolutions, the contents of the magazine may be 
tested for predictive capabilities of the magazine, especially in areas closer to or under 
ISIS control.  At present such data are unavailable for public use.     
 A final note for manual coding turns to a limitation which is shared by the 
categorization and cartographic visualizations processes—clearly defining what and 





Kären Wigen (1997) examine the metageographical categories of West (Occident) and 
East (Orient).  They argue that although each term had a specific geographic context in 
their original meanings, these meanings have shifted over time to such an extent that 
today “the West” and “the East” are essentially nonspatial categories (Lewis and Wigen 
1997).  Indeed, the meaning of the West has transitioned from Latin Christendom in its 
original context, to noncommunist Europe, Canada, and the United States following 
World War II, to a synonym for the “developed world” in modern discourse.  Meanwhile, 
the meaning of the East has changed from Southwest Asia in its original context, to 
communist Europe and Russia, to the “Third World” or “developing world” today (Lewis 
and Wigen 1997).  While the contested and ever-changing meanings of the West and the 
East are somewhat problematic with respect to mapping, it is the shift from spatial to 
nonspatial meaning which has rendered the terms essentially unmappable.   
ISIS uses “the West” fifty-seven times and “the East” four times over the span of 
ten issues of Dabiq.  In nearly all of the occurrences of the West, ISIS employs the term 
as a reference to an opposing ideology, forms of government, groups of people, and 
socio-religious beliefs and practices.  Rarely is the West used as a place name.  Rather, it 
is a mindset, a culture, or an ideology which presents external opposition to Islam. 
(Islam-internal opposition to ISIS is referred to as either “murtad,” or apostate, for fellow 
Sunni Muslims, or “rafidah,” or rejector for Shia Muslims).  Therefore, this research 
acknowledges the limitations of both defining and mapping the terms, West and East, and 
leaves them unmapped.  However, the terms are viewed (later in this chapter) in their 
nonspatial context employed by ISIS as a means of constructing the terrorist identity 





Similar to the West-East binary narrative, ISIS employs another pair of opposite 
terms which seem to be geographic but are nonspatial in context.  These terms are “Land 
of Islam,” with fifteen occurrences and “Land of Kufr” (unbelief) or “Land of Harb” 
(war), with thirty-one occurrences over ten magazine issues.  Lewis and Wigen (1997) 
observe that premodern Muslim scholars divided the whole of their known world into one 
of those two categories.  ISIS seems to take the same binary approach, although its 
definition is more narrow and not necessarily spatial.  For ISIS, the lands of Islam are 
anywhere that ISIS has control, while the lands of kufr are literally everywhere else, 
including all Muslim-majority countries and states with Islamic governments which 
would have been included in the original definition.  Simply stated, if ISIS is in control, it 
is the land of Islam.  Everything else is not.   
This binary categorization is problematic, however, due to the constant capture 
and recapture of territory in the ongoing war in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, the 
Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and anywhere ISIS has some measure of 
influence or control.  Lacking the more well-defined (yet still changing) boundary of the 
original land of Islam, ISIS’s land of Islam is a moving, fluid entity with ever-shifting 
borders, spaces of control, and geographic meanings.  Like the West-East binary, the 
Islam-kufr pair is evoked more for identity building than for describing geographic space 
in the pages of Dabiq.  For these reasons, the land of Islam and the land of kufr are also 
acknowledged as important ideological constructs to be considered in the narrative 
analysis, but are not mapped in this research.      
 





4.3  Results of the Cartographic Visualization 
 The results obtained from the manual categorization process are used to create a 
series of twenty-one maps.  Because the place names from three of the geographic 
categories are represented as polygons on the maps, there would be considerable overlap 
if all place names were mapped together.  Moreover, as the size and location of the 
regions, countries, and provinces vary significantly, a small-scale map would omit much 
of the detail that can be achieved using several maps at variable scales.  Thus, the results 
of the manual coding are mapped within their categories according to the spatial 
distribution of the place names.   
Additionally, each place name is mapped individually by its frequency result 
rather than nesting the terms in a geographic hierarchy.  In a nested hierarchy, the larger-
scale terms would be combined with the smaller-scale place names such that the 
frequencies of Mecca, Medina, and other cities or features in Saudi Arabia would be 
added to the province, country, and region total and mapped as a single frequency.  While 
a nested hierarchy map would show a similar spatial distribution of high frequency place 
names, considerable detail and nuance would be lost from the country level down to the 
city level as the larger-scale place names are subsumed into country and region place 
names.  Moreover, the nested hierarchy approach is far more susceptible to the “territorial 
trap” (privileging the international state as fixed units) than a multiscale approach which 
includes the larger-scale place names, even if the multiscale approach must also be 
cautious of the territorial trap (Agnew 1994).  One particularly illustrative example of the 
territorial trap is Russia and its immense territorial expanse.  ISIS’s presence in Russia is 





Russia is mapped.  While acknowledging this limitation at the regional and country 
scales, the territorial trap is mitigated by mapping multiple scales and by exploring the 
meanings of place names as employed by ISIS.  Thus, in an effort to map the terms as 
ISIS uses them, the place names are visualized using a multiscale approach.  The 
following sections exhibit and discuss the cartographic visualization results of the 
regions, countries, provinces, and cities categories.   
 
4.3.1  Cartographic Visualization Results  
of the Regions in Dabiq 
   The manual classification process yields twenty-five distinct place names in the 
regions category.  The place names are further categorized as either continents, current 
regions, historical regions, or hydrologic features.  One exception is Central America, 
which, although it is a current region place name, is mapped with the continents to 
optimize the map scale.  If Central America were included in the current regions map, the 
scale would be too small to show sufficient detail in the spatial extent of all current 
regions.  It would also be of little value to map this region by itself (there are no other 
region place names in the Western Hemisphere) when it could easily be included in the 
continents map.  Figure 4.10 is the map of the continent place names in Dabiq magazine.  
The continents map presents Dabiq frequency data in the Robinson projection, 
which minimizes overall distortion (error) in global scale maps (Dent et al. 2009).  The 
frequencies are depicted using graduated colors (choropleth technique).  Typically, raw 
data or count data are not suited to choropleth mapping because the numbers are not 
standardized to account for size differences in the areal units (Dent et al. 2009).  For 















































perception of population distribution, especially if larger provinces had higher total 
population.  However, if population density were mapped, the data would be standardized 
(population per square kilometer) across all areal enumerations, and smaller units could 
be directly compared to larger areal units.   
 For this study, however, the data (frequencies of place names) are not geographic 
phenomena which occur within areal units, they are textual references to those areal units.  
There is no relationship between spatial area and place name usage that needs to be or 
even could be standardized in a meaningful way.  Furthermore, applying graduated 
symbols or dot density mapping techniques (traditionally associated with total or raw 
count data) for the regions, countries, and provinces categories obfuscates the spatial 
patterns which are immediately intuitive in a graduated color scheme applied to areal 
units.  The most effective way to represent these frequency data is the choropleth 
technique using a sequential color scheme (light yellow through brown) with the 
cartographic convention of “dark equals more” (Harrower and Brewer 2003).  
Unmentioned countries, continents, oceans, and seas are mapped for reference.  For these 
background items, the standard cartographic conventions of gray for background land 
features and blue for background water features are adopted. 
 The data for the map are classified using the natural breaks (Jenks) method.  This 
method has three distinct advantages with respect to the Dabiq data.  First, the frequency 
values of place names do not have a normal distribution, eliminating standard deviation 
as a useful classification scheme (Dent et al. 2009).  Second, equal interval classification 
produces classes which contain no observations due to the distribution of data values 





which have less contrast between classes than the natural breaks classification 
(acceptable, but not optimal).  Therefore, for these frequency data, the best classification 
method is natural breaks because it maximizes the distinction between classes while 
minimizing the variance of values within each class (Jiang 2012). 
 Europe is the most often mentioned continent with thirty occurrences.  The next 
closest continent is Australia (also mapped with the countries category as it is impossible 
to separate continent from country in the case of Australia) at twelve, then Africa at eight 
occurrences.  Interestingly, ISIS appears to favor “Europe” over smaller geographic 
regions: “Western Europe” with two occurrences and “Iberian Peninsula” with one 
occurrence are the only two subregions of Europe appearing in the pages of Dabiq (see 
Figure 4.11).  In the cases of Africa and Asia (only three occurrences), ISIS seems to 
prefer the smaller regions over the entire continent.  In Asia, ISIS uses “Arabian 
Peninsula,” “Caucasus,” “Kurdistan,” “Middle East,” and “Persian Gulf” more frequently 
than the continent place name.  In Africa, Dabiq refers to West and North Africa twenty-
five times, totaling three times as many references as Africa.  For North America, the 
choice is overwhelmingly country-level place names (USA with 144 occurrences versus 
just one for the continent), while South America at any level is comparatively ignored by 
ISIS. 
 Figure 4.11 is a map of the current regions occurring in Dabiq issues 1-10.  The 
map employs the Plate Carrée projection which optimizes the viewing extent of the map.  
The majority of the remaining maps also utilizes this projection in an effort to maximize 
the area of the polygons being mapped, standardize the distortion across all maps, and for 















































Earth).  All other projections are noted explicitly in the text.  This research acknowledges 
that defining regions by economic unions, political alliances, geographic features, or any 
other grouping is a process of managing contested meanings.  One geographer may insist 
that Europe has specific geopolitical regions, while another would draw differing 
boundaries and regions altogether (see Cohen 2003 and de Blij 2005).   
With these caveats in mind, the regions presented here fit within the range of 
commonly used definitions in the modern world system.  The region polygons are 
constructed by merging the shapes of the included countries.  The country boundaries 
appear in the background for general reference.  Although the Arabian Peninsula is also 
included in the Middle East, it is shown as the top layer to prevent it from being masked.  
Similarly, Western Europe includes the Iberian Peninsula, which is displayed as the top 
layer to avoid being masked by the larger region.  The polygon for Kurdistan was 
digitized from a map of Kurdistan found on the Kurdish Institute’s website (n.d.).  The 
boundaries encompass those areas which have a Kurdish majority among the residents.  
In this way, Kurdistan is more of a cultural entity and not a recognized political entity.     
 The Arabian Peninsula occurs the most times among the current regions 
mentioned by ISIS.    West Africa, the Middle East, Kurdistan, and the Caucasus also 
have relatively high frequencies.  These areas encompass many of the ISIS-declared 
provinces, which may account for the higher frequency.  However, ISIS also declared 
provinces in Libya and Afghanistan/Pakistan, which fall in regions with relatively few 
mentions (albeit higher frequencies in the countries and provinces categories).  
Figure 4.12 is a map of the historical regions mentioned in the pages of Dabiq.  


















































represent places of an earlier age—the golden age of Islam (Lapidus 1992).  The borders 
of these regions are approximations of territorial extents based on historical maps.  The 
Historical Atlas of the Islamic World provided the areal extents for Andalus, 
Mesopotamia, and Transoxiana (Nicolle 2003).   The historical borders of Khurasan were 
derived from cartographic information at Anthrogenica.com (Atmal 2013).  Finally, the 
Atlas of the Qur’an outlined the areal extents of Sham and Hijaz (Khalil 2003). 
The most frequently used term is Sham, which refers to the historical region of 
Greater Syria or the Levant.  This region roughly covers an area equivalent to modern-
day Syria, Jordan, parts of southern Turkey, western Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, 
eastern Egypt and northern Saudi Arabia.  Sham boasts the second highest frequency 
place name in any category, underscoring its ideological importance for ISIS (see section 
4.4 Narrative Analysis).  Khurasan, a distant second to Sham, still maintains a relatively 
high frequency in the regions category.  This historical region covered modern-day 
Afghanistan, parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Pakistan.  In the earlier issues of Dabiq, ISIS refers to Khurasan in this context.  
However, after declaring their own “Wilayat Khurasan” (province), later references in the 
text refer to the province Khurasan (mapped in the provinces category). 
Andalus is the Islamic name for the region roughly equivalent to the modern 
Iberian Peninsula.  However, Andalus did extend into what is now southern France, and it 
did not include portions of the northern coast of modern-day Spain (Nicolle 2003).  The 
Hijaz is an ancient region which extends from the Gulf of Aqaba down the Red Sea coast 
of modern-day Saudi Arabia.  Home to Arab tribes and Jews before the days of 





to the Wahhabi, the Egyptians, and the Ottomans (Ochsenwald 2015).  It is the place of 
Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina.  Mesopotamia is the ancient Greek name 
for the “land between the rivers” (Euphrates and Tigris) in what is now Iraq and Syria 
(Pollock 1999).  This region overlaps Sham along its northeastern reaches.   
Transoxiana is the final historical region place name.  This area consists of parts 
of modern-day Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Like 
Mesopotamia, the meaning of Transoxiana is rooted in Greek, meaning “the land on the 
other side of the Oxus River” (Allouche 2007: 45).  The region spanned the area between 
the Oxus River (Amu Darya in the modern world) and the Syr Darya River.  As it 
overlaps Khurasan on the map, the transparency level for Transoxiana is increased to 
allow viewers to see the northern borders of Khurasan.   
Figure 4.13 depicts the final regions category map—hydrologic features 
mentioned in Dabiq magazine.  The Persian Gulf was exported from the Natural Earth 
oceans shapefile.  The Tigris, Euphrates, and Indus Rivers were digitized from ESRI’s 
National Geographic base map layer.  Country boundaries (and select country names) are 
shown in gray for reference.  This map departs from the sequential color scheme applied 
to the other maps in the analysis for two reasons.  First, the cartographic convention for 
mapping hydrologic features is blue.  In keeping with that tradition, these water features 
are presented in blue.  Second, both polygon and line features appear on this map, and 
each type of feature requires a unique form of representation.  Line width indicates the 
difference in frequency in the river features, where thicker lines represent higher 
frequencies.  Because there is only one polygon feature (Persian Gulf) and one 


















































outlined in light blue distinguishes the Persian Gulf from the gray-blue water features in 
the background.           
 
4.3.2  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Countries in Dabiq 
The manual categorization process yields sixty-two country place names.  Unlike 
the regions category, the countries need no further categorization to prevent overlapping 
entities.  However, in order to optimize the visualization of countries of differing areal 
dimensions, the maps display countries in geographic groupings defined by the data in a 
series of four maps.  Based on the spatial distribution of countries mentioned in Dabiq, 
the four maps are the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and 
Asia.  Country polygons are exported from the GADM feature class.  The same 
sequential color scheme (light yellow through brown) denotes frequency.   
Figure 4.14 is the map of countries in the Western Hemisphere which appear in 
the pages of Dabiq magazine.  The USA Contiguous Lambert Conformal Conical 
projection minimizes distortion within the extent of this map. The United States is the 
most frequently mentioned country on this map, and the second most frequently 
mentioned country overall with 144 occurrences.  With ten mentions, Canada is a distant 
second.  The remaining four countries (Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela) only 
garner one mention each.  The very high frequency total for the United States is expected 
from ISIS, an ideological offspring of al Qaeda and Salafi-jihadism, which have often 
referred to the US as “the Great Satan” (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002).  The 
recurrent references to the “Other” are an important facet of establishing and perpetuating 











 Figure 4.15 is a map of European countries mentioned in the magazine.  The UK 
and Russia each have the highest total number of references with thirteen. (The Middle 
Eastern and North African countries on this map are discussed later).  Like the US, these 
countries represent the “Other” in ISIS’s ideological narrative.  Other relatively high-
frequency countries like Belgium and France, however, gain more mentions because of 
successful ISIS-led or ISIS-inspired operations.  As previously mentioned, France has a 
higher total due to reportage on the Charlie Hedbo attack.  Belgium’s higher numbers are 
attributed to commentary on the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium on May 24, 
2014 in Brussels (Higgins 2014).  Compared to other geographic regions mapped in this 
category, European countries have relatively low frequency totals.  However, ISIS used 
the continent’s term thirty times, indicating its discursive importance. 
 Figure 4.16 is a map of countries in the Middle East and Africa.  This area 
represents the highest concentration of high-frequency country terms.  Twelve of the top 
fifteen countries appear on this map (see Appendix D).  It is expected that Iraq and Syria 
would yield high totals, as ISIS maintains de facto sovereignty there.  Yemen, Iran, 
Turkey, and Libya also boast high frequencies.  Turkey and Iran are perceived as military 
and ideological enemies to ISIS, which views the Turkish government as an apostate 
regime and the Iranian (Shia) people as rejecters of the true form of Islam (Akyol 2016).  
ISIS has declared provinces in both Yemen and Libya, which contribute to the higher 
frequencies (Lister 2015, Zelin 2016).  
Figure 4.17 is a map of the Asian countries mentioned in Dabiq.  With seventy-
five occurrences, Afghanistan has the highest frequency outside of Southwest Asia.  






















































































































































that centers on Iraq and Syria.  Like Yemen, Libya, Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan offers 
geographic territory with limited or no national government presence and/or control.  
These “ungoverned spaces” have enabled Islamist extremists to plan, train, fight, and in 
the case of ISIS, establish sovereign power (albeit in a state of constant flux) (Roberts 
2016).  Pakistan’s frequency of seventeen is perhaps a bit lower than expected, due to its 
shared border with Afghanistan and its vast ungoverned space of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  Yet, ISIS cites Waziristan (a pair of districts in the 
FATA) fifty-two times—the highest total for any place name in the provinces category. 
The remainder of South, Southeast, and East Asian countries have relatively low 
frequencies.  Japan scores the highest in those regions with thirteen occurrences.  The 
majority of these references are directly related to ISIS’s beheading of two Japanese 
journalists in January 2015 when Japan did not comply with prisoner release demands 
(Norland 2015).  ISIS largely ignores the majority of Southeast Asia and mentions the 
most populous Muslim country in the world (Indonesia) only two times in ten issues.  
The Philippines, a country with one of the highest numbers of terror attacks in recent 
years, garnered only three mentions in Dabiq (Medina and Hepner 2013). 
 
4.3.3  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Provinces in Dabiq 
 The manual categorization process yields seventy-three province (or similar areal 
unit) place names.  This category includes all subnational divisions of space such as 
provinces, states, districts, governorates, and agencies, but excludes cities, towns, 
villages, or geographic features such as named mountains.  The provinces are presented 





Caucasus, and South Asia.  The GADM feature class (administrative levels 1 and 2) 
provides the majority of the province polygons.  However, some of the ISIS-declared 
provinces were created in ArcMap using the create features function.  These are 
discussed in the context of each map on which they occur.  The same color scheme (light 
yellow through brown) applies to this series of maps. 
 Figure 4.18 shows the provinces of the Western Hemisphere as they occurred in 
Dabiq magazine.  This map utilizes the USA Contiguous Lambert Conformal Conic 
projection to minimize distortion within the extent of the map.  Three US states and one 
Canadian province are mentioned one time each.  ISIS discusses California’s earthquakes 
and the Missouri’s civil unrest in Ferguson (without naming the city) in terms of 
domestic crises that President Obama should be addressing instead of engaging in wars in 
Muslim lands (Issue 3).  ISIS refers to Virginia in a recurring section of the magazine 
called “In the Words of the Enemy.”  This section presents quotes about ISIS given by 
political figures, analysts, and other influential people who oppose the terror group.  In 
this case, Virginia Senator Richard Black’s statement on the importance of Damascus in 
the fight against ISIS is featured.  Martha’s Vineyard appears in an article titled, “If I 
Were the US President Today” written by the captive British journalist, John Cantlie 
(Issue 5).  Cantlie sarcastically states that if he were the US president, he would rather 
spend time golfing in Martha’s Vineyard than deal with ISIS.  Finally, the reference to 
Quebec in Issue 5 is in the context of the hit-and-run incident wherein a terrorist ran over 
two Canadian soldiers, killing one (Austen 2014). 
Figure 4.19 is a map of African province place names occurring in the first ten 


































































































the international community.  Since ISIS has not published any maps to date, delimiting 
the boundaries of their declared provinces is speculative work at best.  Furthermore, it is 
very unlikely that ISIS maintains continuous, sovereign control of any of its declared 
provinces outside of Iraq and Syria.  Smith (2005) argues that bounded territory 
representations (polygons) are less accurate than network representations (nodes and 
connectors) of a central government’s capacity to influence territory.  Thus, depicting 
these ISIS-declared provinces as bounded areas is somewhat problematic in that the 
visualization of boundaries inherently suggests the limits of sovereignty.  However, the 
data extracted from Dabiq are not meant to represent ISIS’s actual territorial holdings, but 
its aspirational or reimagined geography.   
With these limitations in mind, the provinces of ISIS are mapped using polygons 
with boundaries based on the best information available, be it descriptions by ISIS or 
traditional boundaries derived from historical place names.  In Libya, ISIS established the 
provinces of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Barqa (also called Cyrenaica) based on historical 
divisions that existed until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Vandewalle 2012).  The 
boundaries for these divisions were constructed using current GADM district boundaries 
for Libya, grouped into three provinces as outlined in Global Security.org’s Libya map 
(2011).  The significance of the names and provincial divisions is discussed later in the 
narrative analysis section.ISIS also declared a province in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 
November 2014 (Kirkpatrick 2014).  The boundaries for this province are the combined 
boundaries of Egypt’s North Sinai Governorate and South Sinai Governorate from 
GADM’s province feature class.  To date, ISIS has not articulated the boundaries for its 





purpose of the map.  There are only two references of “Sinai” in Dabiq prior to ISIS’s 
declaration of the Sinai Province.  The remaining forty references all occur in the context 
of ISIS’s newly established province.  However, as the preprovince borders of Sinai are 
mapped the same as the ISIS province borders, all forty-two occurrences of Sinai are 
simply mapped as ISIS’s province. 
 Figure 4.20 is a map of provinces in the Middle East.  This area represents the 
highest spatial concentration of ISIS-declared provinces.  The leadership of ISIS has kept 
many of the existing province names.  However, they have also declared many new 
provinces in Iraq especially.  ISIS claims authority over the following governorates in 
Syria: Latakia, Idlib, Hama, Rif Dimashq, Homs, Halab (Aleppo), Ar Raqqah, Deir al-
Zour, and Hasakah.  These are not mapped as ISIS-declared provinces because the 
boundaries and names have not changed (with the exception of Deir al-Zour).  In Iraq, 
however, ISIS has completely redrawn the boundaries between provinces and has 
renamed many of them.  The new boundaries are shown, as are the names of the new 
provinces marked with “(ISIS)” following the name.  The boundaries for these new 
provinces are simplified estimations based on descriptions of the provinces in Dabiq.  For 
example, ISIS describes Junub Province as being everything south of Baghdad.  To create 
this polygon, all existing provinces south of Baghdad are merged into one polygon.   
For the other new provinces, the existing provinces are divided according to the 
descriptions in the magazine to produce approximate boundary locations.  One border 
change of particular importance is that of Furat Province which straddles an international 
boundary.  ISIS deliberately targeted the Syria-Iraq border in creating Furat, a process 





















































from the hearts of Muslims” (Dabiq Issue #4, 18).  To show the international border on 
the map, Furat Province is rendered more transparent.  Rejection of the Sykes-Picot 
borders (a secret agreement between the French and British to divide the lands of the 
Ottoman Empire) (Fromkin 2010) is a common recurring theme which appears in six of 
the first ten issues a total of ten times.  Expunging the effects of this 1916 agreement is 
central to ISIS’s ideology and is examined in detail in the narrative analysis section of 
this chapter. 
Figure 4.21 is a map of the provinces of the Arabian Peninsula that occur in 
Dabiq.  ISIS declared provinces in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  The Saudi Arabian 
provinces are Najd, which is the central plateau region consisting of the modern-day 
provinces of Ha’il, Riyadh, and al-Qassim, and Haramayn, which consists of the 
provinces of Mecca and Medina (Bishai 1968).  The boundaries for these new ISIS 
provinces are constructed by merging the polygons of the existing Saudi provinces listed 
previously.  Again, as ISIS does not exercise sovereignty within these boundaries, they 
are notional delimitations of approximate spatial dimensions.  ISIS has not indicated a 
change of boundaries for the Yemeni provinces it declared in November 2014 (Dabiq 
Issue #5).  Rather, like the Syrian provinces, Yemeni provinces seem to retain their 
established boundaries.  Thus, the province borders depicted in the map are consistent 
with current Yemeni political boundaries. 
Figure 4.22 is a map of provinces in the Caucasus region of Russia that occurred 
in the magazine.  The Russian republics (autonomous provinces within the Russian 
Federation) of Dagestan, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia are each 





























































































Province in February 2015 (Issue #7).  The Dagestani districts of Babyurtovsky and 
Tabarasan are likewise singled out, but in reference to the formation of Al-Qawqaz 
Province.  Beginning with Issue 7, ISIS refers to its new Al-Qawqaz Province five times.  
Prior to that issue, all references to the Caucasus area are counted as a current region (see 
Figure 4.11).   So as not to obscure the areal units that constitute ISIS’s Al-Qawqaz, the 
province is mapped as the sum of all the polygons appearing on the map.  The label for 
Al-Qawqaz is positioned in the center of the map and a note directs the map reader to the 
spatial extent of Al-Qawqaz. 
Figure 4.23 is a map of the provinces of South Asia.  This is the final map for the 
provinces category.  The highest frequency province is Waziristan, Pakistan which totals 
nearly four times the next nearest province’s sum of eighteen occurrences.  Within the 
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Waziristan is actually two agencies—
North and South Waziristan.  However, ISIS seems to view the area as a single entity, 
never referring to either North or South Waziristan, only Waziristan.  Thus, for the 
purpose of the map, North and South Waziristan are merged to form a single province 
which reflects ISIS’s usage of the term. 
 ISIS announced the formation of the Khurasan Province in Issue 7 (February 
2015).  The spatial extent of this province remains unclear, but the inclusion of 
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan is certain.  From the text of Dabiq, Khurasan Province 
seems to include the whole of Afghanistan as well as the Pakistani provinces of 
Balochistan, the FATA, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  This interpretation is comparable to 
the ancient boundaries of Khurasan which serves to validate ISIS’s apocalyptic ideology 



















































can only be approximated for visualization.  The current boundaries of all stated 
provinces, districts and agencies are utilized in creating the map.  An explanatory note 
describes the boundaries of Khurasan Province, which is mapped beneath the smaller 
provinces and districts so as not to mask their areal expanses.  The international boundary 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is depicted as a slightly thicker line for clarity through 
the border region. 
                            
4.3.4  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Cities in Dabiq 
               The final cartographic visualization category is cities.  Amassing 191 place 
names, this is the largest category with the most maps.  As the classification is based on 
geographic scale, this category consists of a range of smaller-scale places including cities 
(157), airports (8), ancient battles (8), named valleys (4), prisons (3), named mountain 
peaks (3), gas fields (2), mosques (2), lakes (2), a cemetery, and a training camp.  Unlike 
the previous three categories, the spatial representation for this category is a point feature 
class.  Graduated symbols (circles) denote the frequencies in this series of maps.  The 
feature class is created by importing a spreadsheet (in .csv format) with the place names 
and their corresponding x-y coordinates and frequencies into ArcMap, then converting 
the table into a point feature class.  The spatial distribution of the 191 points facilitates 
the creation of seven maps.  
 Figure 4.24 is a map of places in the cities category located in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The USA Contiguous Lambert Conformal Conical projection is used to 
minimize distortion within the extent of the map.  Washington, DC has the highest 





category.  ISIS uses “White House” six times in referring to the US capital, so these 
occurrences are added to the total for Washington.  In keeping with political convention, 
ISIS uses the capital city of Washington (and the White House) as a proxy for the United 
States as a whole in most occurrences.  This is also true of several other capital cities 
featured on the following maps.  Ottawa, however, appears in reference to the attack on a 
Canadian soldier guarding the tomb of the unknown soldier at Canada’s National War 
Memorial on Parliament Hill (Austen and Gladstone 2014).  Garland, Texas likewise 
makes an appearance in Dabiq because of a (failed) shooting incident on May 3, 2015 at 
an art exhibit of cartoons depicting Muhammad (Stack 2015).  ISIS refers to Hollywood 
in an article penned by the captive British journalist, John Cantlie.  
Figure 4.25 is a map of European and North African cities that occur in Dabiq.  
The highest frequency term on this map is Rome, with eighteen mentions.  Rome is very 
important to ISIS’s ideology both as a proxy term for “the West” or “Crusaders” and as a 
place that plays a central role in its apocalyptic narrative (discussed later in this chapter). 
Moreover, Rome is referred to in the context of the seat of Christianity and the origin of 
Western ideals, not as the modern capital of Italy.  Similarly, Constantinople (Istanbul) is 
another critical place in ISIS’s end of the world discourse.  Dabiq refers to “Istanbul” 
only one time through the entire body of text (Issue #10).  In every other instance, the 
magazine calls the Turkish city “Constantinople,” which has not held that name officially 
since 1930, when the fledgling government of Turkey requested the countries of the 
world use the name Istanbul exclusively (Lewis 1972).  The significance of preferring 
Constantinople to Istanbul is examined in the geographic narrative analysis section 











































































































 Figure 4.26 is a map of the cities of the Middle East in Dabiq.  This map includes 
the place name with the highest total frequency in any category—the Syrian city of 
Dabiq.  This eponymous city occurs in the magazine 430 times.  Some might assert that 
the number is artificially inflated due to Dabiq’s appearance in the margins of many 
pages as well as the name of the interviewer in numerous interview featurettes throughout 
the issues.  However, this research contends that in choosing a place name (with its 
specific sense of place) as the title of its official periodical, ISIS underscores the 
importance of that place in its ideology.  Each issue’s table of contents (located on page 2 
in every case) begins with the following statement from ISIS’s founder, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by 
Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq” (Dabiq Issues #1-10).  
Each occurrence of the name Dabiq reminds the reader of this statement and the prophecy 
to which it is linked.  Thus, each instance of Dabiq is counted as a place name (see the 
narrative analysis section for the full explanation.  
The map in Figure 4.26 is densely populated with place names, especially in Syria 
and Iraq.  Eight of the top ten and eleven of the top fifteen highest frequency cities appear 
on this map (see Appendix F).  Many lower frequency place names also appear on this 
map.  To render areas with the most overlap more readable, two inset maps display more 
detailed geographic scales.  The first inset map is labeled “Dabiq & Vicinity.”  The 
corresponding) area on the larger map is marked by a black-outlined box labeled “Fig. 1.”  
The second inset map is labeled “Damascus & Vicinity” and its corresponding area on 
the larger map is likewise marked by a black-outlined box labeled “Fig. 2.”  The other 


















































space within the map extent for labeling, and therefore, required no insets. 
    Figure 4.27 is a map of the Arabian Peninsula cities that occur in Dabiq.  
Islam’s two holiest cities, Medina and Mecca, are the third and fourth highest frequency 
city names in the magazine, emphasizing their relative importance in the ISIS narrative.  
In fact, most of the place names in Saudi Arabia refer to Koranic locales or battles in the 
early days of Islam.  The Yemeni cities emerge in the text in the context of operations 
against the government and warring factions (like the Houthi).  Interestingly, Camp 
Bucca only has one occurrence in the first ten issues of the magazine.  One might have 
expected more references to a place that was instrumental in the radicalization of Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi as well as the resurgence of AQI and ISI when released prisoners 
returned to the militant ranks with renewed anti-Western sentiment (Nevins 2015 and 
Benraad 2009). 
Figure 4.28 is a map of the cities of South Asia mentioned in Dabiq.  Aside from 
Miran Shah (11), most of the cities on this map have relatively low frequencies.  Miran 
Shah’s higher frequency occurs all in one issue (#6) due to a feature article on the 
mujahidin of Waziristan.  Most of the other Pakistani cities occur in the next issue in the 
context of ISIS declaring its Khurasan Province in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  References 
to Tehran emerge in the same vein as the other capital cities—ISIS uses the place name 
of Tehran as a proxy for the government of Iran and Iran as a whole.  
Figure 4.29 is a map of the Russian cities referred to in Dabiq.  No Russian city 
accrues more than one occurrence in the first ten issues.  Four Dagestani cities are 
mentioned in the context of areas of strong ISIS support in the Caucasus region.  These 















































































































































magazine.  Moscow’s instance is a reference to a Chechen mujahidin assault on a theater 
in Moscow in 2002 during which more than fifty armed militants took hostages and wired 
themselves and the theater with explosives.  The Russian military pumped an undisclosed 
gas into the ventilation system, killing 118 hostages and fifty attackers (Wines 2002).  
The reference to the Moscow attack in Dabiq came in the context of a congratulatory 
statement issued by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (a top-level ISIS officer/strategist who 
frequently acted as the official spokesman) to the people of Al-Qawqaz Province, whom 
he urged to continue the fight against Russia (Issue #10).  Incidentally, al-Adnani, whom 
many believe was next in line to be the Caliph, was killed in an American drone strike 
which targeted his vehicle in Aleppo, Syria on August 30, 2016 (Schmitt and Barnard 
2016).  Russia also claims that its own airstrikes killed al-Adnani (Nechepurenko 2016).     
Figure 4.30 is a set of maps featuring the cities mentioned in Dabiq in East Asia, 
Australia and Africa.  The map on the right side of the figure shows the African locales.  
Only two cities in Sub-Saharan Africa appeared in the magazines.  The context for both 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania was a brief mention of the al Qaeda 
embassy bombings in 1998.  Because of the geographic distance between these two 
African cities and those located in North Africa, it is necessary to make two maps to 
optimize scale and detail.  The figure also includes an inset showing the location of the 
map extent on the African continent.  
The map on the left shows the East Asian and Australian cities.  Sydney, Australia 
has the highest frequency in this area, with three occurrences.  Each of the mentions 
occurs in Issue 6, which begins with a featurette on Man Haron Monis, the terrorist who 
























































as the only historical case of victory in armed conflict utilizing airpower alone (Issue#4).  
Finally, Tokyo arises in passing, mentioned only as brief meeting place for emissaries of 
the Taliban and the West during a rare diplomatic engagement (Issue #6). 
 
4.4  Results of the Narrative Analysis 
   The narrative analysis relies on input from the content analysis (categorized list of 
place names and their frequencies) and the cartographic visualization processes (series of 
maps by category), as well as the original text.  Further, ISIS’s use of place names in the  
magazine is compared to the historical use of place names during the first three Islamic 
caliphates.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the conventional approach to narrative analysis 
has examined stories (literary works, films, ideology, etc.) in terms of their five structural 
elements which are settings, characters, events, problems, and resolutions (Kwan and 
Ding 2008).  Clandinin and Connelly (1999) suggest a more geographically-focused 
method for studying narratives in terms of actions/interactions, time, and space.  The 
geographic narrative analysis that follows in this section (and again in the next section 
featuring al Qaeda’s ideology) applies Clandinin and Connelly’s (1999) framework to the 
ideological narrative of ISIS. 
 
4.4.1  Elements of Geographic Narrative Analysis:  
Actions and Interactions 
 The first element of geographic narrative analysis is sociality, or in other words, 
the cultural context of the characters and their actions and interactions within the 
narrative. The foundations of cultural context which must be considered are language, 





myths encapsulated and preserved in a familiar language that a collective consciousness 
(or group identity) is created and shared by a cultural community.  At the first 
opportunity, ISIS unequivocally defined its cultural community by announcing, “…the 
world has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present…” 
(Issue #1, 10).  This binary categorization renders the process of self-identification 
simple: one is either allegiant to ISIS or against it. Simply stated, there is no middle 
ground in the struggle between the virtues of Islam and faith and vices of unbelief and 
apostasy in ISIS’s Salafi-jihadist ideological framework.  Thus, the cultural narrative of 
Islam is appropriated by ISIS and manipulated to construct new personal identities based 
on the shared cultural foundation of religious belief.  
 Arena and Arrigo (2005) describe the framework for understanding the terrorist 
identity as a product of culture via the sociological theory of structural symbolic 
interactionism (SSI).  They assert that five principles of SSI apply to the construction of 
terrorist identities.  First, the establishment and use of symbols are integral to the 
terrorist’s narrative (Arena and Arrigo 2005).  Symbols can be objects, events, or even 
people that draw on the underlying cultural narrative while simultaneously creating a new 
terrorist agenda.  For ISIS, the caliph (al-Baghdadi) serves as a symbol of a unified Islam 
under the direction of Mohammad’s rightful successor as well as the spiritual and 
political leader of the movement.  Another prominent symbol is the black banner of the 
caliphate, which occurs frequently in images throughout the magazine.  The flag dually 
signifies the Islamic State and the black banner of the Mahdi, a mysterious warrior who 
will lead the armies of Allah in the days preceding the apocalypse according to the hadith 





Muslim cultural narrative and ISIS’s ideology in the form of a symbol—the black banner. 
The second principle of SSI is the definition of the situation, which is the process 
of assigning meaning to the symbols (Arena and Arrigo 2005).  This is facilitated by 
drawing on cultural narratives and terrorist ideologies.  ISIS achieves this in part by 
publishing prophecies and teachings of great Islamic thinkers alongside pictures and 
stories of victorious military campaigns in Dabiq.  For the reader, the images of 
victorious mujahidin surrounded by verses from the Koran or other sacred texts 
communicate the religious legitimacy of the actions.  As the symbols of jihad take on 
meaning for the followers, the terrorist identity grows at the personal and societal levels.   
The third principle of SSI is roles.  A person’s role defines how he or she is 
connected to other people within social and cultural systems.  Roles also cue behavior, 
which is defined and justified by the place or position of the role within the social system 
(Arena and Arrigo 2005).  ISIS defined the role of a true believer in the first issue of 
Dabiq by declaring that all Muslims were obligated to emigrate to the new caliphate: “O 
Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the 
Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory” (Issue 
#1, 10).  ISIS also attempts to appeal to those Muslims who live under oppressive 
regimes by promising that the newly-formed caliphate will, “return your dignity, might, 
rights, and leadership” (Issue #1, 7).  The identity being created is that of an obedient, 
dutiful follower of Allah whose rightful place is in the land of Islam (where ISIS 
maintains sovereign control of territory). 
The fourth principle of SSI is socialization and role-taking.  Socialization is the 





within the system (Arena and Arrigo 2005).  The use of formal training (in areas 
controlled by ISIS, or in virtual environments) and propaganda (videos, speeches, and 
magazines like Dabiq) facilitates the socialization of the terrorist narrative.  This process 
is particularly important for terror groups because the effective use of terrorism as a 
means to achieve political change relies heavily on narrative in two ways.  First, the 
philosophy or ideology must be clear and accessible to the trainees or potential recruits.  
Likewise, the training materials (such as manuals) must be coherent and logical (Kubiak 
2004).  Dabiq excels in presenting ISIS’s narrative as both accessible and logical.  The 
layout and format of the magazine is appealing, and the religious quotations are well 
documented with proper citation.  The second reliance on narrative is that the attack itself 
must create the desired effect of terror, or it runs the risk of not matching the narrative of 
massive loss of life, widespread destruction, or chaos (Kubiak 2004).  ISIS celebrates 
successful terror attacks by publishing them in prominent places in the magazine, such as 
the cover or first featurette, even using the word “terror” to describe the effects (Issues 6, 
10, 12).  Thus Dabiq serves to legitimize the cultural/ideological narrative of ISIS 
through education and favorable reportage.  
Role-taking is the process of imagining oneself in another’s role.  Role-taking 
could be employed by a potential recruit to imagine himself as a member of the terror 
organization, or it could be used by terrorist planners to anticipate a response or counter-
terror actions.  In the case of building a terrorist identity, however, the process of 
imagining oneself in a different role takes center stage.  ISIS facilitates this process by 
showing the doctors of the caliphate working in state-of-the-art hospitals, villagers 





victoriously overhead while the black banner of ISIS waves in the distance.  It is easy for 
a sympathetic reader to imagine himself or herself doing those things and being those 
people in the pages of Dabiq.     
The fifth and final principle of SSI is the emergence of self.  This occurs when the 
symbols, narratives, and roles work in unison to authenticate the meaning of the terrorist 
ideology which can be embodied through the new terrorist self (Arena and Arrigo 2005).  
Whatever identities existed previously, the new self emerges dominant. Former identities 
are not wholly abandoned, but they become less important in defining oneself.  An ISIS 
militant who previously self-identified as “Syrian” or possibly “Muslim” would now 
assume the ISIS self as the primary identity.  In whole, the SSI principles demonstrate the 
integral role of cultural narratives in the formation of the terrorists’ identity.  Terrorist 
ideologies and identities are born, nurtured, and realized in the cultural context.  Situated 
in its cultural context, the terrorist identity becomes the main character in the ideological 
narrative. 
Yet, cultural processes cannot advance or evolve in a vacuum.  They, along with 
social, economic, and political processes which lead to violence, require space for their 
formation, development and implementation (Simmons 2005).  Within that interactive 
space, place becomes the site or location wherein daily life occurs, human processes 
converge, and local cultural structures produce distinct community identities (Agnew 
1987; Martin and Miller 2003).  But as Janz (2008) warns, places cannot be studied as 
independent objects.  Places can only be given meaning through the dynamic discourses 
which continually define and redefine them.  In this way, places become indispensable 





necessary for violence, place-based cultural and historical circumstances convert 
necessary conditions to sufficient conditions for violence (Simmons 2005).  For example, 
the Arab Spring was a regional political process which helped to set the conditions for 
violence in Syria, and it was the local anti-Kurd and anti-Sunni policies of the Assad 
regime combined with a failing local economy and severe drought that transformed the 
necessary conditions into sufficient conditions for the civil war and rise of ISIS in 
northeast Syria (Al Jazeera 2016). 
Janz (2008) suggests that places associated with terrorism have seven 
psychological features which drive their narratives.  These places can be the site of an 
attack, the site of the planning of the attack, or even the hometown of the attackers or 
victims.  Although Janz applies these features in the context of the targeted nation (the 
United States in nearly every example), this research contends that the psychological 
features of terror places can also apply to those who employ terrorism, especially in terms 
of a given terror group’s creation of the Other within its ideological narrative.   
The first feature of a place of terror is the loss of place-making imagination, or in 
other words, the place must reinforce the new narrative of terror (Janz 2008).  For 
example, the Bataclan Theater in Paris can no longer exist as a place for cultural events 
from the perspective of the targeted city/country/people (and by extension, those who can 
identify with the targeted city/country/people).  Rather, the attack transformed the theater 
into the site of the ISIS terror attack and a memorial for those who died there.  Similarly, 
ISIS publishes gruesome images of dead children who were killed by the enemies of ISIS 
in Aleppo, Raqqa, and other locales in Dabiq, transforming those cities into places of 





The second feature is that place creates “the Other” which embodies the fears of a 
given cultural narrative (Janz 2008).  Using place to define the Other allows the French to 
see those who attacked the Bataclan Theater as “Muslim” or even “terrorists” instead of 
seeing them as legal citizens of France (Farmer 2016).  ISIS effectively conflates the 
place of “the West” with the dominant cultural values of those who live in the West 
(wherever that may be).  Throughout the pages the Dabiq “the West” can mean culture, 
nationalism, liberal democracy, and even religion that opposes ISIS’s ideology and 
theology.  By presenting the West in this way, ISIS creates the Other against whom the 
faithful followers of Caliph Ibrahim can rally and from whom they must be protected.  
The construction of the Other serves to unify ISIS immigrants of varying cultural, ethnic, 
and national backgrounds against a common enemy.  It also serves as a practical 
demonstration of ISIS’s binary world view in which one must choose to either join the 
camp of Allah or remain in the company of infidels and apostates.  Moreover, the various 
names of ISIS’s Other are inseparably connected to prophecies recorded in hadith 
through place.  The Other (who must be Roman or, in other words, Christian) must come 
to either Al Amaq or Dabiq to fight against the armies of Allah.  The Other must also be 
present in Constantinople for its fall to ISIS and again in Rome for its fall.  Because 
ISIS’s theology rests on these prophecies, the fulfillment of these sayings cannot take 
place anywhere else—they must occur in their original locational context.     
The third feature is the narrative of place becomes triumphalist in the wake of an 
attack (Janz 2008).  The narrative must show its place as rising from the ashes of 
victimhood.  The images of American flags hanging from the twisted steel ruins of the 





black banners of the caliphate flying over the ruins of coalition-bombed cities stand a 
monument to ISIS’s resilience in the face of a technologically superior enemy.  The 
fourth feature is the death of the public space (agora), or in other words, the loss of public 
space due to heightened security and control.  The narrative shifts from public interaction 
to public protection which trades freedom for security and prevention of further attacks 
(Janz 2008).  For fear of another attack, the place is avoided until the narrative shifts 
again to the aforementioned triumphalist narrative.  ISIS has all but eliminated public 
interaction in its two most important cities, Raqqa and Mosul (Hawramy et al. 2015).  
They have banned mobile phones and home internet service for fear of exploitation by 
enemy intelligence operations.  As airstrikes in these cities have increased, activity in the 
public markets has slowed to fraction of its former volume.  In these places, agora is, for 
the time being, dead. 
The fifth psychological feature is the tendency to impose fixed meanings on 
places of terror.  The permanence of place is constructed by narrowing definitions which 
exclude alternate understandings from the discourse (Janz 2008).  “For example, the 
reality of America’s past as a pluralistic nation gives way to an imaginary Christian 
America, tacitly contraposed to the Muslim ‘nation’ of terrorism that is being resisted” 
(Janz 2008, 200).  This also holds true for ISIS, which fixes the meaning of its territory 
through the narrative of immutable and ineluctable prophecy.  As readers of Dabiq are 
reminded in each issue, “The spark has been lit…” and it will not be extinguished until 
ISIS achieves its ultimate goals (Issue 1, 2).  The Caliphate has a single meaning and a 
single destiny, neither of which is open to interpretation.  They are fixed.     





the fear of a place that often occurs after it has been the site of an attack.  Yet, more 
significant that the fear of a place itself is the “cultural stage fright” that occurs as a 
byproduct of an attack (Janz 2008, 201).  The victimized state reasserts its cultural 
identity in the form of retaliatory foreign policy, masking the fear of another attack 
behind the false bravado of a heavy hand.  For ISIS, the loss of previously held territory 
and the devastation of bombing attacks are the epicenters of topophobia.  The subsequent 
declarations of provinces in near and distant lands and the crackdown on public spaces 
within caliphate controlled areas are the manifestations of ISIS’s cultural stage fright. 
The final psychological feature of places of terror is the realization that terror 
narratives of places eventually begin to include other ways of experiencing and 
understanding those places (Janz 2008).  For societies which enjoy broader social 
freedoms, the process of challenging terror narratives can be faster than in societies with 
limited freedoms.  For ISIS, however, the cultural narrative of place only has to last until 
the apocalypse.  For the near future, ISIS will likely attempt to enforce (through violence) 
its version of the place narrative in the areas which it controls, and propagate its vision 
(through magazines, videos, and social media) through areas it does not control.   
In summary, the actions/interactions component of the geographic narrative 
analysis of ISIS’s magazine consists of the people which make up the cultural community 
of ISIS, the construction of the ISIS identity and the parallel construction of its opposite 
Other, and the psychological elements of places of terror.  These features combine to 
inform the ISIS faithful (and potential recruits) who they should be or become, who their 
enemies are, how the ideal ISIS subject should view the world, and the ways in which 





meaning into places as it incorporates the elements of time (the when of place) and space 
(the where of place).      
 
4.4.2  Elements of Geographic Narrative Analysis: 
Time and Space 
The space element of geographic narrative analyses consists of the physical places 
of the narrative (Clandinin and Connelly 1999).  Clearly, not every place name from the 
list of 353 terms extracted from Dabiq enjoys equal significance in the overall ideological 
narrative of ISIS.  In fact, the geographic place names appeared in all sections of the 
magazine, including quotations from non-ISIS sources.   Thus, it is necessary to apply the 
time element (past, present, future) of geographic narrative analysis to reveal the usage 
pattern of place names which supports ISIS’s ideological discourse.   
In general terms, ISIS’s usage of place names can be divided into three categories: 
homeland places (where ISIS either controls or has some measure of influence), places of 
the Other (enemy places), and sacred places (religiously important sites where ISIS has 
little or no influence at the moment, but aspires to in the future).  ISIS’s binary worldview 
makes this categorization possible—there truly are no neutral places according to its 
theological narrative.  There are only areas which it controls (lands of Islam) and areas 
outside of the caliphate’s sovereignty (lands of kufr).  However, it is clear from the text of 
the magazine that ISIS views sacred sites of Islam in a slightly different way than the rest 
of the lands of kufr, even though the sites are in areas governed by enemies of ISIS (e.g., 
Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem).  For this reason, it is useful to distinguish the sacred 
sites from the remainder of the enemy place names.  Of the fifty-one highest frequency 





places of the enemy, and 6% were sacred places.    
Still, broad categorizations of ISIS’s place name usage fail to identify integral 
elements of ideology.  Rather, examining the ways in which ISIS uses geographic place 
names to advance its ideology is a more fruitful endeavor.  A key component of this 
approach is historical analogy, which allows for the comparison of place names of the 
past (especially the first three Islamic caliphates) to the way in which ISIS utilizes place 
names today to advance its ideology.   The Dabiq data reveal two notable patterns of 
place name usage when viewed through the lens of historical analogy.  The first is the use 
of antiquated or historical place names to simultaneously create a specific sense of place 
and fuse the ideology of ISIS to Islamic prophecies contained in the sacred writings of 
the Koran and hadith.  The second is the implementation of the provincial system of 
governing conquered territories used in the earliest Islamic caliphates as the geographic 
boundaries expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula into Africa, Europe, and Asia.  Each 
of these patterns is examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
4.4.2.1  Developing a Sense of Place Infused 
With ISIS’s Ideology 
At the center of ISIS’s ideology is the concept of a divinely commissioned 
Islamic caliphate, which according to al Baghdadi (2014), came into existence by the 
grace of Allah.  The rise of the caliphate not only fulfills ancient prophecy, but it 
legitimizes the tactics employed to gain the caliphate (Wood 2015).  While the vast 
majority of Muslims reject ISIS’s version of a caliphate, the concept of an Islamic 





appeal, even in the more secular or moderate Sunni communities (Hamid 2014).  It is this 
longing for a true Muslim homeland, absent from the world for centuries (although many 
Muslims cite the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century as the most recent 
caliphate), that ISIS intends to evoke amongst Muslims everywhere.  In his inaugural 
speech, al-Baghdadi connected the fall of the caliphate (presumably the Abbasid empire, 
as the Ottomans are rejected by ISIS as illegitimate caliphs because they lacked the 
required Qurayshi bloodline) to the collective humiliation, defeat, and weakness of 
Muslims everywhere (al-Baghdadi 2014; Wood 2015).  Thus, al-Baghdadi gives the 
weak, dispossessed Muslim subject a homeland in his declaration of the caliphate.  Place 
and self are fused into a single identity embodied by a true Muslim—an identity which 
can only exist in the context of a Muslim state which is “remaining and expanding” 
(Issue #5).   
To further legitimize the claim of the caliphate, ISIS relies on the frequent 
quotation of sacred religious texts, leaning heavily on literal interpretations of the Koran 
and hadith to propagate its apocalyptic discourse.  One potential problem with place 
names, however, is that they change over time.  Some of the place names like Dabiq and 
Rome have endured, while others such as Constantinople and Khurasan have evolved.  
Thus, in order to link 1400-year-old prophecies to the current geopolitical situation, ISIS 
simply refers to ideologically significant places in their original (seventh and eighth 
centuries) context.  The practice of referring to places by their historical names achieves 
three effects.  First, the antiquated names evoke a collective memory of a glorified 
Muslim past, reminding the reader/listener of his/her heritage and further empowering the 





future when viewed through the arc of Islamic prophecies.  Finally, the use of antiquated 
place names is an overt rejection of the current political landscape in the Middle East and 
its ill-conceived, invalid borders established by the Sykes-Picot agreement following the 
First World War.  All three effects combine to form a sense of place that induces feelings 
of community, homeland, and destiny as the prophecies of Islamic scripture unfold in the 
believers’ eyes.  Figure 4.31 shows the spatial extents of the Rashidun, Umayyad, and the 
Abbasid Caliphates at the height of their territorial claims.  The Umayyad Caliphate 
(shown in dark green) included all of the Rashidun territory in addition to its own gains, 
resulting in the most expansive territory among the three dynasties.    
The highest frequency term of any category, the Syrian town of Dabiq, is the most 
obvious historical term which supports ISIS’s apocalyptic narrative.  The introductory 
feature in the first issue of Dabiq explains the meaning of its namesake—certainly a 
necessary elucidation for the English-speaking audience which is presumably unfamiliar 
with Syrian geography and possibly unfamiliar with the particular hadith quoted.  The 
magazine tells the reader that Dabiq is a place in northern Syria where “one of the 
greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders” will occur in the future as told by 
Abu Hurayrah, an oft-cited narrator of the hadith in the Sunni tradition (Issue #1, 5).  
According to ISIS’s interpretation of the events associated with the end of the world, this 
future battle at Dabiq is the first in a series of events that must occur prior to the ultimate 
victory of the apocalypse, when Allah will destroy the enemies of Islam.   
There is some debate among Sunni scholars concerning the order of the events of 
the apocalypse.  This uncertainty applies to ISIS as well, but from the official 




























































appear to have the following order:  1) establishment of a rightful caliphate (occurred in 
June 2014); 2) great battle between the armies of Allah (ISIS) and the Romans 
(Christians) at Dabiq, Syria; 3) the appearance of the Mahdi (descendant of Mohammad 
who bears his name, rules in righteousness, and helps to conquer the Antichrist; 4) 
Muslim armies conquer Constantinople; 5) The Dajjal (Antichrist) appears; 6) Muslim 
armies conquer Rome; 7) Jesus, Son of Mary, appears and kills the Antichrist; 8) end of 
the world (Hijazi 1995; Discovering Islam 2016; McCants 2014; Islamic State 2014).  
ISIS seems to interpret these events from the collection of hadith literally, including the 
names of the places mentioned.   
Dabiq is the epitome of this interpretation.  During its expansion into Syria in 
2014, ISIS made a special effort to capture and subjugate the town of Dabiq despite its 
limited military importance (Fraser 2014).  However, as a significant locale in ISIS’s 
apocalyptic geography, Dabiq’s strategic importance is elevated.  ISIS reminds the reader 
on nearly every page that he/she is engaged in the early stages of the final jihad before 
the end of time in the very places prophesied by Mohammad.  This powerfully 
compelling cultural narrative, centered in geography, has attracted fighters from all over 
the world. 
Appearing in the same group of related hadith are the terms Constantinople and 
Rome.  Constantinople represents an intermediate milestone while Rome represents the 
final conquest in the eschatological series of events.  Constantinople’s significance to 
ISIS’s ideology is multifaceted.  First, the hadith, which predate the city’s current name 
of Istanbul by several centuries, specifically refer to it by name.  Therefore, ISIS must 





legitimizing its narrative.  Second, using the term Constantinople instead of Istanbul 
demonstrates ISIS’s rejection of the Ottoman Empire as a legitimate caliphate.  ISIS 
essentially suggests that Constantinople has yet to be conquered by the army of Allah as 
outlined in the hadith.  In other words, according to ISIS, Mehmet II’s conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453 CE is not a fulfillment of the prophecy because the Ottomans did 
not meet the prophetic requirements laid out in the hadith.  This dismissal of the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire and rejection of the Ottoman apocalyptic narrative 
(which names its own conquest of Constantinople as the beginning of the end of the 
world) (Sahin 2010) emerges in the text of the magazine.   
ISIS blames the Ottomans for polluting the Muslim lands with “pagan domes” 
and “manmade laws” (Issue #9, 21).  In the following issue the message recurs, this time 
accusing the Ottomans of establishing a false caliphate because there was no sharia law 
and because the Turk rulers did not descend from the Qurayshi line (Issue #10).  
Consequently, the Ottoman’s capture of Constantinople and modern Turkish state’s 
renaming of Istanbul are both invalid.  Thus, Dabiq’s use of the term Constantinople in 
place of Istanbul is simultaneously a rejection of the Ottoman Empire and a scriptural 
reference which links ISIS’s ideology to a wider Muslim narrative of the end of times.  If 
the city has not been conquered by the army of Allah according to the hadith’s prediction, 
it certainly cannot be Istanbul.  It must remain Constantinople until the prophecy is 
rightfully fulfilled. 
Rome enjoys a similar level of importance in the geopolitical narrative of ISIS.  
Also appearing in the hadith, Rome was mentioned in the first speech given by Abu Bakr 





been some discussion among scholars and pundits regarding ISIS’s intended meaning of 
the place name Rome, the cover of Issue 4 appears to settle the debate.  Waving atop the 
Egyptian obelisk in St. Peter’s Square is the (digitally added) black banner of the 
caliphate in place of the (digitally removed) cross.  While St. Peter’s Square is actually in 
the Vatican City (a sovereign state), the message inside this issue and the other issues is 
that ISIS literally intends to conquer Rome and raise its banner over Rome’s monuments.  
ISIS spokesman al-Adnani said, “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and 
enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted” (Issue #4, 5).  Further, a 
video released by ISIS in August 2016 specifically mentions Rome as a target, spurring 
Italian leadership to increase security at historic, cultural, and transportation sites across 
the city (Jackson 2016; Roy 2016).  Because Rome is referenced directly in the hadith 
quoted by ISIS, there can be little doubt that ISIS intends to expedite the apocalyptic 
chain of events until they can rest “…under the olive trees of Rome” (Issue #4, 4). 
Cities are not the only category which includes ideologically-charged historical 
place names.  There are several historical region place names that support ISIS’s 
narrative as well.  The most frequently-used term is Sham, an Arabic word meaning “land 
of the left hand” (Jacob 2007).  This phrase refers to the geographic area north of the 
Hijaz (or Greater Syria), which would be on an observer’s left side when facing east in 
the vicinity of Mecca and Medina.  The same observer would find Yemen, or “land of the 
right hand,” to the south (Jacob 2007).  Prior to the Arab invasion in 636 CE, the 
Byzantine Empire controlled the area they called “Syria,” which corresponds to the 
modern terms “Greater Syria” and “the Levant” (Rollinger 2006; Bishai 1968).  Umar, 





Syrians, declared it a province of the caliphate, and appointed a governor to oversee the 
administrative affairs according to the wishes of the caliph (Belyaev 1969).   
Sham gained greater prominence in the new empire when Muawiyah, the first 
ruler of the Umayyad dynasty, moved the caliphate’s capital from Medina to Damascus 
where it remained for nearly a century (Little 2016).  It was during the Umayyad rule that 
the caliphate enjoyed its greatest period of expansion and reached its maximum territorial 
expanse (Bishai 1968; Belyaev 1969).  Though ISIS has not controlled Damascus at any 
time since its founding, it established the capital of the caliphate in another Syrian city of 
historical significance (Remnick 2015).  Raqqa was the capital of Harun al-Rashid’s 
Abbasid caliphate for nearly 13 years before it was again relocated to Baghdad (Bonner 
1994).  Whether it was out of the convenient circumstances of the Syrian rebellion 
against Assad, a deliberate attempt to restore an historical seat of government in its 
original place, or if it was sheer happenstance, ISIS’s de facto capital city is the same as 
the short-lived capital during the Golden Age of Islam.  Thus, in evoking Sham, ISIS 
resurrects the name of an ancient province which symbolized Muslim victory over both 
Jews and Christians, and restores a connection to the glory of the Umayyad and Abbasid 
dynasties who established capital cities therein.  Consistent with the use of other 
historical place names, ISIS positions Sham within its ideological narrative which recalls 
the glory of the medieval caliphates as a victorious, powerful homeland for believers.                        
  Additionally, ISIS effectively erases the international boundaries created by the 
Sykes-Picot agreement by evoking the historical place name of Sham.  In the seventh and 
eighth centuries, the province of Sham encompassed modern-day Lebanon, Israel, 





place names fade away for the audience which reads “Sham” instead of modern place 
names.  The same effect occurs when ISIS employs other historical region’s place names 
such as Mesopotamia and Transoxiana.  The intent appears to be defiance of the current 
geopolitical system, denunciation of Sykes-Picot borders, and rejection of all non-ISIS 
governments. 
Khurasan is another ideologically-charged place name occurring throughout the 
pages of Dabiq.  While the name survived the centuries as a modern province in Iran, the 
original Khurasan encompassed a much larger area of central Asia.  At the outset of 
Rashidun territorial expansion under Abu Bakr, Khurasan was a province of the 
Sassanian Empire (Ghodrat-Dizaji 2011).  The conquest of Khurasan by the Arab 
Muslims occurred during the reign of the Uthman (third Rashidun caliph), who gained 
full control of Sassanian territory as far north as the Amu Darya River by 651 CE 
(Belyaev 1969).  The Arab conquest of Persia marked the defeat of one of the greatest 
empires of the day.   
It is clear from the text that ISIS’s use of the term refers to the historical province 
of the Rashidun and later caliphates as opposed to the current province in Iran.  Here 
again, the inclusion of an historical term in the magazine allows the reader to imagine a 
new border which displaces the colonial borders of central Asia while reminding him/her 
of a time when Muslims ruled atop the international power structure.  Past, present and 
future coalesce in the place name of Khurasan.   
Furthermore, Khurasan makes a by-name appearance in the hadith as the place 
from which the Mahdi will lead an army carrying black banners to capture Jerusalem 





conflates its own (deliberately designed) black flag with those which will march to 
certain victory as promised in the hadith.  It positions the caliphate as the vessel of 
prophecy fulfillment, further legitimizing its claim as a divinely-sanctioned government 
and setting the stage for the arrival of the Mahdi through the lineage of the rulers of 
ISIS’s caliphate.  Thus, ISIS exploits the process of identity-ideology-place construction 
by intermingling historical place names tied to sacred texts throughout the features of its 
official magazine. 
ISIS also utilizes the antiquated place name “al-Andalus” in the text of Dabiq 
magazine.  When the Umayyad expansion reached the Iberian Peninsula early in the 
eighth century, Visigoths ruled the area known as Hispania (Belyaev 1969).  In 711 CE, 
Muslim invaders led by Tariq landed at Gibraltar and subdued the Visigoths (Bishai 
1968).  By 712, nearly all of Hispania was subject to Muslim rule (Nicolle 2003; Hebert 
1991).  Islamic governance remained in varying forms by various ruling parties in al-
Andalus until 1492 (Belyaev 1969).  In the early years of the Umayyad rule in Spain, 
Andalusian raw materials supplied the rest of the Islamic world with (among other 
minerals) mercury, which was used in the amalgamation of precious metals for usage in 
coins (Hebert 1991).  Prior to this time, Muslims favored the use of Roman and Persian 
coins over minting their own.  However, Islamic (Rashidun) coins dated as early as 651 
CE have been discovered (Donner 1986).  It was the reform efforts of Abd al-Malik ibn 
Marwan, the fifth Umayyad caliph, that changed the caliphate’s policy on minting 
Islamic coins free of Roman or Persian imagery (Donner 1986).   
In a feature story in Dabiq Issue 5, ISIS links Marwan’s reform and images of 





copper currency for the caliphate.  While the magazine article overtly states ISIS’s 
motive in producing its own coins is “…to disentangle the Ummah [community of 
believers] from the corrupt, interest-based global financial system…,” the reference to al-
Andalus achieves another purpose.  It reminds the reader that this disengagement from 
the world economic standards of the day has been accomplished in the past, lending 
credence to the idea that it can be accomplished again today.  Furthermore, the 
renunciation of the global financial structure frees ISIS from the political power structure 
that governs the world economy.  Finally, invoking the antiquated al-Andalus place name 
serves both as a reminder of Islam’s once-great influence in Europe and as a subtle hint 
that Muslim rule in al-Andalus may soon return. 
Several references to other historical sites of Islamic importance occur in the 
context of scriptural passages and other religious quotations.  These references occur in 
nearly every section of the magazine, repetitively marrying ISIS’s actions, programs, and 
ideas to Sunni theology.  Invoking Koranic place names such as Hijaz (ancient coastal 
region in the Arabian Peninsula), Haramayn (the land of the two cities, Mecca and 
Medina), and Nadj (central highlands of the Arabian Peninsula) affords ISIS the 
opportunity to openly reject the Saudi royal family, government, and borders in the 
Muslim holy land.  These historical names appeal to a time when the land of Mohammad 
was not polluted with apostate governments, but flourished under the rule of the “rightly 
guided” caliphs.  This was a time for conquest as well, beginning with Mohammad’s 
subjugation of most of the Arabian Peninsula during his lifetime and continuing with the 
Rashidun caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali (Nicolle 2003; Bishai 1968; Belyaev 





ISIS reminds its readers of decisive battles of Islam’s past such as the Battle of 
Nahavand in 642 CE, which effectively destroyed the Sasanian Empire in the Middle 
East and Central Asia and gave the riches of Persia to the invading Muslims (Bishai 
1968).  Known as the “battle of battles” to Muslim scholars, the Arab victory at 
Nahavand (near present-day Hamadan, Iran) resulted in a caliphate that stretched from 
Egypt to India (Bishai 1968).  The Battle of Qadisiyyah (near present-day Najaf, Iraq) 
also appears in Dabiq.  This battle in 637 CE pitted the Rashidun army against the 
Sassanian forces in Iraq near the capital city of Ctesiphon.  A Muslim victory at 
Qadisiyyah exposed the weakness of the battle-weary Sassanid army which was still 
depleted from a decade of war with the rival Byzantines (Bishai 1968).  One year after 
the battle of Qadisiyyah, Ctesiphon fell to the Arabs—a military and moral defeat that 
drove the Sassanian Empire’s counterattack at Nahavand four years later (Bishai 1968). 
Additionally, ISIS references some of the earliest battles (also known as 
expeditions) of Mohammad which were instrumental in the consolidation of the Arab 
tribes under the banner of Islam in its infancy.  In 624 CE, Mohammad ordered the raid 
of a Meccan caravan heading north to Syria.  The resulting skirmish, known as the Battle 
of Badr (near Medina), was a modest military victory for the Muslims, but yielded 
lucrative spoils of war (Bishai 1968).  It also enraged the Meccans who were more 
powerful and wealthy than the Muslims.  The following year the Meccans plotted to 
avenge the losses of Badr, which they accomplished at the Battle of Uhud (also near 
Medina).  While Mohammad’s men lost the battle, their resilience and tenacity impressed 
a number of other Arab tribes.  By 630, the Muslims sacked Mecca and united most of 





(and other) battles to advance its divinely-sanctioned jihad narrative.  The greatly 
outnumbered army of Mohammad was protected and blessed with victory over a superior 
enemy.  So, too, will the armies of ISIS be blessed with victory over a superior enemy if 
Allah wills.  Through the place names of these historical battles, ISIS tells its faithful 
followers that Mohammad’s story is their story, and his blessings and victories are their 
blessings and victories.             
While the memory of great Muslim victories of the past certainly plays a central 
role in the creation of identity and the imbuing of meaning to a place, it also illuminates a 
similar set of geopolitical circumstances for the rise of ISIS today and the establishment 
of the Rashidun caliphate in the seventh century.  Bishai (1968) attributes the immediate 
success of Abu Bakr’s fledgling empire to four factors (to which this study adds a fifth): 
1) Abu Bakr’s personal prestige afforded to him by his close association as a companion 
of Mohammad; 2) the competence of the army commanders he selected to lead his forces; 
3) the appeal of fighting for one’s religion; 4) the lengthy wars between the Byzantine 
and Persian Empires which greatly reduced their military capabilities by 632 CE; 5) a 
fifth factor, not mentioned by Bishai, was the military knowledge and experience gained 
by the Arabs while fighting as hired hands in the wars of their enemies (Nicolle 2003). 
The parallels between then and now are uncanny:  1) The self-proclaimed caliph 
of ISIS, also named Abu Bakr, relies on his (purported) Qurayshi lineage to qualify him 
for the position of caliph and to elevate his personal prestige as member of Mohammad’s 
tribe; 2) al-Baghdadi selected his military commanders from the experienced army and 
security forces of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Hashim 2014); 3) the appeal of jihad has 





places throughout the world since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
(Malashenko 2001); 4) the lengthy US/NATO wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian 
civil war, and the anti-Sunni policies in Iraq and Syria combined to create the 
political/military/social conditions which allowed the rise of ISIS; 5) Some of the current 
military leaders (including former Tajikistani lieutenant colonel Gulmurod Khalimov) 
and fighters of ISIS received training and experience directly from the American military 
(Kucera 2015; Bulos 2015).  It is very unlikely that ISIS could have deliberately 
orchestrated all of the similarities, but it is certain that its ideological and theological 
legitimacy are enhanced by these coincidences. 
In addition to decisive historical military engagements against the foreign Other, 
ISIS also alludes to several scriptural battles involving caliphate-internal conflicts.  When 
Mohammad died in 632 CE, a number of Arab tribes rescinded allegiance from his 
successor, Abu Bakr, disputing the legitimacy of Islam’s required taxes (zakat) for 
believing subjects (Bishai 1968).  The establishment responded by dispatching troops to 
quell the rebellions across Arabia in a military campaign known as the Ridda wars, or 
Wars of Apostasy (Nicolle 2003).  One of the first battles was at Buzakhah (near present-
day Ha’il, Saudi Arabia), where the Asad tribe and its prophet, Talha, renounced Abu 
Bakr’s authority.  Khalid ibn al-Walid led the Muslim soldiers, defeating the Asads and 
capturing Talha, who was sent to Medina where he repented and reconverted to Islam 
(Bishai 1968). 
 Like the Rashidun caliphate, the Umayyad caliphate had its share of internal 
rebellions of dissatisfied subjects.  When the first Umayyad ruler, Muawiyah, died in 680 





However, the descendants of the companions of Mohammad rejected the Umayyad’s 
shift to a dynastic form of succession because it left them without power or position 
within the caliphate (Belyaev 1969).  The revolt’s epicenter was in the land of the two 
holy cities.  Yazid sent an army to quell the rebellion in the Hijaz, which resulted in an 
Umayyad victory at the Battle of Al Harrah outside of Medina in 683 CE (Belyaev 1969).  
Yazid died mysteriously that same year and his son, Muawiyah II (who was only 13 years 
old) accepted the mantle of caliph in political conditions nearing anarchy (Bishai 1968).  
Muawiyah II died 40 days later and another Umayyad clansman named Marwan assumed 
the title of caliph in Damascus (Bishai 1968).   
Amidst the uncertainty surrounding the rapid turn-over in leadership, the 
rebellions and civil war continued in the Umayyad-controlled state under Marwan until 
he died in 685 CE.  His son Abd al-Malik finally subdued the rebels and established 
peace in the caliphate after two decades of turmoil (Bishai 1968).  The Battle of Dayr al-
Jamajim in Iraq was the last stand for the enemies of the Umayyad clan, and with their 
defeat, Abd al-Malik stabilized the Arab Empire and set the stage for expansion into 
Europe, Asia, and Africa (Bishai 1968).  In citing these past battles, ISIS communicates 
to its faithful that internal struggle is an expected part of the history of the formation of 
the original caliphates.  The battle analogies also demonstrate the ultimate fate of those 
who do not pledge their allegiance to the rightful caliph.  Thus, ISIS draws on historical 
elements of the first caliphates to legitimize its own efforts and solidify its claim as a 
divinely-sanctioned successor to the glory of an idealized Islamic past which it seeks to 







4.4.2.2  The Significance of ISIS’s Provincial 
Administrative System 
 The territorial gains achieved during Mohammad’s lifetime were not substantial 
enough to warrant the distribution of administrative power.  Rather, he instituted a system 
of representation wherein his appointed agent would serve as an emissary and tax 
collector to the Arab tribes which pledged their allegiance to Mohammad (Bishai 1968).  
Abu Bakr continued in this administrative practice over the course of his stewardship, but 
by the time Umar became caliph, changes were in order.  He appointed governors from 
among his trusted (Arab) associates to oversee the affairs of the newly conquered 
provinces (Bishai 1968).  The practice of designating Arab governors to administer in 
non-Arab provinces was continued by the Umayyad rulers.  However, this fostered 
resentment among the local populations as Arabs received leadership roles and held 
political power.  Bishai (1968) cites this as one of the causes of the fall of the Umayyad 
dynasty.  The Abbasids, however, learned from the mistakes of the Umayyads, and they 
appointed local regents to oversee the caliphate’s affairs in the provinces.  The custom of 
declaring provinces where allegiance to the caliph was either offered or coerced, and 
appointing provincial governors with authority from the caliph lasted from the Umayyad 
dynasty in the seventh century until the partition of the Ottoman Empire brought the age 
of the caliphates to a close in 1922 (Fromkin 2010).   
ISIS reintroduced this practice shortly after declaring itself a caliphate in 2014.  
Although the group claimed administrative authority over territory in Iraq and Syria, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the caliphate’s first acceptance of another group’s oath of 





formation of the provinces (wilayat) which are noncontiguous territories in most cases.  
ISIS’s ability to exercise territorial control in the newly proclaimed provinces outside of 
Iraq and Syria is most likely limited at best.  Still, ISIS can point to the expansion of the 
caliphate as new provinces are declared, even if it suffers significant territorial losses in 
Iraq and Syria.  It can also draw parallels between the narrative of its own territorial 
administrative practices and those of caliphates past.   
ISIS appears to have adopted the Abbasid model of governor selection, favoring 
local leadership over imported Arab leadership, even in cases which forced ISIS to 
replace chosen governors (wali).  One example is the change in leadership of ISIS’s West 
Africa Province (Nigeria) which was formerly known as Boko Haram.  When the 
province was established, the existing leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, was 
appointed wali.  However, his tactics of using children to carry out suicide attacks and his 
attacks on other Sunni Muslims apparently caused ISIS to disavow Shekau and appoint 
another governor in his place (Searcey and Schmitt 2016).  The Arab leadership of ISIS 
selected the Nigerian, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, as the new wali.  This appointment is 
significant for two reasons.  First, it demonstrates ISIS’s commitment to include non-
Arab Muslims in provincial leadership positions, even after other non-Arab Muslims 
rebel or disappoint in those positions.  Second, it emphasizes ISIS’s concept of the 
ummah, which is not limited to Arabs, but includes “all Muslims” (al-Baghdadi 2014).  
Positioning the ISIS identity alongside the ummah identity could possibly generate wider 
appeal, and it encourages the faithful to retain the elements of their ethnic identity that are 
congruent with ISIS’s interpretation of Islam.  If a follower can identify as Caucasian and 





looking ahead to further expansion during which it would likely need to rely on local 
governors because of ISIS’s limited manpower.         
  ISIS already controlled sizeable portions of the provinces in northern Iraq and 
Syria when the group announced the caliphate from Mosul.  These areas serve as ISIS’s 
core, much like Medina for the Rashidun, Damascus for the Umayyad, and Baghdad for 
the Abbasid (and Constantinople for the Ottomans, which ISIS does not recognize as a 
valid caliphate).  ISIS initially did not amend the administrative borders of the provinces 
it controlled within Iraq and Syria.  However, later ISIS announced a revision of the 
boundaries in an effort to erase the borders drawn by Sykes and Picot and fight against 
what it deems the false idol of nationalism (Issue #4).  ISIS claims that wherever its 
provinces are established, the existing government becomes null and void, and the 
caliphate assumes control of religious and government activities (Issue #5).  To date, ISIS 
has declared provinces in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (together comprising the province of Khurasan), Nigeria, and 
Russia (North Caucasus region). 
 In the years 2014 and 2015, ISIS enjoyed expansion of territory, and by virtue of 
taxation (like the caliphates of old), increased financial support.  In 2016, however, ISIS 
lost nearly half of the key locations (gas fields, airports, cities, places of infrastructure) it 
gained (Almukhtar et al. 2016).  Furthermore, it is unlikely that ISIS has any significant 
measure of sovereignty in any of its provinces outside the core area, with the possible 
exceptions of Libya and the Sinai Peninsula (Visser 2016; Wintour and Stephen 2016).  
Yet, ISIS can only claim control of small areas in Libya and Egypt.  In the embattled 





state-building functions or taxation it manages in Syria and Iraq.  Thus, the declaration of 
provinces outside of ISIS’s core territory is mostly political in nature.  The territorial 
claims serve to establish ISIS as a formidable power on the international stage, and they 
serve to attract more Muslims to immigrate to the expanding caliphate.  Moreover, these 
declarations match ISIS’s geopolitical narrative, and at the very least, they mirror the 
administrative practices of the caliphates of the past, even if they have little bearing on 
sovereignty in those areas.     
         
4.4.3  The Reimagined Territory of ISIS 
 As Hoffman (1998) noted, the goal of terrorism is political change which a group 
achieves by gaining power.  Any given group’s power has spatial limitations defined by 
the territory it controls (Sack 1986).  Therefore, without territory, political power has no 
context.  In order to understand a terror group’s political goals, then, a study must include 
the territorial extent of those goals, even if the group in question does not explicitly state 
its spatial agenda.  Through cartographic visualization paired with content and narrative 
analyses of the group’s written or verbal statements, letters, or other publications, 
researchers can discover the ways in which a given terror group views political space and 
ways in which it wishes to modify territorial control.  Thus, a terror group’s vision for 
territorial control when the desired political change has been realized is the group’s 
reimagined territory. 
 Medina and Hepner (2013) introduce the concept of aspirational homelands as 
geographic areas over which nationalistic, cultural, or ideological terrorist groups wish to 
exert political control.  The theoretical concept of reimagined territory builds on this 





reimagine geographic space and boundaries in order to fuse the identities of group 
members to specific places via the cultural narratives of the groups.  These place-making 
processes not only define the group goals, they inform the members of the group how to 
experience place.  Thus, the theoretical concept of reimagined territory advances Medina 
and Hepner’s (2013) aspirational homelands by tying its premise to geographic theories 
of place and space, geopolitics, and theories of political violence, and by demonstrating 
that terror groups intentionally “make place” to advance and legitimize their ideologies.     
This research has produced a list of 352 place names extracted from Dabiq 
magazine and sorted into one of four spatial scale categories.  The results were then 
visualized in a series of twenty-one maps.  Next, the list of place names, the maps, and 
the original text of the magazine contributed to the geographic narrative analysis of 
ISIS’s ideological message.  Finally, the reimagined territory of ISIS takes shape by 
combining the results of the list of place names, the maps, and the narrative analysis into 
a representation of ISIS’s desired geopolitical situation.      
 ISIS’s eschatological narrative takes center stage in understanding the group’s 
geographic goals.  It is clear from official statements and from Dabiq that ISIS intends to 
expand beyond its holdings in Syria and Iraq.  Issue 4, which shows the black banner of 
ISIS flying over the Vatican, presents the clearest version of ISIS’s spatial aspirations.  In 
the foreward section of that issue, several quotations from various top-level leaders lay 
out the blueprints for ISIS’s map of the future.  Jerusalem and Rome are singled out as 
places that will be conquered.  One statement describes a caliphate that stretches from 
Spain to China, while another quotation on the same page (p.4) indicates the caliphate 





made these comments in reference to former president George W. Bush’s remarks about 
the political goals of Sunni extremists.  Al-Baghdadi confirmed the veracity of the 
statement by adding, “He [Bush] spoke the truth although he is a liar” (Issue #4, 4). 
 But how would the borders of this caliphate appear in today’s geopolitical 
climate?  A good start would be to examine the greatest extent of the early caliphates 
referenced earlier in this dissertation.  Returning to these borders would bring the glory of 
political relevance on the world stage back to the Muslim population living in those 
areas, and instill in them a sense of dignity and might according to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
(al-Baghdadi 2014).  However, the geopolitical power structure and international system 
of today are much different from the global power network that operated between the 7th 
and 13th centuries.   
The modern (sovereign) state emerged through a gauntlet of wars and treaties, 
dissolutions of empires, and the consolidation of power at the national level—the bulk of 
which occurred after the fall of the Abbasid’s Baghdad in 1258 CE (Krasner 2001; Bishai 
1968).  As much as ISIS would like to ignore the Westphalian system of international 
relations, the group understands that states are its main antagonists.  Evidence for this 
acknowledgement arises in ISIS’s construction of the Other in the form of states as 
previously outlined (USA, Russia, Israel, Iran, etc.).  Thus, using the early caliphates as a 
territorial backdrop, a clear view of ISIS’s geographic aspirations takes shape by 
considering states with relatively large Muslim populations as potential places of 
provincial expansion.  With a few exceptions (like Indonesia), these countries cover 
roughly the same area as the original “lands of Islam” that ISIS seeks to recover from 





Figure 4.32 displays countries wherein the largest religious denomination (in terms of 
percentage of the population) is Islam on the first map, and the spatial dimensions of the 
caliphates of old compared to Muslim countries today on the second map.  ISIS seeks to 
unite the Muslim world under its black banners, and the countries shown in Figure 4.32 
represent the places ISIS believes that could happen if Muslims answer the call to pledge 
spiritual and political allegiance to the caliphate. 
In addition to explicit statements from official ISIS sources regarding territorial 
interests, the cartographic visualizations from this analysis corroborate the group’s 
reimagined territory.  By comparing and/or overlaying the place name frequency of use 
results from Dabiq with the early caliphates and current Muslim-dominant countries, we 
discover striking similarities.  For the regions and countries categories, a visual 
examination requires comparison maps because the frequency polygons would obscure 
the underlying Muslim countries and early caliphates.  For the provinces and cities 
categories, however, overlay maps demonstrate the congruence between the most 
frequently used terms and the borders of Islam (early and current). 
Figure 4.33 presents a map of the historical and current regions mentioned in 
Dabiq and a map showing the boundaries of the early Islamic caliphates superimposed 
over the countries wherein Islam is the most prevalent religion today.  The continent 
frequencies are omitted from the regions map for simplicity, but it should be noted that 
“Europe” had thirty mentions and “Africa” had eight.  The spatial distribution of high-
frequency regions in Dabiq closely simulates the borders of historical and modern Islam.  
In fact, only three region place names (North, Central, and South America) occurring in 






Figure 4.32 Countries wherein Islam is the most prevalent religion compared with the 







Figure 4.33 Historical and modern regions mentioned in Dabiq magazine compared with 






the caliphates.  Western Europe includes both the Iberian Peninsula (al-Andalus) and 
Italy.  Neither area boasts a large Muslim population currently, but both areas fell under 
Muslim rule (the Umayyads held Spain and Portugal and the Abbasids held Sicily) in the 
past.  Moreover, Spain and Italy (Rome) are both mentioned by name as places ISIS 
wishes to control.  At the regions scale, the frequency data generally align with the stated 
objectives of ISIS, the borders of past caliphates, and the countries in which Islam is 
currently the most prevalent religion. 
 Figure 4.34 compares the countries (excluding the Western Hemisphere) 
mentioned in Dabiq to the traditional and current Muslim lands.  Here again the spatial 
distribution of high-frequency place names generally follows the borders of past and 
present Islam.  Among the highest three frequency categories, only one country is outside 
of the past and/or current Muslim-dominated areas—the United States.  Once more, the 
reason for the United States’ high frequency centers on its important role as the Other 
within ISIS’s ideology.  Similarly, Japan, Russia, the UK, Belgium, and Australia garner 
higher frequencies based on their positions as enemies of ISIS, but none of them is in the 
highest three frequency categories.  One seemingly obvious anomaly that occurs when 
comparing the two maps in Figure 4.34 is the relatively low frequency (5) of Muslim 
Indonesia, which houses the largest number of adherents of Islam in the world.   
Yet, ISIS’s fixation with territorial holdings of the past combined with prophecies of the 
future may shed light on why the group largely ignores Indonesia (aside from the single 
comment about the extent of the eventual caliphate in Issue #4).  Although Arab 
merchants brought their religion to Indonesia’s ports as early as the eighth century, Islam 






Figure 4.34 Countries mentioned in Dabiq magazine compared with the boundaries of 






fifteenth century (Wanandi 2002).  The timing of Islam’s spread into Indonesia 
contributes to its low frequency of occurrence in Dabiq.  First, none of the idealized 
caliphates of the past included Indonesia within its borders.  Second, Islam reached 
Indonesia after the Koran and hadith were recorded, and therefore, the place name occurs 
in neither of those sacred writings.  Thus, because Indonesia is not mentioned in the 
prophecies regarding the end of the world, it does not hold as much ideological sway in 
ISIS’s eschatological narrative. Like the regions scale, the country scale frequency data 
also align with ISIS’s stated goals, the borders the Rashidun, Umayyad, and Abbasid 
caliphates, and the places wherein Islam prevails today.  
Figure 4.35 depicts the provinces and cities mentioned in Dabiq magazine with 
the early caliphates and Muslim-dominant countries as a base map.  Only five 
(California, Martha’s Vineyard, Missouri, Quebec, and Virginia) of the seventy-three 
provinces occur outside of the past and current lands of Islam, with each of them having a 
frequency of one.  These provinces are each mentioned in the context of enemy places, or 
places of the Other.  Each of the remaining sixty-eight province place names occurs 
within the boundaries of the historical caliphates and current Muslim countries.  Thus, the 
high-frequency and lower frequency place names at the province scale mirror the two 
previous geographic scales in terms of spatial distribution within the confines the early 
caliphates and the current countries where Islam is the most prevalent religion.   
At the city scale, only two place names in the three highest frequency classes 
occur outside of the lands of Islam.  Rome is the ninth most frequently used city place 
name (eighteen mentions).  As previously discussed, Rome’s ideological importance as 






Figure 4.35 Provinces and cities mentioned in Dabiq magazine compared with the 






city is Washington, DC, the capital of ISIS’s Other.  All remaining high-frequency (top 
three classes) place names and the overwhelming majority of low-frequency city names 
occur within the areas of Islam’s past and present.  Therefore, the frequency city scale 
follows the same spatial distribution pattern as the larger three geographic scales. 
A clear picture of ISIS’s reimagined territory now emerges.  The group’s 
apocalyptic outlook positions specific geographic places at the center of its ideological, 
military, and political goals.  In order to initiate the chain of events that ISIS believes will 
lead to the end of the world, the group has focused on establishing a de facto state by 
declaring itself a caliphate.  ISIS, while performing state-building functions in Syria and 
Iraq, has attempted to expand its influence and borders by declaring provinces in eleven 
countries (including Syria and Iraq).  The group has also executed terror attacks in 
several countries in an effort to draw the target countries into a ground war in Syria.  ISIS 
needs the army of Rome to come to battle at Dabiq, where Allah will grant them victory 
over the crusaders.  The battle will then turn to Constantinople, and on to Rome before 
the apocalypse occurs.  Based on the place name frequencies from Dabiq magazine, 
ISIS’s stated geographic objectives, and the borders of past and current lands of Islam, 
ISIS’s reimagined territory appears in Figure 4.36. 
 In the short term, the most important places for ISIS are its core in Syria and Iraq 
(for security, administration, and expansion) and the holiest sites of Islam (Mecca, 
Medina, Jerusalem).  In order to gain and maintain legitimacy as a caliphate, ISIS must 
show that it can perform the functions of a caliphate such as security, health care, 
education, and taxation.  It must also gain control of Islam’s holy sites if it wants to 



































 (Crooke 2014).  If Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is to be a rightful successor of Mohammad, he 
must control Mohammad’s homeland.  Accordingly, Dabiq mentions Medina forty-seven 
times and Mecca forty-five times, making them the third and fourth most frequently used 
city place names.  Moreover, ISIS has already declared a province that spans the lands of 
the two holy cities in Saudi Arabia—an area which each of the three early caliphates 
controlled.  ISIS’s medium range goals include the expansion of the caliphate.  Like the 
short-term goals, this endeavor has also begun in earnest with the announcement of 
provinces from Algeria to Afghanistan.  These provinces are depicted in lilac on the map 
in Figure 4.36.  Even if ISIS cannot enforce sovereignty in these provinces, the 
declaration of control is ideologically sufficient to maintain legitimacy.  As ISIS declares 
more and more provinces (meaning that more groups and/or populations have pledged 
their allegiance to the caliphate), the caliphate’s borders grow more akin to its dynastic 
predecessors.  When it first declared its statehood, ISIS’s caliphate was small and 
confined like the Rashidun’s state.  Viewing the spatial extent of its declared provinces, 
ISIS’s caliphate now extends beyond the reach of the Rashiduns, but not yet as far as the 
Umayyads. 
ISIS’s long term geographic aim is to unite the entire Muslim world under the 
black banner of the caliphate to usher in the final victory for Allah and his army.  
However, in order to fulfill the eschatological prophecies of the hadith, ISIS will need to 
conquer lands beyond the current and historical bounds of Islam.  Any of the Sunni-
majority countries holds the potential for a pro-ISIS internal uprising and overthrow of its 
own secular government (see Libya or Syria).  But Iran will require external pressure due 





prize of Persia.  Next, the once-Muslim al-Andalus has been Christian for more than 400 
years.  Returning Islam to the Iberian Peninsula will require another full military 
conquest.  Finally, Rome must fall to the Muslim army.  Here again, ISIS cannot rely on 
internal pressure to break the crosses of Rome.  It must accomplish what no Muslim army 
has ever accomplished—the conquest of Rome for Allah. 
 In short, ISIS imagines the future borders of the caliphate to encompass all the 
lands of Islam.  The boundary will stretch from Spain in the west to Indonesia in the east, 
defying the false borders of Sykes-Picot and the reordering the international system of 
state sovereignty.  The sprawling caliphate will be the homeland for the entire ummah of 
believers with a rightful successor leading them to victory against the enemies of Allah 
until Constantinople and Rome fall.  The high frequency place names which occur 
outside of the lands of Islam serve their purpose in becoming the place of the Other.  
These places are to be attacked and provoked, but not conquered and occupied.                         
      
4.5  Validation of the Theoretical Concept 
Using al Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine 
 This dissertation analyzes the official publications and statements of ISIS to 
reveal the group’s geographic vision for the future.   However, the analytical methods and 
theoretical concept of reimagined territory apply to any terrorist organization with 
political (and therefore geographic) ambitions.  The aim of this section is to validate the 
utility of the methods employed using ISIS data on a different data set, and to 
demonstrate general applicability of reimagined territory as a useful theoretical concept 
in understanding the goals and aspirations of terror groups.  In analyzing al Qaeda in the 





employed earlier in this chapter: results of the computer-aided content analysis, results of 
the manual content analysis, cartographic visualization, geographic narrative analysis, 
and reimagined territory of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  The methodology and 
theoretical framework remain the same for these data.  Accordingly, only deviations or 
other special considerations are highlighted as necessary in an effort to present the data 
and analysis in a more abbreviated fashion. 
 To date, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has published a total of 14 issues of 
Inspire magazine, which first appeared on the Internet in 2010 (Droogan and Peattie 
2016).  Inspire is the second attempt at publishing an English language jihad magazine 
aimed specifically at Muslims in the West.  The first magazine was (American) Samir 
Khan’s Jihad Recollections, which managed four issues before Khan departed the United 
States for Yemen where he joined AQAP in 2009 (Droogan and Peattie).  Khan 
collaborated with another American, Anwar Al-Awlaki, in the creation and publication of  
Inspire.  They produced nine issues (the last two were published posthumously) in the 
span of one year before they were killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2011 (Droogan 
and Peattie 2016).  As the title implies, the goal of Inspire magazine is to encourage its 
readers to wage war against the West in their home countries, but especially in the United 
States (Lemieux et al. 2014).  AQAP is widely considered to be the strongest and most 
capable branch of al Qaeda (Karmon 2015).   
 For the purpose of this validation, the first five issues of Inspire are selected as the 
data sample.  The issues were selected without prior knowledge of their content or length 
with the assumption that the first five issues would be a representative sample of the 





Jihadology.net, a website dedicated to the collection of jihadi materials.  Table 4.4 
displays the publication information for the issues of Inspire used in this research. 
 
4.5.1  Results of the Computer-Aided 
Content Analysis 
 The Inspire issues are subjected to the same format conversion in preparation for 
processing in the text mining software.  Furthermore, the same R code (adapted for the al  
Qaeda files) is used in the creation of the term document matrices from the text files.  The 
average number of unique terms per issue is 2,673.6, with 3,476 terms (Issue 5) 
registering as the maximum value and 837 individual terms (Issue 3) as the minimum 
value.  As with Dabiq, the most frequently used term over all five issues is “Allah” with 
1,137 individual occurrences.  Table 4.5 displays the number of unique terms that 
appeared in each issue of the magazine along with its highest frequency term.  
Word clouds are also generated from the Inspire data.  The minimum frequency 
for these visualizations is also set to 15, except for Issue 3.  Because the page count (and 




Issues of Inspire Magazine 
Issue  Hijri (Islamic) Date Gregorian Date Length (pages) 
1 Summer 1431 January 2010 67 
2 Fall 1431 October 2010 74 
3 November 1431 November 2010 23 
4 Winter 1431 January 2011 67 







Number of unique terms and highest frequency terms in Inspire 
Issue Length (pages) Unique Terms Highest Frequency Term Frequency 
1 67 3139 Allah 189 
2 74 3017 Allah 277 
3 23 837 Allah 37 
4 67 2899 Allah 277 
5 70 3476 Allah 357 
 
produces a word cloud with very few terms.  Setting the minimum frequency  
to five results in a more useful visualization.  Figures 4.37 and 4.38 are the word clouds 
for the Inspire data. 
There are some similarities between the word clouds of Inspire and Dabiq.  The 
highest frequency words of Inspire also include “Allah,” “will,” and “Muslim” in the top 
tier (blue font), indicating the ideological importance of religious identity in al Qaeda’s 
narrative.  The second tier consists of “Islam,” “jihad,” “people,” “one,” “fight,” and 
“brother.”  Notably, there are fewer place names among the highest frequency terms in 
comparison to ISIS.  Only Yemen appears in the second tier, and America in the next tier 
down.  Like ISIS, however, AQAP refers to the United States using various place names.  
Accordingly, the frequencies for each term are not high enough individually, but together 
make the United States the most frequently used place name in Inspire.  Also of note is 
the shorter length of Issue 3, which is a special issue outlining the details of AQAP’s plot 
to send printer bombs via FedEx and UPS.  “Package” appears 24 times and “operation” 
(stemmed to “oper”) appears 23 times in the issue.  Because the issue is singularly 
focused, there are fewer opportunities for the usual ideological themes and associated 







                













4.5.2  Results of the Manual Content Analysis 
 As previously mentioned, there are no preexisting data dictionaries to assist in the 
computer-aided content analysis.  However, for the manual coding process applied to the 
Inspire data, the dictionary of Arabic terms and proper names contributed to overall 
efficiency.  Naturally, the text of Inspire included names and terms that did not appear in 
Dabiq, and those new terms were added to the dictionary as the manual coding process 
progressed.  Furthermore, the context for each term is verified using the original 
magazine issue to ensure that its usage and meaning (in the al Qaeda context) are not 
derived from the ISIS context.   
 AQAP also utilizes multiple place names in referring to a single geographic 
location.  The most common occurrence is the use of “America,” “USA,” “US,” or 
“United States” interchangeably.  As before, the sum of each term’s frequency is used in 
generating the cartographic visualizations.  Furthermore, each instance of “us” is verified 
in the original text to distinguish between the plural pronoun and the place.  Other 
multiple-term place name examples from the magazine include the use of “Jerusalem” 
and its Arabic name, “al Quds,” as well as “England,” “UK,” and “Britain” in various 
contexts.  Each multiple-term place name is reduced to a single term for cartographic 
representation.  Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula refers to the White House in only one 
instance over the span of five issues.  As with ISIS’s usage, Inspire employs the White 
House as a proxy for Washington, DC as the geographic place of the head of the US 
government.  Accordingly, the one occurrence of White House is combined with the six 
occurrences of Washington, DC.   






Number of unique terms and highest frequency terms in Inspire 
Issue Length (pages) Place Names Highest Frequency Place Frequency 
1 67 81 America 72 
2 74 87 America 51 
3 23 22 Arabian Peninsula / USA 7 
4 67 75 America 21 
5 70 67 Yemen 78 
 
 
issue, as well as the place name from each issue with the highest frequency.  The average 
number of place names per issue is 66.4, which represents a much lower figure than 
ISIS’s total of eighty-one names per issue.  The next five issues of Inspire would need to 
average 95.6 place names each in order to match the average number of place names 
occurring in an issue of Dabiq.  The maximum number of place names occurring in a 
single issue is eighty-seven in Issue 2.  The minimum number of place names is twenty-
two in Issue 3 (the special issue).  Figure 4.39 displays a bar chart of the eleven highest  
 
 





frequency place names in Inspire (two places had twenty-two mentions).  The 
frequencies shown in the bar chart represent the sum of all place name variants associated 
with each term.  Interestingly, ISIS and al Qaeda share only four of the top eleven highest 
frequency place names: Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and the United States. 
The context for each place name is also verified for correct categorization in the 
event that a term could fall into more than one category (city vs. province, etc.).  
Geographic directional terms like “north” and “central” are noted and recorded as 
different place names when they modify place names like “America” or “Africa.”  The 
categorization process yields at total of 179 distinct place names classified in one of four 
spatial scale categories.  There are twenty-seven place names in the regions category, 
forty-nine place names in the countries category, twenty-two place names in the 
provinces category, and eighty-one place names in the cities category, as shown in Table 
4.7.  The complete listings of place names by category are found in Appendices G, H, I, 
and J.  
As with Dabiq, the majority of the place names occurring in Inspire have a low 




Number of place names and highest frequency places in Inspire by category 
Category Place Names Highest Frequency Place Frequency 
Regions 27 Arabian Peninsula 65 
Countries 49 America 211 
Provinces 22 Abyan, Yemen 26 






issues.  One hundred fourteen (64%) place names occur only two times or less in the text.  
The changes in usage over the span of five issues, the frequencies of the eleven most 
mentioned place names are plotted by issue in a series of bar plot visualizations.  Figures 
4.40, 4.41 and 4.42 present bar plots of each place name accompanied by its trend line 
(dotted line) for reference.  Six of the terms show an increasing trend while five of the 
terms show a decreasing trend. 
A geographic analysis of Inspire magazine shares the same challenges and 
limitations as encountered with the Dabiq data—defining the West and the East.  The 
treatment of “the West” as a nonspatial reference to ideology, socio-religious beliefs, and 
governments continues in the analysis of AQAP.  Because ISIS can trace its origin and 
ideological lineage through al Qaeda, a shared parent organization, it would be expected 
to find many similarities in the narratives of two groups.  Like ISIS, al Qaeda Central 
sees the West as the root of the problems in the Muslim world for a number of reasons 
including the Western occupation of Muslim holy lands, Western support for Israel, and 
negative sociocultural influences which have corrupted Islam (Blanchard 2007). 
Consequently, “the West” plays the central role of the Other in Al Qaeda’s ideology as 
well.  “The West” appeared 129 times in the first five issues of Inspire magazine.  If this 
term were treated as a place name, it would be the third most frequently used geographic 
place, behind only the United States and Yemen.  As expected, AQAP’s narrative 
includes the premodern Islamic tradition of dividing the world into the “Land of Islam” 
and its opposing twin, the “Land of War” (harb).  AQAP’s definition of each term, 
however, differs significantly from ISIS’s interpretation.  Inspire describes the Land of 






Figure 4.40 Bar plots of the four highest frequency place names occurring in Inspire 















Figure 4.41 Bar plots of the fifth through the eighth highest frequency place names 













Figure 4.42 Bar plots of the ninth and tenth highest frequency place names occurring in 








where Islam is the most prevalent religion today (Inspire Issue 4).   
Conversely, the Land of War is any country that has entered into war with or 
invaded the Land of Islam.  AQAP asserts that “…all of the Western nations that have an 
active participation in the occupation of Afghanistan or Iraq or any other Muslim land are 
considered to be dar al-harb” (Issue 4, 56).  These definitions of each land are more 
static and quantifiable than those of ISIS which shift with every military confrontation 
that results in ground gained or lost.  Moreover, it suggests that states not involved in any 
way in operations in Muslim lands may comprise a third category of neutral lands, 
indicating that al Qaeda may not view the world in the same binary fashion as ISIS.  
However, AQAP’s use of the terms aligns with its use of “the West” as the Other.  Thus, 
in the AQAP context, Land of Islam and Land of War are ideological cues evoked in the 
construction of the jihadi identity.  They do not inform the follower where he/she, should 
be.  Rather, they tell the reader how they should be.  Again, these terms are not mapped 
due to their nonspatial application.  “Land of War” appears twenty-seven times in the 
first five issues of Inspire and “Land of Islam” appears four times.       
 
4.5.3  Results of the Cartographic Visualization 
 The results of the manual categorization of the place names occurring in Inspire 
are used in the production of a series of 18 maps.  The same cartographic strategy used in 
the mapping of ISIS’s place names is applied to the list of AQAP place names.  
Accordingly, the lists of places in each geographic scale category are mapped according 
to their spatial distribution.  Thus, the data play a key role in determining the number of 
maps required to efficiently and effectively visualize the place names.  Not surprisingly, 





The following sections show and discuss the cartographic visualization results of the 
regions, countries, provinces, and cities categories.   
 
4.5.3.1  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Regions in Inspire 
 The manual classification process yields twenty-seven distinct place names in the 
regions category.  These results were further categorized as either continents, current 
regions in Africa and the Middle East, current regions in Asia, historical regions, or 
hydrologic features.  The same considerations that applied to the projections, color 
schemes, map background information, and data classification scheme (natural breaks) 
for the Dabiq data also apply in the case of the Inspire data.  The following paragraphs 
discuss only the deviations from these norms rather than repeating the information 
presented previously. 
 Figure 4.43 is the map of continent place names occurring in Inspire magazine.  
All of the frequencies on this map are relatively low.  Europe accumulates the most 
mentions with four.  Asia garners three mentions and Africa and Australia each appear 
just two times in the text.  North and South America are only mentioned one time, and 
Antarctica is not mentioned at all in the first five issues of Inspire.  In fact, the entire 
regions category has relatively lower frequencies with the exception of its most often 
occurring place name, the Arabian Peninsula (sixty-five mentions).  It appears that, aside 
from its homeland of the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP favors using place names at the 
country scale over the larger regional (including continents) scale.  
 Figure 4.44 is a map of the current region place names in Africa and the Middle 





























































































seven times the frequency of the next highest place name.  None of the sixty-five 
occurrences is from the acronym “AQAP.”  As with ISIS, the name of the group refers to 
an organization and not a place, even though the name contains a geographic reference.  
It should be noted once more that while some regions have relatively clear, uncontested 
definitions (like the Arabian Peninsula), other regions have more fluid, ambiguous 
definitions (like the Middle East or Western Europe).  With the previously discussed 
limitations of constructing and defining regions in mind, Inspire’s treatment of African 
regions is considered within the range of accepted regional conventions for Africa.  Al 
Qaeda mentions all of the regions of Africa by name at least one time.  This research 
acknowledges that the regional boundaries selected for cartographic visualization are 
simply one of many ways to group the various countries into the regions on the map.  It is 
important to note that aside from the Maghreb (North Africa), each region in Africa only 
garners one mention in the first five issues.  Thus, whether Angola (or any given African 
country outside the Maghreb) is in Central or Southern Africa is less important because 
each region has an equal frequency. 
Some definitions of the Maghreb include Egypt while others do not.  However, as 
Egypt is also generally considered to be part of the Middle East (culturally and 
geographically), this research excludes Egypt from the Maghreb in favor of mapping the 
country as part of the Middle East.  The Maghreb (nine occurrences) has the second 
highest frequency in the current regions category.  The Middle East is next with five 
mentions.  Like ISIS, AQAP also refers to Kurdistan by name in the text of Inspire.  The 
boundaries for this polygon are the same used in the ISIS maps (based on the Kurdish 





Figure 4.45 is a map of the current regions in Asia that occur in the first five 
issues of Inspire.  The focus regions of this map all have low frequencies, reinforcing the 
observance that AQAP appears to favor country place names over regional place names.  
The conspicuous absence of South Asia in the text of Inspire also underscores this 
tendency of the magazine authors.  Both Afghanistan and Pakistan (which are generally 
considered part of South Asia) accumulate high frequencies at the country scale with 80 
and 22 respectively.  This indicates a preference to refer to these ideologically important 
place names at the country scale instead of the region scale.  Curiously, AQAP only 
refers to Southeast Asia one time as a region.  Yet, this area is home to the world’s largest 
Muslim country, Indonesia, which only manages two mentions by name in the magazine.  
Furthermore, al Qaeda Central has established a working relationship with jihadi 
organizations in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, and the Philippines through the  
years (Joscelyn 2013).  AQAP mentions none of these countries by name with the 
exception of Indonesia.  It is possible that these areas do not garner mentions in Inspire 
simply because it is the magazine of a regional branch of al Qaeda as opposed to al 
Qaeda Central.  However, AQAP mentions Afghanistan and Pakistan very frequently, 
despite their locations outside the Arabian Peninsula.  For whatever reason, this region 
appears to be less important in the ideological narrative of AQAP (and ISIS as well). 
Figure 4.46 is a map of the historical regions occurring in Inspire magazine.  
AQAP references six historical place names, all of which occurred in Dabiq as well.  
Sham accumulates the highest frequency of ten.  Most of those references occur in the 
context of direct quotes from the hadith.  Only one occurrence of Sham is a modern 























































































next highest total frequency of four.  Each of these mentions is a modern usage of the 
classical Islamic name for the land surrounding Mecca and Medina.  Najd has three 
occurrences, all in the context of direct quotes from the hadith.  Khurasan has two 
mentions in the context of an interview with a top AQAP official, Said Ali al-Shihri, who 
later died in 2013 from injuries sustained from a US drone strike in Yemen (Mazzetti 
2013).  Al-Shihri most likely uses the term Khurasan as a proxy for Afghanistan, but the 
context is somewhat vague in the magazine.  Finally, AQAP uses the terms Andalus and 
Hijaz two times each.  Andalus appears in an article about the history of Islam in that area 
of the world.  One of the Hijaz references occurs in a direct quote from the hadith while 
the other is a modern reference to coastal area of Saudi Arabia. 
 Figure 4.47 is a map of the hydrologic features occurring in al Qaeda’s magazine.  
This map is the final installment in the regions category.  The Persian Gulf and Gulf of 
Aden polygons are exported from the Natural Earth oceans shapefile.  The Amu Darya 
and Jordan rivers are digitized from ESRI’s National Geographic base map layer 
available in ArcMap.  The same mapping convention described in ISIS’s hydrologic 
features map is employed for the coloring of the polygons and the line width of the rivers 
in this map.  As two polygon features occur in the map, two differing shades of blue are 
employed to distinguish the frequencies of the features.  AQAP’s usage of the Persian 
Gulf occurs primarily in the context of the political region surrounding the body of water.  
The occurrences of the Jordan River and the Amu Darya river appear in the context of 
using the rivers as geographic reference points in narratives about military operations in 






                           






































4.5.3.2  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Countries in Inspire 
The manual categorization process yields forty-nine country place names in the 
first five issues of Inspire magazine.  To optimize the visualization of the country place 
names, the maps display the results in a series of four maps.  Based on the spatial 
distribution of the data, the four maps are the countries of the Western Hemisphere, 
Europe, Africa and Middle East, and Asia.  The same sequential color scheme (light 
yellow through brown) denotes the frequencies of the country place names.   
Figure 4.48 is a map of countries in the Western Hemisphere which occur in the 
text of Inspire magazine.  The USA contiguous Lambert conformal conic projection 
provides the best visualization for this map.  The United States is the most frequently 
mentioned country on the map, with 211 occurrences in just five issues.  This high 
frequency underscores the importance of positioning the United States as the evil Other 
in AQAP’s jihadi narrative.  AQAP’s total number of references to the United States in 
five issues is sixty-eight higher than ISIS’s total in ten issues.  The only other countries 
mentioned in the Western Hemisphere are Cuba (two occurrences) and Canada (one 
occurrence).  Not surprisingly, the references to Cuba arise in the context of al Qaeda 
personnel imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base’s detention camp, which ties for 
the most occurrences in the cities category.  The relatively high frequency for 
Guantanamo Bay demonstrates the ideological magnitude of that place as a symbol of 
injustice and struggle against the Other.  Canada is mentioned as one of the countries in 
which a lone attacker could use a pickup truck with steel blades mounted on the front to 






















































Figure 4.49 is a map of European country place names occurring in the first five 
issues of Inspire.  The United Kingdom scores the highest frequency among European 
countries with nine occurrences.  This total includes the sum of the frequencies of four 
individual terms: England, the UK, United Kingdom, and Britain.  In each case, the  
reference to the UK positions the place name as the enemy or the Other.  A close second 
is Bosnia with eight occurrences.  In the ideological discourse of AQAP, Bosnia is the 
place of a missed opportunity.  While a Muslim genocide was largely prevented, the 
efforts to establish an Islamic state fizzled out (or never really started) before making any 
real progress in that direction—a missed opportunity al Qaeda regrets (Issue 2).  Russia 
garners five mentions, usually in the context of an enemy of Islam, but also more 
specifically as the antagonist and aggressor in the Chechen conflict.  AQAP generally 
presents the remaining European countries it mentioned in Inspire as lands of the West, 
places of the enemy, and targets of future attacks.  However, the relatively low 
frequencies indicate that AQAP’s ideological focus is elsewhere. 
Figure 4.50 is a map of the countries in Africa and the Middle East occurring in 
the first five issues of Inspire magazine.  Although the United States boasts the highest 
frequency of any country (or any place name for that matter) by far, this map displays the 
area of the highest spatial concentration of high frequency country place names.  
Fourteen of the top fifteen place names are at least partially visible on this map.  As the 
territorial home (albeit without sovereign control like ISIS in Syria and Iraq) of al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen predictably tallies a high frequency of 132 mentions.  
Iraq is second with fifty-eight occurrences, all in the context of the ongoing war and the 





































































































and Palestine (forty-one mentions) occupy a central position in the ideology of AQAP 
(discussed later in the narrative analysis section) which is reflected in their high 
frequencies.  With twenty-five occurrences, Israel also holds a key position in AQAP’s 
political agenda to rid the Levant of the Zionists and restore Muslim rule to Jerusalem 
(Blanchard 2007).  
Figure 4.51 is a map of the Asian countries occurring in Inspire.  This map is the 
final installment of maps in the countries category.  Afghanistan is the third highest 
country place name with eighty occurrences over five issues.  As the birth place and first 
trial run of al Qaeda’s jihadi ideology, Afghanistan plays a central role in AQAP’s 
organizational identity and its more recent anti-Western narrative.  Al Qaeda views 
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan as a crusade against the whole of the Muslim world 
(Blanchard 2007).  The same logic applies to Pakistan (twenty-two mentions), which 
AQAP often lumps together with Afghanistan in the context of the crusade against 
Muslims.  Curiously low is the total number of occurrences of Iran in AQAP’s magazine.  
Bin Laden’s vision for the future did not include the Shia perspective within the 
caliphate, and the early days of al Qaeda in Iraq saw attacks on Shiites (for which al- 
Zawahiri later reprimanded al-Zarqawi) (Atwan 2008).  Thus, as a non-Western Other, 
Iran seemingly should garner more mentions.  However, dealing with heretics within 
Islam has become a lower priority to the immediate fight against the West in Iraq, 
















































4.5.3.3  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Provinces in Inspire 
The manual categorization process yields only twenty-two province (or equivalent 
areal unit) place names.  The spatial groupings of the place names mentioned in this 
category yielded a series of four maps:  Western Hemisphere, Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Middle East, and South Asia.  Unlike ISIS, AQAP only refers to existing 
provinces, states, or districts, allowing for the use of the GADM feature classes for all of 
the polygons mapped.  For consistency, the previously employed color scheme applies to 
the frequencies in this series of maps. 
 Figure 4.52 is a map of the provinces in the Western Hemisphere that occur in 
Inspire magazine.  This map makes use of the USA Contiguous Lambert Conformal 
Conic projection to minimize the distortion in North America.  AQAP references five 
American states over the span of five issues.  The California reference was in the context 
of Muslims defending their beliefs from the pulpit in America.  AQAP mentions Arizona 
in the context of racial profiling by government agencies along the border with Mexico.  
The Texas reference relates to AQAP’s criticism of corporate America and the “harmful 
actions against humanity” (Issue 1).  The authors of Inspire allude to a judge in Georgia  
who jailed a Muslim woman in 2008 for refusing to remove her headscarf while in his 
courtroom (Nasaw 2008).  Finally, the North Carolina references arise in Samir Khan’s 
feature article on his decision to leave the United States behind forever to join al Qaeda in 
Yemen.  According to his version of events, he departed the United States from North 
Carolina, where his family lives (Issue 2, Brown and Severson 2011).  







































































































occurring in AQAP’s magazine.  This map features only four provinces, but one of them 
is the highest frequency place name in the provinces category.  Abyan Governate, Yemen 
garnered 26 mentions in the first five issues of Inspire.  The site of militant attacks 
against the Yemeni government for nearly a decade, Abyan Governate has been an 
AQAP stronghold in recent times (Kasinof 2011).  It is also mentioned in a hadith as the 
place from which an army of 12,000 will come to fight for the caliphate (which does not 
exist yet for al Qaeda) (Issue 5).  Thus, as a battleground and as the place name 
mentioned in the hadith, Abyan is an ideologically important place.  The Yemeni 
province of Shabwa occurs three times, all in reference to US bombings of militants 
(Issue 1).  Al Jawf Province in Yemen is mentioned in reference to AQAP’s attack on the 
Shiite Houthi rebels who also seek power in Yemen (Issue 4).  Finally, Zanzibar (a 
semiautonomous region in Tanzania) occurs in the context of AQAP’s demand for the 
United States and the rest of the West to remove their troops and interests from all 
Muslim lands from Afghanistan to Zanzibar (Issue 2).   
Figure 4.54 is a map of the Middle Eastern and Russian provinces evoked by 
AQAP in Inspire.  The Russian Republic of Chechnya has the highest frequency on this 
map with ten mentions in the first five issues.  The textual references to Chechnya arise 
mostly in the context of places of international jihad in which al Qaeda operatives have 
played a role.  Inspire mentions only three provinces in Iraq and one in Egypt, all with 
low frequencies.  The general lack of references to place names in these areas indicates 
that AQAP’s operations and permanent presence are limited here, and that its focus may 
be in other areas with higher frequencies (such as Yemen). 






































































































Inspire magazine.  This map is the final installment in the provinces category.  The 
highest frequency place name on this map is Panjshir Province, Afghanistan with two 
occurrences.  Three other Afghan place names are mapped along with two Pakistani 
provinces, each with only one instance in the magazine.  The low frequency totals in the  
provinces category indicate that AQAP favors country-level place names in advancing its 
narrative.  For example, Afghanistan accrues eighty mentions and Pakistan accrues 
twenty-two, while their provinces amass just seven total mentions combined.  
Furthermore, because the category only tallies twenty-two total place names, the 
indication is that AQAP largely avoids using province place names in favor of using 
either country or city place names. 
 
4.5.3.4  Cartographic Visualization Results 
of the Cities in Inspire 
The manual categorization process yields eighty-one place names in the cities 
category.  The spatial groupings of these place names result in a series of five maps in the 
cities category: Western Hemisphere, Europe and North Africa, the Middle East, South 
Asia, and Yemen and Somalia.  Like the ISIS maps before, these maps rely on a point 
feature class for the spatial representation of the city locations.  Graduated symbols 
(circles) denote the frequencies using the cartographic convention of larger circles equals 
higher frequencies.  Although the cities category yields the highest number of individual 
place names in any category (eighty-one different locations), its highest frequency of 
twelve is also the lowest total among the most frequently mentioned names in each 
category.  


















































other maps of this part of the world, this map uses the USA Contiguous Lambert 
Conformal Conical projection to minimize distortion.  Guantanamo Prison garners the 
most attention in Inspire magazine with twelve mentions over five issues.  Tied with 
Sana’a, Yemen for the highest in the cities category, Guantanamo Prison is an important 
location in the ideological narrative of al Qaeda.  As described in the previous section on 
the countries category, Guantanamo Prison perfectly embodies the repression of the 
Muslim self by the evil American Other in the eyes of al Qaeda.  Notwithstanding the 
magnitude of al Qaeda’s success in the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 
Guantanamo Prison’s frequency doubles both New York City and Washington, DC (six 
mentions each).  AQAP mentions Times Square seven times in the context of Pakistani- 
American Faisal Shahzad’s failed bombing attempt of the popular tourist destination in 
New York City in 2010 (Mazzetti et al. 2010).  Ground Zero (at the World Trade Center 
site in New York City) also appears by name one time in the text. Detroit, Michigan 
appears in the magazine twice in the context of the failed attempt to detonate a bomb on 
an international flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009 (O’Connor 
and Schmitt 2009).  The other mention of Detroit is a reference to ghettos where Muslims 
live in the United States.  Chicago emerges as the target city of Operation Hemorrhage, 
the attempt to send two package explosives via FedEx and UPS as outlined in Issue 3.  
AQAP references Annapolis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace conference 
that took place at the United States Naval Academy in 2007 (Myers and Cooper 2007).  
Finally, Arlington, Virginia emerges in passing as the location of a terrorism think tank. 
Figure 4.57 is a map of the European and North African cities mentioned Inspire 
























































Granada, Vienna, and the Suez Canal.  The other cities mapped manage only a single 
mention over the span of five issues.  London has a different context for each mention. 
AQAP mentions London as a location through which a package bomb transited (Issue 3) 
and as an example of a European ghetto wherein Muslims live (Issue 4).  Both Vienna  
instances refer to the place where interim Egyptian leader, Mohamed El Baradei, resided 
(Issue 5).  Both references to the Suez Canal come in the context of its regional location 
which held great strategic importance in the past as well as in the current geopolitical 
environment (Issue 5).  Each of the Granada occurrences recalls the fall of the last 
Muslim stronghold in Spain in 1492.  The Fall of Granada marked the end of more than 
seven centuries of Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula (Nicolle 2003).  
Figure 4.58 is a map of the Middle Eastern cities occurring in the first five issues 
of Inspire magazine.  The highest frequency cities are Mecca and Medina, each with nine 
occurrences.  Jerusalem is next with eight mentions, and Islam’s holy site of Al Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem has seven occurrences.  These four place names occur in the 
context of linking al Qaeda’s ideology to broader Islamic theology in an effort to 
legitimize the cause.  Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, also garners seven mentions in 
the first five issues.  Fallujah draws the most attention of the Iraqi cities mentioned, 
amassing a frequency of five.  AQAP refers to several Koranic locations as well, such as 
the Battle of Uhud, the Battle of Badr, the Battle of Tabuk, and the Ka’aba in Mecca.  
Also of note are the prisons of Abu Ghraib in Iraq (two instances) and Al Hair in Saudi  
Arabia (one instance).  These prisons hold ideological value as detention centers for al 
Qaeda personnel.  


























































































Inspire magazine.  The cities of Afghanistan dominate this visualization.  As the site of 
the modern era’s first international jihad, Afghanistan commands considerable attention 
from al Qaeda and its affiliates, which sought diplomatic shelter there in 1996 after being 
expelled from Sudan (Astill 2001).  The relatively high frequencies and high volume of  
cities mentioned in the magazine illustrate this point.  Three Pakistani cities also receive 
treatment: Quetta (four mentions), Karachi (three mentions), and Kohat (two mentions).  
Tashkent, Uzbekistan arises during a discussion of the Muslim identity versus the 
national identity.  AQAP mentions Mumbai, India as the site of the 2008 terror attacks 
during which more than one hundred people died and hundreds more received injuries 
(Sengupta 2008).  
Figure 4.60 is a map of the Yemeni and Somali cities occurring in the first five 
issues of Inspire magazine.  This map is the final installment of the cities category, and 
the final map in the series of eighteen maps generated from the content analysis.  Sana’a, 
the capital of Yemen, boasts the highest frequency of any city place name with twelve 
occurrences—a distinction it shares with Guantanamo Prison.  Including Sana’a, eleven 
Yemeni cities appear in the pages of the magazine, mostly in the context of AQAP’s 
operations and presence in those areas.  Because Yemen is the home of AQAP, the high 
concentration of city place names is not unusual, especially because al Qaeda has stated 
that regional involvement of its affiliates is a key concern (Blanchard 2007).  The Somali 
capital, Mogadishu, appears only in the context of a footnote in one of the feature stories.  




















































4.5.4  Results of the Narrative Analysis 
 The analysis of AQAP’s geographic narrative in this section follows the same  
outline as applied previously in this study.  The categorized list of place names, the 
resulting maps, the original Inspire text, and external analysis of al Qaeda’s ideology 
inform the geographic narrative analysis that follows.  As before, Clandinin and 
Connelly’s (1999) framework consisting of actions/interactions, time, and space provides 
the theoretical structure for this portion of the research.  The following sections offer no  
further discussion of the underlying theory, as this received treatment in the geographic 
narrative analysis of ISIS’s ideology. 
 
4.5.4.1  Elements of Geographic Narrative  
Analysis:  Actions and Interactions 
 The language, religion, rhetoric, and mythology of al Qaeda bears great 
resemblance to those of ISIS, and many other jihadi groups for that matter.  However, 
there are some important differences as well.  First, al Qaeda’s cultural community is far 
more inclusive than ISIS’s binary with-or-against approach.  Al Qaeda views all Sunni 
Muslims as its cultural community, not just those who pledge allegiance to the cause.  
While both have sanctioned attacks against secular Muslim governments, al Qaeda stops 
short of killing innocent Muslim civilians to advance its ideology.  In fact, when ISIS was 
still an al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, al-Zawahiri admonished al-Zarqawi for his brutality 
against other Muslims (al-Zawahiri 2005).  Moreover, when ISIS attacked mosques and 
(Muslim) civilians in Yemen in March 2015, AQAP quickly denied any involvement 
because those tactics do not reflect al Qaeda’s philosophical approach to jihad (Joscelyn 





terrorist identity based on the cultural foundation of Islam in the same way as ISIS, even 
if the tactics differ widely.  
  Recalling that the terrorist identity is a product of the culture from which it 
emerges, the examination turns to al Qaeda’s construction of its ideal Muslim self as 
viewed through the lens of structural symbolic interactionism (SSI) and its five principles 
(symbols, meaning of symbols, roles, socialization and role taking, and emergence of 
self).  Long before ISIS hoisted its black flag over the spoils of war, al Qaeda deliberately 
designed its standard to resemble the black banner of the hadith (McCants 2015).  The 
color of al Qaeda’s flag and the shahada (Muslim profession of faith) tell the faithful 
who they are (a fulfillment to prophecy) and for what purpose they are fighting (the will 
of Allah).  Al Qaeda also makes use of places as identity-forming symbols.  Places of 
oppression, struggle, and injustice like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Prison serve to unite 
the faithful (and potential recruits) against an immoral, unjust enemy.  Places of victory 
and martyrdom like Ground Zero and New York City stimulate feelings of pride and 
determination to carry on in the battle for the cause.  Assigning meaning to these symbols 
occurs in the pages of Inspire as authors quote famous Islamic scholars of the past and 
present, feature stories tell of victories gained in places all over the world, and the Other 
is exposed for crimes against Muslims.  The reader learns about his/her cultural 
community and comes to understand how Islam and al Qaeda intersect.   
The identity becomes more clear as the role-taking process progresses.  AQAP 
pioneered the English-language jihad magazine when it published Inspire.  For the 
intended audience, this magazine represents the formal training in theology, history, 





Inspire are excellent.  The message is clear, effective, and demonstrably influential 
among its target audience of lone wolf terrorists.  Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the Boston 
Marathon bombers, disclosed to investigators that he and his brother learned how to make 
the bombs they used in the attack from Inspire (Cooper et al. 2013).  The next issue of 
Inspire touted its own success in a special issue (Issue 11) dedicated to the incident.  This 
issue emphasized the chaos, loss of life, and inability of the American government to stop 
this and other similar attacks.  Thus, the magazine authenticates the terrorist narrative and 
defines the social roles of the ideal mujahid and his targets.  The emergence of the new 
self completes the formation of the terrorist identity.  Like Dabiq, Inspire seeks to 
introduce potential followers to the cultural narrative, social roles, and ideology of the 
group.  The goal is to facilitate the emergence of the new terrorist self. 
 Recalling Janz’s (2008) psychological features of places of terror, the place names 
of Inspire also contribute significantly to the development and advancement of al 
Qaeda’s ideological narrative.  For al Qaeda, New York City remains the place of its 
greatest success against its enemies (Riedel 2010).  It stands as the beacon of jihadi 
accomplishment, and frequent mentions in Inspire reinforce the ideological importance. 
Serving as the epitome of al Qaeda’s places of the Other, Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility represents the evils of the US and its policies toward the Muslim world.  Its cells 
are full of Muslims taken from the fields of battle in Muslim lands as “unlawful 
combatants” (Elsea 2006, 71).  The torture narratives associate this and other places with 
the Other, simultaneously reinforcing al Qaeda’s justification for defensive jihad and 
showcasing to the Muslim world the immorality of the enemy (Malinowski 2008).  





is a central component of al Qaeda’s ideological aims to: 1) create an Islamic state 
wherein sharia law governs; 2) rid all Muslim lands of foreign influence; 3) free the 
Muslim people from their own leaders (allowing them to depose governments that cease 
to follow Islamic law) (Blanchard 2007).  The existence of the Other gives purpose to al 
Qaeda’s narrative.  For example, the reason a unified Muslim homeland does not exist 
today is because of the West and its corrosive influence.  Furthermore, the West has 
invaded traditional Muslim lands, bringing shame to the occupied territories.  Finally, the 
West has corrupted Muslim governments with ideals of democracy, nationalism, and 
Western thought, rendering Islamic law secondary to the Other’s ideals. 
 The third psychological feature of places of terror is that attack sites must become 
triumphalist in the wake of an attack.  Unlike ISIS, al Qaeda does not practice 
governance in any territory with sovereign borders.  As such, any attack on al Qaeda 
cannot be in its homeland.  Nevertheless, al Qaeda creates a triumphalist narrative based 
on places that could have been considered a homeland in the past.  Specifically, places in 
Afghanistan such as Tora Bora, Kandahar, Kabul, and Al Farouq Training Camp evoke 
memories of a time when al Qaeda could operate openly in society under the protection 
of the Taliban.  These place names appear in articles that romanticize the lives of various 
al Qaeda fighters, idealizing the battles against the Soviets in Afghanistan, or recalling 
the military training during the Taliban years.  These memories fuel the narrative of jihad 
and underscore the defensive nature of al Qaeda’s struggle against the West.  Related to 
this narrative of lost homelands is the death of public space for al Qaeda.  After 9/11, the 
Global War on Terror forced the central leadership of al Qaeda underground, where it has 





loss of public space came a transformation from a centralized organization of terrorists to 
a decentralized network of loosely-affiliated, self-sufficient groups connected by 
enduring ideology (Hoffman 2004). 
 Al Qaeda’s ideology, like that of ISIS, fixes the meaning of places by connecting 
them to religious texts and events from Islam’s past.  While AQAP has not attached itself 
to geographically specific prophecies in the same way ISIS has, the meanings of places 
still become nonnegotiable in the jihadi narrative.  For example, Mecca, Medina, and 
Jerusalem require liberation from the apostate and Zionist governments that hold them 
captive.  Israel must be restored to Muslim rule and an Islamic state must rise in the 
Middle East.  Because these places are inseparably connected to ideology, their meanings 
cannot change until the terrorist goals become reality. 
 If the byproduct of a terror attack is “cultural stage fright” as Janz (2008) 
contends, then al Qaeda’s cultural stage fright manifests in its reaction to the drone 
program in Pakistan and Yemen.  The Pentagon reported that drone strikes killed more 
than four hundred militants in the first two years of the program (Williams 2010).  The 
controversial program decimated the upper level of al Qaeda leadership as well, killing 
more than half of the high-ranking officials from twenty most-wanted terrorists list 
(Williams 2010).  As a result, the one-time sanctuary in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan became a landscape of fear for terrorists.  
Al Qaeda’s response was an internal witch hunt to root out the sources of intelligence 
leaks and informants that made the drone strikes so effective (Williams 2010).  
 Finally, as the narratives which define places of terror begin to shift, meanings of 





Ground Zero can be created in new locales with a single attack.  Moreover, any forceful 
response can bolster the terrorist narrative of the foreign invaders fighting against the 
whole of Islam, or the lack of response can fuel feelings of victory.  In its magazine, 
Inspire, AQAP defines its cultural community, constructs both the Other and the terrorist 
identity, and imbues meaning on places of terror (targets and the targeted).  Once again, 
these cues inform the reader of who they should be (terrorist self) and how they should 
experience place.   
 
4.5.4.2  Elements of Geographic Narrative  
Analysis: Time and Space 
 As in Dabiq, not all of the place names occurring in Inspire share equal 
significance or even importance in the ideological narrative of al Qaeda.  Applying the 
time element of geographic analysis, however, sheds light on the ways in which AQAP 
utilizes place names to advance its ideological discourse as well as its vision for the 
future. Inspire makes use of the past, present, and future aspects of place names in 
different ways than Dabiq, resulting in a different means of conceptualizing geopolitical 
space. 
 Like ISIS, AQAP’s usage of place names can also be classified into three groups.  
However, AQAP’s categories are not the same as ISIS’s categories.  AQAP’s explanation 
of the Land of Islam versus the Land of War provides the framework for these categories.  
As previously discussed, Issue 4 defines the Land of Islam—the first category—as any 
country in which Muslims make up the largest religious percentage of the population.  
Absent from this definition is the condition of controlling geographic space.  Al Qaeda 





sovereignty to satisfy its definition of Muslim lands.  According to Issue 4, the Land of 
War (the Other)—the second category—is any country that either invades or supports the 
invasion of Muslim lands.  Most often, these are the countries of the West.  While this 
definition is somewhat broad and certainly open to interpretation, it leaves room for a 
third category—the neutral countries which are neither invaders/supporters nor lands of 
Islam.  These places are largely ignored as they serve no ideological purpose.  Of the 
twenty-one highest frequency places (ten or more mentions), 96% were places within the 
Lands of Islam and 4% were places of the Other.  None of the highest frequency terms 
were neutral places (Only four of the 179 place names fall into this category: Cuba, 
Vietnam, Southern Africa, and South America).     
 However, broad categorizations of place names do not necessarily reveal the ways 
in which a terror group employs geographic terms to advance its ideology.  Rather, 
viewing how the terror group conceptualizes the time (past, present, future) components 
of place is a more useful approach.  The Inspire data reveal two patterns of place name 
usage.  First, like ISIS, AQAP makes use of historical place names to position its 
narrative as organically Islamic and theologically justified.  Yet, AQAP’s references to 
historical place names are not shackled to literal interpretations of specific prophecies, 
and therefore, have no explicit connection to the future for AQAP.  Second, AQAP’s 
rhetoric deals mostly with the present.  As a result, “the Other versus Islam” is a central 
theme that dominates the usage of place names in their present context.    An analysis of 
each of these patterns follows. 
 Generally speaking, AQAP’s usage of historical place names has a primary 





of making political statements about regimes it opposes.  The most frequently used 
historical term was Sham (10 occurrences).  In every instance except one, Sham emerges 
in the context of scriptural references.  AQAP selects verses from the Koran or quotes 
from the hadith to connect the reader’s religious sentiments with the group’s political 
agenda.  The aim is to fuse the Muslim self to the ideology of al Qaeda via familiar 
passages and quotations laden with the places of Islam.  Thus, an Islamic sense of place 
lends credibility to al Qaeda’s message and bridges the gap between the reader’s identity 
and the terrorist identity.  In one case, however, Sham appears in the present context.  
AQAP refers to Jerusalem as existing in Sham, not Israel.  The distinction is important 
ideologically because the use of the term “Sham” effectively dissolves the state of Israel 
and restores Muslim rule to Jerusalem—a major goal/grievance of al Qaeda. 
 The second most used historical place name was the Battle of Badr with six 
occurrences.  This reference showcases AQAP’s link to the Salafi concept of religious 
authenticity as a function of proximity to Mohammad.  Mohammad ordered the raid at 
Badr himself, leaving no room for doubting the authenticity of the place or events which 
unfolded.  According to AQAP, the Badr narrative teaches the virtues of jihad and 
patience (Issue 2), and carries with it a promise of victory that extends to today’s jihad 
(Issue 4).  Thus, for the reader, Islam’s earliest battle lends credibility to al Qaeda’s cause 
when the two are presented together in the text of Inspire magazine.  Similarly, 
Mohammad also led his armies in the expedition of Tabuk (one mention) against the 
Byzantine army, which never arrived at the battle (Belyaev 1969).  Some of the men of 





(Shah 2013).  AQAP employs Tabuk as an example of dereliction of duty—a charge it 
lays at the feet of Muslims who do not engage in jihad today.      
 Haramayn, Najd, and the Hijaz also appear in the text of the magazine, albeit with 
a relatively low frequency (four, three, and two occurrences, respectively).  Each of these 
terms has two usages in the text.  First, each appears in the magazine in its original 
scriptural context as a place of the Koran.  This usage serves to link the places of 
authentic Islam to al Qaeda’s ideology in the same way as Sham and the Battle of Badr.  
The geographic terms are instantly familiar to students of Islamic holy texts, legitimizing 
the narrative with which the places are intertwined.  There is also a secondary use of 
Haramayn, Najd, and the Hijaz.  AQAP uses each as a substitute for “Saudi Arabia,” an 
Arab country (and familial regime) with which the terror group shares a complicated past.  
Osama bin Laden blamed the Saud family for its involvement in facilitating the West’s 
entry into the Muslim world at the end of World War 1 as well as the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine (Riedel and Saab 2008).  Accordingly, one of al Qaeda’s 
goals is to end the House of Saud’s rule on the way to establishing an Islamic state 
(Blanchard 2007).   
But the relationship between Saudi Arabia and al Qaeda is not quite as simple as 
it seems.  A political rift divides the Wahhabi clerics who argue for sharia law and the 
elite class of pro-West Saudis who favor some distance between religion and rule of law.  
The ideological gap has also divided the royal family, which is sympathetic to both sides 
of the debate (Doran 2004).  As a result, Saudi Arabia’s treatment of al Qaeda is 
schizophrenic: in foreign dilemmas, the Saudis have cooperated with al Qaeda (in Syria 





dynasty’s security force all but eliminated al Qaeda from Saudi Arabia following the 
2003 attacks in Riyadh (Hubbard 2016).  While al Qaeda takes no issue with accepting 
assistance from the Saudis for operations in Syria and Yemen, the Saud regime still 
stands in the way of al Qaeda’s vision for the future.  Thus, by using place names that do 
not include the House of Saud when referring to Saudi Arabia, AQAP simultaneously 
marginalizes the monarchy and bolsters its anti-West narrative. 
Two additional historical place names appear in the pages of Inspire.  AQAP 
evokes al Andalus, but unlike the ISIS reference to the Umayyad Caliphate’s territory, 
this usage refers to the loss of al Andalus as the beginning of the obligatory defensive 
jihad (Issue 4).  In the same vein as the reference to Tabuk and the hypocrites who 
refused their divine duties, the fall of Andalus (1492 CE) serves as the starting point for 
obligatory defensive jihad.  Therefore, AQAP’s reference to Andalus is meant to be an 
admonition to carry out one’s duty to Islam, not as a place which was once Muslim and 
therefore must be reconquered.   
The second historical place name also appeared in Dabiq magazine: Khurasan.  
There is little doubt that al Qaeda subscribes to and propagates jihadi apocalyptic 
narratives.  Some jihadi scholars have even argued that Osama bin Laden’s organization 
is the army that will come from Khurasan carrying its black banners (Paz 2008).  Former 
FBI agent Ali Soufan (2011) suggests that al Qaeda (and ISIS by extension) deliberately 
designed its flag to resemble the prophetic images of the army of the Mahdi.  However, in 
the context of Inspire, the term Khurasan emerges only as synonym for Afghanistan in 
the present.  The context (in the first five issues) did not include an obvious historical 





allusion to the well-known apocalyptic discourse of the black banners of the Mahdi.  
The second pattern of place name usage in Inspire centers on al Qaeda’s narrative 
of the West’s war against Islam.  Positioning the West (especially the United States) as 
the enemy of Islam gives its message meaning in the current geopolitical landscape.   Al 
Qaeda can point to the first Gulf War as the beginning of aggression against the Muslim 
world, and to Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq as a continuation of that aggression.  
It can also pin the blame for corrupt Muslim governments across the world on the 
influence from the West and its ideals which do not align with al Qaeda’s version of 
Islam.  Thus, as Osama bin Laden termed al Qaeda’s adversaries, the “far enemy” is the 
West and the “near enemy” is the collective of corrupt Muslim regimes (particularly 
Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) and Israel (Riedel 2007).   In order to realize 
its geopolitical goals, al Qaeda has developed a strategic plan comprised of seven phases 
or stages which span twenty years, beginning with the 9/11 attacks (Rudner 2013). 
Each stage of the plan has specific tactical aims and timelines.  The first stage, the 
“Awakening,” began on September 1, 2001 with the attacks on the United States.  The 
goal was damaging the US economy and provoking a response against Muslim countries 
that could be seen as American aggression (Rudner 2013).  The second stage, “Opening 
the Eyes,” was planned for 2002-2006 with the purpose of establishing jihadism as a 
viable threat to the West through continued attacks (Roggio 2005).  The third stage, 
“Arising and Standing Up,” was planned for 2007-2010 with the focus on destabilizing 
the near enemy in Israel, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan (Rudner 2013).  The fourth stage, 
“Downfall of the Apostate Muslim Regimes,” aimed to overthrow the targeted Muslim 





Success in Stage 4 would allow for the “Declaration of the Caliphate” in Stage 5, 
lasting from 2013-2016.  At this point, al Qaeda believes that Israel will be unable to 
defend itself and the Western stranglehold on the Muslim world will be loosened (Rudner 
2013; Roggio 2005).  Stage 6, “Total Confrontation,” lasts from 2016-2020 during which 
time the strength of the Muslim people will coalesce in the newly-declared caliphate, 
which will wage total war on the West (Runder 2013).  When the caliphate has defeated 
the West in war in 2020, Stage 7, “Definitive Victory” will begin with the caliphate as the 
top global power (Rudner 2013; Roggio 2005).  
At the time of the research, the twenty-year plan is only partially realized.  The 
first stage was clearly a success for al Qaeda, as the attacks on the US provoked the exact 
response the group hoped to elicit. Fifteen years later, the West is still fighting the long, 
drawn-out war bin Laden envisioned (Rudner 2013).  Stage 2 can also be scored a 
success for al Qaeda. The Western world is certainly more aware of the group’s 
capabilities and political aims.  Somewhere in the third phase, however, is where al 
Qaeda’s plan seems to have stalled.  Attacks on Israel, Turkey, and Jordan have failed to 
achieve any measure of destabilization (Zelin 2013).  Furthermore, while the Arab Spring 
has introduced unstable conditions and even regime change in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya 
al Qaeda cannot claim any influence in those movements (Rudner 2013).  The group has, 
however, been very active in fighting against Assad’s regime in Syria and in the civil 
strife in Egypt (Rudner 2013).  Still, by any measure, al Qaeda has not achieved its goals 
for Stage 4 (2010-2013) or Stage 5 (2013-2016), nor is it likely to in the near future.  
Since 2014, ISIS has hijacked the caliphate movement, and al Qaeda seems to have 





of a longer-term plan to establish an eventual Islamic caliphate (Gartenstein-Ross and 
Barr 2016). 
Although al Qaeda’s original two-year plan may not have proceeded as 
anticipated by its leaders, the group’s near and far enemies have remained the same since 
the plan’s inception.  Accordingly, the place names of its enemies should have higher 
frequencies in Inspire due to the prominence of the Other in al Qaeda’s geopolitical 
narrative.  The data from AQAP’s magazine are consistent with the group’s jihadi 
discourse as evidenced by the ten highest frequency place names.  The United States (and 
variant place names) was by far the highest frequency term with 212 mentions (eighty 
more than second-place Yemen).  As the main antagonist in al Qaeda’s narrative, the 
United States plays an important role.  First, America (along with the rest of the West) is 
the cause of Muslim hardship in the world according to al Qaeda.  Second, America is the 
aggressor bent on destroying Islam as a belief system and usurping the lands of the 
Muslims.  Al Qaeda needs the United States to play the role of the evil Other, and 
therefore, refers to America more often than any other place name.   
Yemen (132 mentions) is the second most-frequently used place name in Inspire, 
and is the de facto home of AQAP. It is also the scene of a bloody civil war pitting the 
Shiite Houthis against the deposed Yemeni government as the main belligerents, and 
AQAP and ISIS among the nonstate actors also contributing to the chaos (Mazzetti et al. 
2016).  The circumstances of Yemen resemble the conditions al Qaeda seeks to incite 
during phases 3 and 4 of its strategic plan, but once again, AQAP did not initiate civil 
war.  Still, AQAP views Yemen as a place of jihad and the potential birthplace of its own 





come out of Aden-Abyan (see Issue 5).  Incidentally, this scriptural reference and the 
strategic importance of Abyan Province in the Yemeni civil war account for Abyan’s 
eighth-highest frequency of twenty-six occurrences.  
Afghanistan garners the third-highest frequency total at eighty mentions.  As a 
former home to al Qaeda Central and ongoing jihad battleground, Afghanistan is an 
important piece of the ideological narrative.  It can be imagined as both a place of victory 
for the mujahidin over two invading powers and as the scene of current imperial 
overreach by the West.  Either narrative is useful to al Qaeda.  The Arabian Peninsula has 
the next highest frequency of sixty-five mentions.  American occupation of the Arabian 
Peninsula during and after the Gulf War is arguably the largest factor in al Qaeda’s anti-
West sentiment.  Moreover, any future caliphate must control Mecca and Medina if any 
claim to legitimacy is to be made.  Therefore, this place is of great importance in the 
overall discourse of al Qaeda’s Islamic jihad.   
Iraq had the fifth-highest frequency total, with fifty-eight mentions in five issues.  
It is important to al Qaeda because like Afghanistan, Iraq represents American aggression 
against Muslims.  Iraq’s failing government, which al Qaeda has helped destabilize, 
represents a failure of the Western ideals of government and interference in the Muslim 
world.  Moreover, Iraq’s absolute location guarantees it will be key terrain for a future 
caliphate.   Egypt is next with forty-four occurrences in five issues.  The Arab Spring 
brought about two regime changes in five years, priming the conditions for the rise of 
Islamist militancy in the Sinai Peninsula (Raghavan and Habib 2016).  In addition to 
these factors, the current leader of al Qaeda Central, Ayman al-Zawahiri, hails from 





and Hepner 2013).  
Palestine is the seventh-most frequently used place name in Inspire magazine 
with forty-one mentions in five issues.  This place is at the heart of al Qaeda’s political 
goals—one of which is to restore the land of Palestine to Muslim rule by removing the 
Jews and destroying the government of Israel (Blanchard 2007).  Israel is the ninth-
highest frequency place name with twenty-five mentions in the first five issues of Inspire.  
For AQAP, invoking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very effective method of 
fomenting anti-Western sentiment in Muslim countries (Karon 2002).   Although al 
Qaeda’s success in Israel has been limited, the Jewish state remains one of its primary 
targets for terrorism and for eventual conquest. 
Two final place names round out the top ten mentions in the first five issues of 
Inspire: Pakistan and Tunisia, each with twenty-two occurrences.  Pakistan is believed to 
be the current locus of command and control for al Qaeda Central (Ayman al-Zawahiri is 
probably in hiding along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border) in the continuing Afghan jihad 
(Scarborough 2016).  It is also on al Qaeda’s list of “near enemy” regimes which the 
group intends to depose (Riedel 2007).  Finally, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia when a 
merchant set himself on fire after feuding with a government official about the location of 
his vegetable cart in the town of Sidi Bouzid (Day 2011).   Al Qaeda cites the pan-Arab 
civil unrest as a sign that Muslims will no longer tolerate apostate secular regimes (Issue 
5).   
While al Qaeda’s efforts did not precipitate the events of the Arab Spring across 
the Middle East, the resulting destabilization benefits the cause of the group.  However, 





a weakened or nonexistent Israel combined with complete indifference from the West and 
Russia for Stage 4 of its strategic plan to materialize.  Although al Qaeda’s aggressive 
twenty-year plan to establish a global caliphate has apparently stalled in Stage 3, the 
group continues to advance its ideology and accompanying geographic aspirations, albeit 
at a less aggressive pace.  The top ten place names appearing in Inspire coincide with al 
Qaeda’s ideological narrative within the larger discourse of jihadi terrorism. 
 
4.5.4.3  The Reimagined Territory of al Qaeda 
 In a letter written to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined 
his vision for a future Islamic state in what he termed, “the heart of the Islamic world” 
(al-Zawahiri 2004).   Unlike ISIS’s ambiguously-stated territorial aspirations, al-Zawahiri 
specified the exact extent of al Qaeda Central’s reimagined caliphate.   He named Egypt, 
the Levant (Sham), the states of the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq as the location for the 
future Islamic state (al-Zawahiri 2004).  Some have pointed out, however, that earlier 
statements from bin Laden seem to indicate that the concept of a caliphate is an ideal, a 
motivational talking point, or a political reality for the distant future, not a concrete 
statement of geographic ambition (Pankhurst 2010).  Yet, bin Laden certainly called for 
the establishment of an actual caliphate in a video message taped sometime in 2001.  He 
stated, “Today, with the grace of Allah, we are redrawing the map of the Islamic world to 
become one state under the banner of the caliphate” (Joscelyn 2014).   
Following ISIS’s declaration of its caliphate in 2014, al Qaeda tweeted the link to 
that video, which also warns of the dangers of establishing a caliphate without the proper 





caliphate and reiterated its position on its own future caliphate.  Still, the vision of the 
caliphate seems to differ at the highest levels of leadership in al Qaeda.  Moreover, these 
views represent al Qaeda central, but not necessarily the regional groups that have 
assumed the al Qaeda brand.  Thus, to arrive at a more complete picture of AQAP’s 
reimagined territory vis-à-vis al Qaeda Central’s reimagined territory, this research 
combines the results from the computer-aided content analysis, the manual content 
analysis, the cartographic visualization, and the geographic narrative analysis of AQAP’s 
ideology. 
 Unlike ISIS, al Qaeda does not seek to recreate the Rashidun, Umayyad, and 
Abbasid Caliphate’s territorial borders for its reimagined state.  Rather, it seeks to unite 
the Muslim world in a single state centered on the Levant, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, 
and Iraq.  By comparing and/or overlaying the place name frequency results from Inspire 
with these conceptualizations of space, we observe the congruence between AQAP’s 
reimagined territory and al Qaeda Central’s stated objectives.  Here again, the regions 
and countries categories require side-by-side comparison maps to avoid obscuring 
information with overlapping polygons.  For the provinces and cities categories, an 
overlay method best represents the data.  
Figure 4.61 is a map of the historical and current regions occurring in Inspire 
magazine compared to a map of the Muslim-dominant countries of today.  Al-Zawahiri’s 
“heart of Islam” lands are superimposed on the Muslim countries for reference.  The 
continent frequencies were omitted from this map for simplicity (the highest frequency  
continent was Europe with four instances).  The spatial distribution of the high-frequency 






Figure 4.61 Historical and modern regions mentioned in Inspire magazine compared with 






“heart of Islam” conceptualization of an Islamic state.  Only East Asia, Central Africa, 
and Southern Africa fall completely outside these areas, and each of those regions had 
only one instance in the first five issues of Inspire.   
Figure 4.62 compares the countries (excluding the Western Hemisphere) 
occurring in Inspire magazine to the current Muslim-dominant lands and al Qaeda’s 
proposed caliphate.  As with ISIS’s circumstances, the places of the West represent the 
Other for al Qaeda (and AQAP).  The high frequency in the magazine (and other  
statements, social media messages, videos, etc.) relates to the ideological requirement for 
an enemy of Islam, not as place which the groups seek to conquer.  Indeed, both ISIS and 
al Qaeda wish to bring the West down, but only in terms of power and influence in the  
Muslim world.  Moreover, al Qaeda’s agenda lacks the strongly apocalyptic tone of 
ISIS’s ideology.  In the three highest frequency data classes, only two are outside of the 
Muslim lands/proposed caliphate areas—the United States and the United Kingdom.  The 
UK’s high frequency can also be attributed to its status as the Other in al Qaeda’s 
ideology.  Thus, accounting for the prominence of the places of the Other, the spatial 
distribution of the highest frequency countries generally follows al Qaeda’s stated 
agenda.  Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, and Israel comprise five of the top seven country 
place names.  Each of these lies entirely within both bin Laden’s concept and al-
Zawahiri’s concept of the caliphate.  Afghanistan (third-most occurrences), Pakistan, 
Tunisia, and Somalia round out the top ten countries.  Each of these countries is within 
bin Laden’s envisioned boundaries for an Islamic state.  The remaining countries in the 
three highest data classes each lie within the same area, demonstrating that the 






Figure 4.62 Countries mentioned in Inspire magazine compared with the boundaries of 





Figure 4.63 is a map of the provinces and cities of Inspire superimposed on the 
maps of the Muslim-dominated countries and al Qaeda’s conceptualization of a future 
caliphate.  The provinces category produced the fewest total number of place names with 
twenty-two.  Five of those were US states (North Carolina with two occurrences and 
California, Georgia, Texas, and Arizona with one mention each) mentioned in the context 
of places of the Other.  Of the seventeen remaining province place names, fifteen are in 
countries where Islam is the dominant religion, which is consistent with the spatial  
distribution of the previous geographic scales.  Of particular note, two provinces are 
neither places of the Other nor inside countries with a Muslim-dominated society—
Chechnya, Russia and Zanzibar, Tanzania.  However, at the provincial scale both  
Chechnya’s and Zanzibar’s populations are majority Muslim.  Only five of the provinces 
accumulated more than two mentions in the first five issues.  The highest, Abyan 
Province, is a contested place in Yemen where AQAP has had a considerable presence, 
but no governance.  A likely explanation for AQAP’s diminished emphasis on  
geographic place names at the provincial scale is the group’s general lack of sovereign 
control of territory.  Thus, the fact that AQAP has avoided seizing geographic space with 
the intent to govern is reflected in its place name frequency in Inspire. 
At the city scale, four place names in the highest three data classes fall outside of 
the lands of Islam—Guantanamo Bay, Times Square, New York City, and Washington, 
DC.  As previously discussed, the ideological value of these place names lies in the 
construction of the evil Other and its threat to Islam.  The remaining high-frequency city 
place names fall within the lands of Islam.  As Figure 4.63 shows, the majority of the 





Figure 4.63 Provinces and cities mentioned in Inspire magazine compared with the 






clusters of place names inside al-Zawahiri’s proposed caliphate, and a second grouping of 
place names in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.  Here again, the spatial 
distribution of place names in this category follows the pattern of the other scale 
categories.   
 Each spatial scale category of place names from Inspire magazine follows the 
general pattern of falling inside the proposed caliphates of al Qaeda Central.  The data 
demonstrate that AQAP’s reimagined territory as expressed via its ideological narrative 
aligns with the previous statements and geographic aspirations of al Qaeda’s top-level 
leadership.  The data also indicate that while al Qaeda and its affiliates have a general 
geographic vision for the future, they have not progressed enough in their long-term plans 
to seize territory and lay the geographic foundations for an Islamic state.  In his letter to 
al-Zarqawi, al-Zawahiri outlined four incremental goals which would lead to an enduring 
Islamic state.  The first stage was expelling the US forces from Iraq and the second stage 
was establishing governance over large areas of Iraq after the US troops withdrew (al-
Zawahiri 2004).  The third stage was to extend the jihad to Iraq’s neighboring secular 
Muslim governments and the fourth and final stage was the destruction of Israel (al-
Zawahiri 2004).  Of course, al Qaeda’s plan for Iraq imploded when its affiliate there 
broke away from the parent organization and declared itself a caliphate.  Still, the plan 
gives insight into the group’s strategy in establishing a caliphate, a process it sees as a 
long-term affair.  Since being outmaneuvered in Iraq by ISIS, al Qaeda Central seems to 
have shifted its focus on Syria, but the plan to establish an Islamic state remains at the 
center of the group’s ideological goals (Schmitt 2015). 





the “heart of Islam” in order to achieve its geographic ambitions.  The most likely 
candidates seem to be Yemen, Syria, or Egypt wherein al Qaeda enjoys significant 
influence and/or presence.  Furthermore, each of these countries currently has the 
necessary political and civil conditions to incite disaffection and discord directed towards 
the secular regimes.  If ISIS loses influence in Iraq, the conditions there could also allow 
for an al Qaeda resurgence.  Whatever the place for stage one of al-Zawahiri’s plan for 
the establishment of a caliphate, the short-term goals remain to expel the US from the 
Middle East and establish an emerging Islamic state in the “heart of Islam.”  The long-
term goal is to unite the Muslim world under the banner of the caliphate until it covers 
the Islamic lands.   
Al Qaeda Central has not declared a caliphate to date.  Therefore, it is valid to 
assume that the group has not progressed beyond the first stage of its plan to establish a 
caliphate.  As a result, al Qaeda’s geographic goals remain futuristic ambitions, but as the 
evidence from Inspire has shown, they are discernable from the text.  Figure 4.64 depicts 
the reimagined territory of al Qaeda Central (and by extension, AQAP).  The countries 
wherein al Qaeda could possibly gain enough control to declare a caliphate are shown in 
light green polygons.  Al-Zawahiri’s vision for the caliphate is shown in dark green, and 
bin Laden’s vision is shown in purple.  The underlying assumptions with bin Laden’s 
caliphate are that 1) the Muslim world consists of countries with a Muslim-dominated 
religious landscape; 2) the caliphate will conform to current borders between Muslim and 
non-Muslim lands.   
 The purpose of this section of the dissertation was to validate the methods and 








































analysis of AQAP’s Inspire magazine produced meaningful results in all spatial 
categories when compared to statements by al Qaeda officials.  As with the ISIS case 
study, the AQAP abbreviated case study clearly demonstrates the utility and general 
applicability of the reimagined territory theoretical concept in understanding the ideology 
and political goals of terror groups.  Given the official writings, statements, speeches, or 
other authentic sources of any terrorist group, a researcher can use these methods and 







CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
      The objectives of this research are to 1) develop the theoretical concept of 
reimagined territory and position it at the intersection of geopolitics and theories of place 
and space; 2) analyze the content of the first ten issues of Dabiq magazine for the 
frequency of use and context of geographic place names; 3) visualize the results of the 
content analyses (computer-aided and manual) by applying the qualitative GIS techniques 
of choropleth and proportional symbol mapping; 4) perform a geographic narrative 
analysis of ISIS’s conceptualization of political boundaries (present and future).  In 
addition to these central objectives, the dissertation also applies the methodology to a 
second data set, demonstrating the overall utility and generalizability of the theoretical 
concept of reimagined territory.  Section 5.1 discusses the methodological findings of this 
research as well as their application in the study of terrorism and terrorist ideologies.  
Section 5.2 discusses the implications of the theoretical concept of reimagined territory 
and its position in the greater context of political violence studies, geographic theories of 
space and place, and geopolitics.  Section 5.3 discusses possible directions of further 







5.1  Methodological Findings 
 This dissertation harnesses the scientific rigor of three well-known methods 
commonly applied to geographic research: content analysis, cartographic visualization, 
and narrative analysis.  As Chapter 3 outlines, the computer-aided content analysis 
yielded a set of ten term document matrices (one per magazine issue) which sorts words 
by frequency of use.  Through a manual content analysis of these matrices, a list of 
geographic place names is compiled for each issue of the magazine.  Each term is then 
classified into one of four predetermined, scale-based geographic categories.  The results 
are subsequently visualized using ESRI’s ArcGIS software package.  Finally, the results 
from each of the previous stages are combined and subjected to a geographic narrative 
analysis process which reveals the territorial aims of the terror group in question.  Each 
method employed produces meaningful results which contribute to the development of 
the theoretical concept of reimagined territory.  The findings for each method are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 The computer-aided content analysis proves to be an efficient, effective way to 
deconstruct a document and present the text in list format.  The R code used in this 
research can easily be modified to read in and process any English-language text 
document.  To achieve the most accurate results, however, it is recommended that the 
raw text files be examined and treated for any special characters which could confuse the 
software.  Still, with minimal adjustments in the data preparation phase of research, the 
method used in this study can be applied to any document or set of documents (including 
transcripts from speeches or videos).  For the analysis of Dabiq, the computer-aided 





seconds.  This method (combined with manual content analysis) has widespread 
application within the field of terrorism studies.  As much of what is known about terror 
groups emerges from official publications, letters, or other forms of communication, the 
ability to process and categorize the information quickly is essential in both 
understanding the terror groups and developing effective ways to counter the violent 
actions of those groups. 
 In the case of Dabiq magazine, the computer-aided content analysis results 
required human intervention to produce a meaningful list of geographic place names.  As 
previously discussed, computer-aided categorization is an emerging technology which 
relies heavily on human-coded documents which teach the software how to categorize.  
Since this study is the first of its kind, however, such documents are not available.  
Therefore, the results of the computer-aided content analysis are subjected to line-by-line 
manual categorization of the 29,908 individual terms.  While the process is time-
consuming, it is a necessary effort to ensure the most accurate results, especially given 
the writing style of the magazine. ISIS chooses to present religious concepts in a 
Romanized Arabic format in the magazine, resulting in a myriad of non-English words in 
each of the ten matrices.  Each of the terms must be verified in its original context in the 
magazine to discover if the term is a place name, a proper name, or religious vocabulary.  
The same effort would be necessary to ensure accuracy in future studies of this kind.   
Additionally, the creation of an Arabic data dictionary comprised of non-English 
religious terms and proper names hastened the categorization process with later issues.  
Each new issue added many terms to the dictionary, which ultimately amassed 1723 





each term was still examined in its original context to avoid any omission, double 
counting (e.g., counting Hollywood, California in both the provinces and cities 
categories) or conflation of geographic place names.  The process requires assiduous 
attention to detail through tens of thousands of terms, but the iterative nature of validating 
terms in their original context ensures the highest accuracy in identification and 
categorization of geographic place names.   
Using four categories based on geographic scale proves to be an effective way to 
organize the place names occurring in the text.  This classification system ensures that 
each data point (place name) could only be sorted into one category—an essential 
element in maintaining scientific rigor.  Furthermore, the categories reflect the commonly 
accepted conceptualization of space as political/administrative units at different scales.  
Accordingly, a different researcher would likely reach very similar categorization results 
with the same data.  (The only ambiguous place names are the geographic features such 
as rivers, lakes, gulfs, and mountains).  At the very least, the transparency of the 
classification process employed in this study allows the reader to understand the rationale 
for the categorization.  In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that the combination of 
computer-aided and manual content analysis is an effective means of extracting and 
categorizing meaningful geographic data from a relatively large corpus of text. 
Successful cartographic visualization of the Dabiq place names allows the reader 
to immediately understand the spatial distribution of the data.  Furthermore, the use of 
choropleth mapping presents the frequencies of the place names in the recognizable 
format of “darker equals more; lighter equals less” for the polygon features.  Graduated 





“larger circle equals more; smaller circle equals less” applies.  These cartographic 
visualization techniques produce a series of maps that reveal the spatial aspects of ISIS’s 
ideological narrative.  This research has shown that mapping a terror group’s important 
places brings about a deeper understanding of the group’s ultimate goals.  The 
cartographic visualization process unveils the places wherein a terror group wishes to 
gain, exert, or diminish political power in a way that textual lists or tables of places 
cannot.  Thus, in analyzing any terror group, it is essential to visualize (cartographically) 
where that group aims to exercise influence in the present and in the future.  For cases in 
which terror groups do not explicitly communicate their geographic aspirations either 
textually or graphically, the combined methods of content analysis and cartographic 
visualization can uncover and visualize the extent of the sought-after territory. 
Geographic narrative analysis also proves to be an effective method in 
discovering the ways in which terror groups view current and future political boundaries.  
The actions/interactions aspect of geographic narrative analysis provides the basis for 
understanding the construction of the terrorist identity and the formation of the Other.  
These distinct identities not only tell potential recruits who they are, but how they should 
experience place (homeland or sacred place vs. lands of war or lands of the Other).  The 
space element is simply comprised of the place names themselves.  The time aspect of 
geographic narrative analysis demonstrates that terror groups can successfully use 
historical place names to evoke theological legitimacy and indicate future borders.  The 
narrative analysis combines the results from each previous method to form a more 
complete view of ISIS’s (and later al Qaeda’s) geographic goals as outlined in its 





ideologically important place names would either be lost or undiscovered.  For example, 
the narrative analysis revealed why ISIS prefers province-level place names to country-
level place names—because the “rightly-guided” caliphates declared provinces and 
appointed governors to oversee them. 
The three methods employed in this research yield meaningful results from the 
Dabiq data, and again when applied to the Inspire data.  The applicability of these 
methods is not restricted to studying Islamist terror groups, even though both data sets 
fall into this category of terror.  Rather, the methods can be applied to any terror group’s 
(or any group that aspires to political change in a given space) official statements, 
publications, websites, etc.  As all terror groups have geographic goals (even if the group 
only wants political change within existing borders), the resulting reimagined territory 
emerges as the narrative analysis gives context to the results of the content analysis and 
cartographic visualization.            
    
5.2  Implications to Theory and the 
Study of Terrorism 
 In the past, multidisciplinary studies of terrorism have borrowed from theories of 
political violence, place and space, psychology, and sociology in an effort to analyze 
terror groups and their motivations, ideologies, and goals.  However, lacking from each 
of the past endeavors is an in-depth treatment of their geographic goals.  This research 
has proposed the theoretical concept of reimagined territory as a way of better 
understanding the ideology, goals, and actions of terror groups.  This new concept fills 
the void in previous research endeavors which have largely ignored geographic analyses 





geopolitics and space and place.  The analysis in this dissertation asserts that imbuing 
recruits and followers with a specific sense of place is an integral element in identity-
building within terrorist ideologies.  The sense of place contributes to the “us vs. them” 
divide, and delineates what is homeland and what is enemy territory.  This dissertation 
has also shown that the official publications of terror groups contain indicators of 
territorial aspirations (in the form of high-frequency place names), even if the group does 
not explicitly state the goals or lay out a geographic agenda.  Discovering which places 
are important to a specific group and why they are important leads to a greater 
understanding of the terror organizations and their goals.  Understanding a terror group’s 
reimagined territory can also help policy makers formulate more effective responses, find 
solutions, and prevent or mitigate further problems.  (Note: this research has focused on 
some of the theories and methods of terrorism studies using two known terror groups as 
case studies.  None of the findings or conclusions should be interpreted as 
recommendations for a specific policy or political agenda, nor should they be interpreted 
as a call for policy change). 
 This dissertation proposes that future studies of terror organizations include the 
concept of reimagined territory as an integral component of the overall analysis.  Using 
two different groups and their publications, this research demonstrates the utility of 
reimagined territory as it successfully connects ideology and identity to place.  Previous 
studies tended to treat terrorist ideologies and motivations as psychological, social, 
political, or cultural subjects which may or may not include a discussion of territorial 
considerations.  Aside from Medina and Hepner’s (2013) discussion of aspirational 





connections between ideology and place in the context of political violence.  In this 
dissertation, however, the theoretical concept of reimagined territory unites ideology, 
identity, and place in terrorism studies, substantively demonstrating that the goals of 
terror groups have definitive geographic underpinnings.   Furthermore, the concept of 
reimagined territories illuminates and visualizes the process of simultaneously creating a 
sense of place and a group/individual identity, which are inseparably linked to a specific 
geographic context within a given ideology.  Thus, in order to understand the 
motivations, goals, and ideologies of terror groups, one must understand the ways in 
which those groups conceptualize territory.  In developing the theoretical concept of 
reimagined territories, this research has shown the importance of identifying and 
analyzing the geographic context of terror groups. 
The methods and theoretical concept apply to any terror organization simply 
because all terror groups seek to control or influence bounded geographic space.  In cases 
of terror organizations with understated or ill-defined territorial goals, the methods 
applied in this study will lead to accurate conclusions regarding ideologically important 
places and future limits of territorial control for those groups.  In cases of terror 
organizations which explicitly define their geographic aspirations, these methods can 
corroborate the ways in which the terror groups reimagine geopolitical boundaries, and 
can reveal other unstated territorial goals.  In any case, the theoretical concept of 
reimagined territory is a valuable analytical tool for researchers and policy makers in 







5.3  Further Research 
 As reimagined territory is a newly-proposed theoretical concept, there are many 
potential applications for future studies.  First, this dissertation is limited to two terror 
groups, both of which fall into the religious/cultural category as explained by Medina and 
Hepner (2013).  The methods and theoretical concept should also be applied in cases of 
terror groups from the nationalist/separatist and the ideological categories.  Moreover, 
both ISIS and al Qaeda (including AQAP) are international terrorist organizations with 
(arguably) more complex geographic agendas because they involve restructuring the 
current geopolitical environment on the global level.  However, reimagined territory also 
applies to national and subnational terror groups which have no international ambitions.  
The goal of achieving political control of space still exists for these groups, even if the 
desired space does not cross international boundaries.  In these cases, the groups’ 
reimagined territory may be relatively simple, but the concept of understanding an 
organization’s territorial vision is still of great importance. 
 Future studies would do well to restrict the analyses of terror groups’ territorial 
ambitions to official documents, statements, videos, or other media formats.  Although 
social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook provide nearly 
unlimited amounts of data, it is very difficult to determine the authenticity of messages 
claiming to be from terror groups themselves.  ISIS and al Qaeda have undoubtedly 
exploited the far reach of social media in recruiting, sending political messages, and 
making announcements.  However, determining which tweets come from ISIS and which 
come from copycats or supporters would be nearly impossible to achieve.  For this 





publications, statements, and media releases that are verifiably official.  The inadvertent 
inclusion of nonofficial data could potentially skew the results and lead to false 
conclusions. 
 Another question for further examination is the conceptualization of categories of 
place names.  This study relied on a geographic scale-based system of classification from 
continents to cities, which it proved to be effective in the treatment of two separate data 
sets.  However, other forms of classifying place names or other geographic scales might 
also be useful in determining territorial goals, especially in nationalist or subnationalist 
groups.  Alternative classification schemes might focus more neighborhoods or census 
blocks as opposed to cities and provinces.  A cursory knowledge of a given terror 
organization and its ideology may help researchers identify more useful classification 
schemes.   
 Future studies might also include the exploration of quantitative ways to test the 
visualized results of the computer-aided and manual content analysis.  One example 
would be comparing the frequency results of Dabiq to a set of expected results.  In this 
scenario, the researcher would compare the observed frequencies from the magazine with 
a uniform distribution of frequencies obtained by dividing the sum of all frequencies by 
the total number of place names mentioned in the magazine.  The comparison of these 
two distributions would reveal any preference among locations in the observed data, as 
the expected distribution assumes that each location is as frequently mentioned as all 
other locations.  Another model could test for spatial decay in frequencies as measured 
from a central location (presumably the areas which ISIS maintains sovereign control).  





the ISIS areas of control, while locations spatially removed from these areas would yield 
lower frequencies.  This type of decaying curve model, however, would need to account 
for the high frequency place names like “America” and “Europe” which are known to be 
far from ISIS areas, yet still occur very frequently in the text of the magazine.         
 As a new theoretical concept in multidisciplinary terrorism studies, reimagined 
territory offers insight into the spatiality of terrorism which previous analyses have 
lacked.  This research underscores the importance of understanding the limits of a given 
terror organization’s territorial aspirations, and it provides a reproducible mixed methods 
approach to achieve that understanding for any terror organization.  It is therefore 
proposed that future multidisciplinary analyses of terrorist organizations consider the 
ways in which these groups envision current and future political space—their reimagined 
territory.  
Lastly, the utility of the theoretical concept of reimagined territory need not be 
limited to studies of terrorist or extremist organizations.  Reimagined territory applies in 
any case wherein human control of geographic space occurs.  Thus, the ways in which 
groups of people conceptualize territorial limits of power in any context should be 
considered in analyzing geographic phenomena.  This new approach to looking at the 
territorial aspirations of cultural groups, nonviolent political groups, governments, or 
international businesses could lead to conclusions across multiple academic disciplines.  
The findings of this dissertation suggest that reimagined territory can apply to any 
situation in which human actors seek to exert influence, power, or control over 
geographic space for any reason.  Territorial aspirations have always been an integral 





geographic dimensions of power and ask the questions which lead to the discovery of a 







R CODE FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS: 
SINGLE ISSUE 
 






##read in text file and prep for TDM for Issue 1 
i1  <-Corpus(DirSource("D://Dissertation/ISIS/ISIS/Text/Issue 1/"), readerControl = 
list(language="lat")) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, removeNumbers) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, removePunctuation) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1 , stripWhitespace) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, content_transformer(tolower)) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, removeWords, stopwords("english")) 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, stemDocument, language="english") 
i1 <- tm_map(i1, stemCompletion, dictionary=i1, type="prevalent") 
i1dtm <- TermDocumentMatrix(i1, control=list(wordLengths=c(1, Inf))) 
options(max.print=1000000) 
 
##wordcloud for Issue 1 
m1 <- as.matrix(i1dtm) 
v1 <- sort(rowSums(m1), decreasing=TRUE) 
myNames <- names(v1) 
d1 <- data.frame(word=myNames, freq=v1) 
wordcloud(d1$word, colors=c(3,4), random.color=FALSE, d1$freq,  scale=c(4,0.3), 
min.freq=15) 
 
##save .csv file with freq terms for Issue 1 





R CODE FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS: 
ALL ISSUES 
 






##read in all text files into single corpus 
all.i  <-Corpus(DirSource("D://Dissertation/ISIS/ISIS/Text/All Issues/"), readerControl = 
list(language="lat")) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, removeNumbers) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, removePunctuation) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, stripWhitespace) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, content_transformer(tolower)) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, removeWords, stopwords("english")) 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, stemDocument, language="english") 
all.i <- tm_map(all.i, stemCompletion, dictionary=all.i, type="prevalent") 
all.idtm <- TermDocumentMatrix(all.i, control=list(wordLengths=c(1, Inf))) 
options(max.print=1000000) 
 
##all issues wordcloud 
m.all <- as.matrix(all.idtm) 
v.all <- sort(rowSums(m.all), decreasing=TRUE) 
myNamesAll <- names(v.all) 
d.all <- data.frame(word=myNamesAll, freq=v.all) 








LIST OF ISIS PLACE NAMES IN THE  
REGIONS CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Frequency 
1 Sham 277 
2 Arabian Peninsula 49 
3 Europe 30 
4 Khurasan 28 
5 Caucasus 21 
6 West Africa 21 
7 Middle East 20 
8 Kurdistan 16 
9 Persian Gulf 11 
10 Africa 8 
11 Hijaz (Arabia) 8 
12 Euphrates (Furat) River 4 
13 North Africa 4 
14 Tigris (Dijlah) River 4 
15 Andalus 3 
16 Asia 3 
17 South Asia 3 
18 Mesopotamia 2 
19 Western Europe 2 
20 Central America 1 
21 Iberian Peninsula 1 
22 Indus River 1 
23 North America  1 
24 South America 1 









LIST OF ISIS PLACE NAMES IN THE 
COUNTRIES CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
1 Iraq 236 31 India 5 
2 US/USA/America 144 32 Indonesia 5 
3 Syria 128 33 Israel 5 
4 Yemen 92 34 Morocco 5 
5 Afghanistan 75 35 Bahrain 4 
6 Persia/Iran 58 36 Germany 4 
7 Turkey 55 37 Sudan 4 
8 Libya 48 38 Chad 3 
9 Qatar 34 39 Italy 3 
10 Jordan 29 40 Philippines 3 
11 Algeria 22 41 Bangladesh 2 
12 Egypt 22 42 Burma/Myanmar 2 
13 Tunisia 21 43 Ethiopia 2 
14 Pakistan 17 44 Oman 2 
15 Kuwait 14 45 Ukraine 2 
16 Britain/UK 13 46 Austria 1 
17 Japan 13 47 Cameroon 1 
18 Russia/USSR 13 48 Colombia 1 
19 Australia 12 49 Cyprus 1 
20 Belgium 11 50 Ecuador 1 
21 Palestine 11 51 Kosovo 1 
22 Saudi Arabia 11 52 Mali 1 
23 Canada 10 53 Mexico 1 
24 Nigeria 10 54 Niger 1 
25 Somalia 10 55 Poland 1 
26 France 8 56 Senegal 1 
27 China 7 57 Switzerland 1 
28 Spain 7 58 Tajikistan 1 
29 Lebanon 6 59 Turkmenistan 1 





 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
61 Uzbekistan 1 62 Venezuela 1 
  
 








 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
1 Waziristan, Pakistan 52 31 Babil, Iraq (ISIS: Junub) 2 
2 Halab, Syria 48 32 Golan Heights, Israel 2 
3 Sinai, Egypt 42 33 Helmand, Afghanistan 2 
4 Al-Raqqah, Syria 35 34 Ingushetia, Russia 2 
5 Ninawa, Iraq 30 35 Latakia, Syria 2 
6 Al Anbar, Iraq 28 36 Swat, Pakistan 2 
7 Khurasan (ISIS) 18 37 Tabasaran, Dagestan 2 
8 Idlib, Syria 17 38 West Bank, Israel 2 
9 Damascus, Syria 13 39 Abyan, Yemen 1 
10 Deir al-Zour, Syria 13 40 al-Jawf, Yemen 1 
11 Hasakah, Syria 12 41 As Suwayda, Syria 1 
12 Saladin, Iraq 9 42 Babayurtovsky, Dagestan 1 
13 An Nabek, Syria 7 43 Bajaur, Pakistan 1 
14 Barqah, Libya (ISIS) 7 44 Balochistan, Pakistan 1 
15 Homs, Syria 7 45 California, USA 1 
16 Haramayn, Arabia (ISIS) 6 46 Eastern Province, S. Arabia 1 
17 Al-Fallujah, Iraq (ISIS) 5 47 Fezzan, Libya (ISIS) 1 
18 Al-Qawqaz (ISIS) 5 48 Gaza, Israel (or Palestine) 1 
19 Chechnya, Russia 5 49 Ghazni, Afghanistan 1 
20 Daraa, Syria 5 50 Hadhramaut, Yemen 1 
21 Furat, Iraq (ISIS) 5 51 Hangu, Pakistan 1 
22 Kirkuk, Iraq 5 52 Kabardino-Balkaria, Russia 1 
23 Dagestan, Russia 4 53 Kandahar, Afghanistan 1 
24 Shamal Baghdad, Iraq (ISIS) 4 54 Khost, Afghanistan 1 
25 Tripoli, Libya (ISIS) 4 55 Kunar, Afghanistan 1 
26 Dijlah, Iraq (ISIS) 3 56 Kunduz, Afghanistan 1 
27 Diyala, Iraq 3 57 Kurram, Pakistan 1 
28 Hama, Syria 3 58 Lakki Marwat, Pakistan 1 
29 Khyber, Pakistan 3 59 Logar, Afghanistan 1 





 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
61 Missouri, USA 1 68 Quebec, Canada 1 
62 Najd, Saudi Arabia 1 69 Quneitra, Syria 1 
63 Nangarhar, Afghanistan 1 70 Sana'a, Yemen 1 
64 Nuristan, Afghanistan 1 71 Virginia, USA 1 
65 Orakzai, Pakistan 1 72 Wardak, Afghanistan 1 
66 Paktia, Afghanistan 1 73 Zarqa, Jordan 1 










 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
1 Dabiq, Syria 430 31 Al Sukhnah, Syria 5 
2 Yarmouk, Syria 55 32 Idlib, Syria 5 
3 Medina, Saudi Arabia 47 33 Masjid al-Aqsa Mosque 5 
4 Mecca, Saudi Arabia 45 34 Mount Sinai, Egypt 5 
5 Damascus, Syria 42 35 Muwaffaq Salti Airbase 5 
6 Baghdad, Iraq 24 36 Sa'dah, Yemen 5 
7 Mosul, Iraq 24 37 Tikrit, Iraq 5 
8 Rome, Italy 18 38 Yalda, Syria 5 
9 Washington, DC 17 39 Al Judi Mountain, Turkey 4 
10 Jerusalem, Israel 15 40 Erbil, Iraq 4 
11 Raqqa, Syria 15 41 Guantanamo Prison, Cuba 4 
12 Constantinople, Turkey 12 42 Halab, Syria (Aleppo) 4 
13 Fallujah, Iraq 12 43 Kabul, Afghanistan 4 
14 Miran Shah, Pakistan 11 44 Khaybar (Arabia) 4 
15 Azaz, Syria 10 45 London, England 4 
16 Ghouta, Syria 9 46 Lyon, France 4 
17 Kobani, Syria 9 47 Maidan, Pakistan 4 
18 Al-Bukamal, Syria 8 48 Najran, Saudi Arabia 4 
19 Sinjar, Iraq 8 49 New York, New York 4 
20 Al Hajar Al Aswad, Syria 7 50 Palmyra (Tadmur), Syria 4 
21 Al-Tabqa Airbase, Syria 7 51 Saqlawiyyah, Iraq 4 
22 Paris, France 7 52 Tell Abbyad, Syria 4 
23 Sana'a, Yemen 7 53 Al Adhim, Iraq 3 
24 Baiji, Iraq 6 54 Al Qaim, Iraq 3 
25 Jarablus, Syria 6 55 Amiriyah Fallujah, Iraq 3 
26 Qalb Loze, Syria 6 56 Battle of Al Harrah, Arabia 3 
27 Ramadi, Iraq 6 57 Beit Sahem, Syria 3 
28 Tunis, Tunisia 6 58 Benghazi, Libya 3 
29 Al Amaq, Turkey 5 59 Huwar-al-Nahr, Syria 3 





 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
61 Khukai, Pakistan 3 105 Amman, Jordan 1 
62 Sydney, Australia 3 106 Anatawt Camp, Israel 1 
63 Ta'if, Saudi Arabia 3 107 Aqabah, Jordan 1 
64 Tal Afar, Iraq 3 108 Aqraba, Syria 1 
65 Tehran, Iran 3 109 Arar Airport, Saudi Arabia 1 
66 Zur Maghar, Syria 3 110 Ash Sharqat, Iraq 1 
67 Akhtarin, Syria 2 111 Atme, Syria 1 
68 Al Hayl Gas Field, Syria 2 112 At-Tahiya, Iraq 1 
69 Al Khaldiyyah, Iraq 2 113 Baqirda, Turkey 1 
70 Ankara, Turkey 2 114 Bashiriyyah, Syria 1 
71 Arish, Egypt 2 115 Batn Idam, Saudi Arabia 1 
72 Ashkelon, Israel 2 116 Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, Iraq 1 
73 Babila, Syria 2 117 Battle of Badr, Saudi Arabia 1 
74 Baghdad Intl. Airport, Iraq 2 118 Battle of Dayr al-Jamājim 1 
75 Battle of Buzakhah, Arabia 2 119 Battle of Nahavand (Iran) 1 
76 Beirut, Lebanon 2 120 Battle of Tabuk, Arabia 1 
77 Daquq, Iraq 2 121 Battle of Uhud, Arabia 1 
78 Doha, Qatar 2 122 Binnish, Syria 1 
79 Duluiyyah, Iraq 2 123 Camp Bucca, Iraq 1 
80 Hawija, Iraq 2 124 Dammam, Saudi Arabia 1 
81 Homs, Syria 2 125 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1 
82 Jawatha Mosque, Arabia 2 126 Dir, Pakistan 1 
83 Madrid, Spain 2 127 Douma, Syria 1 
84 Mir Ali, Pakistan 2 128 Fadak (Arabia) 1 
85 Muqdadiya, Iraq 2 129 Garland, Texas 1 
86 Samarra, Iraq 2 130 Geneva, Switzerland 1 
87 Sidi Miqdad, Syria 2 131 Haditha, Iraq 1 
88 Tadamon, Syria 2 132 Hammam al-‘Alil, Iraq 1 
89 Yusufiyah, Iraq 2 133 Harran, Turkey 1 
90 Zummar, Iraq 2 134 Hasaka, Syria 1 
91 Al Ajrawi, Syria 1 135 Herat, Afghanistan 1 
92 Al Baaj, Iraq 1 136 Hiroshima, Japan 1 
93 Al Baqi Cemetery, Medina 1 137 Hollywood, California 1 
94 Al Hatra, Iraq 1 138 Hunayn, Saudi Arabia 1 
95 Al Jazrah, Syria 1 139 Irbid, Jordan 1 
96 Al Khafsah, Syria 1 140 Islamabad, Pakistan 1 
97 Al Mushallal, Arabia 1 141 Jazah, Iraq 1 
98 Al Qura Valley, Arabia 1 142 Kamishly Airport, Syria 1 
99 Al Rusafah, Baghdad, Iraq 1 143 Kendal, Syria 1 
100 Al Zab, Iraq 1 144 Kessab, Syria 1 
101 al-Azraq, Jordan 1 145 Khasavyurt, Dagestan 1 
102 al-Hayir Prison, S. Arabia 1 146 Kirkuk, Iraq 1 
103 Al-Karak, Jordan 1 147 Kizilyurt, Dagestan 1 





 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
149 Kuwait Intl. Airport 1 171 Salqin, Syria 1 
150 Lake Hulah, Israel 1 172 Sarrin, Syria 1 
151 Lake Tiberias, Israel 1 173 Sha'er Gas Field, Syria 1 
152 Latakia, Syria 1 174 Shamil Kaminsk, Dagestan 1 
153 Manbij, Syria 1 175 Shar Asiyat, Afghanistan 1 
154 Maskanah, Syria 1 176 Sinsil, Iraq 1 
155 Mintaqat Albu Shihab, Iraq 1 177 Sulaiman Bek, Iraq 1 
156 Moscow, Russia 1 178 Sulaymaniyah, Iraq 1 
157 Mount Adah, Syria 1 179 Suluk, Syria 1 
158 Nagasaki, Japan 1 180 Tabalah, Saudi Arabia 1 
159 Nairobi, Kenya 1 181 Taji, Iraq 1 
160 Nakhlah Valley (Arabia) 1 182 Tal Abtah, Iraq 1 
161 Ottawa, Canada 1 183 Tel Malid, Syria 1 
162 Peshawar, Pakistan 1 184 Tokyo, Japan 1 
163 Qatif, Saudi Arabia 1 185 Tura, Pakistan 1 
164 Qayyarah, Iraq 1 186 Umm Qasr, Iraq 1 
165 Quetta, Pakistan 1 187 Valley of Taymullah, Syria 1 
166 Rabia, Iraq 1 188 Wanah, Iraq 1 
167 Rafa, Egpyt 1 189 West Point, New York 1 
168 Rasin El Aboud Airport 1 190 Yanbu Al Nakhal, Arabia 1 
169 Rawa, Iraq 1 191 Zarqa, Jordan 1 






LIST OF AL QAEDA PLACE NAMES IN  
THE REGIONS CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Frequency 
1 Arabian Peninsula 65 
2 Sham/Levant 10 
3 North Africa/Maghreb 9 
4 Middle East 5 
5 Europe 4 
6 Haramayn, Arabia  4 
7 Asia 3 
8 Najd, Saudi Arabia 3 
9 Africa 2 
10 Andalus 2 
11 Central Asia 2 
12 Hijaz, Arabia 2 
13 Iberian Peninsula 2 
14 Jordan River 2 
15 Khurasan 2 
16 Kurdistan 2 
17 Persian Gulf 2 
18 Amu Darya River 1 
19 Balkans 1 
20 Central Africa 1 
21 East Africa 1 
22 Gulf of Aden 1 
23 North America 1 
24 South America 1 
25 Southeast Asia 1 
26 Southern Africa 1 





LIST OF AL QAEDA PLACE NAMES IN  
THE COUNTRIES CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
1 America/US 186 26 Sweden 3 
2 Yemen 132 27 Australia 2 
3 Afghanistan 80 28 Bahrain 2 
4 Iraq 58 29 Cuba 2 
5 Egypt 44 30 Indonesia 2 
6 Palestine 41 31 Japan 2 
7 Israel 25 32 Kuwait 2 
8 Pakistan 22 33 Spain 2 
9 Tunisia 22 34 Sudan 2 
10 Somalia 15 35 Vietnam 2 
11 Syria 15 36 Bangladesh 1 
12 Lebanon 11 37 Belgium 1 
13 Libya 11 38 Bulgaria 1 
14 Saudi Arabia 10 39 Canada 1 
15 Algeria 9 40 Greece 1 
16 England/UK/Britain 9 41 Netherlands 1 
17 Morocco 9 42 Korea  1 
18 Bosnia 8 43 Kosovo 1 
19 Jordan 8 44 Mauritania 1 
20 Iran/Persia 6 45 Nigeria 1 
21 India 5 46 Qatar 1 
22 Russia 5 47 Romania 1 
23 Turkey 5 48 Serbia 1 
24 Denmark 4 49 Uzbekistan 1 






LIST OF AL QAEDA PLACE NAMES IN 
THE PROVINCES CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Frequency 
1 Abyan, Yemen 26 
2 Chechnya, Russia 10 
3 Gaza, Israel 10 
4 Aden, Yemen 6 
5 Shabwah, Yemen 3 
6 North Carolina 2 
7 Panjshir Province 2 
8 Sinai, Egypt 2 
9 Al Anbar, Iraq 1 
10 Al Jawf, Yemen 1 
11 Arizona 1 
12 Bamyan, Afghanistan 1 
13 California 1 
14 Diyala, Iraq 1 
15 Georgia 1 
16 Khost, Afghanistan 1 
17 Khwaja Ghar, Afghan. 1 
18 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 1 
19 Saladin, Iraq 1 
20 Texas 1 
21 Waziristan, Pakistan 1 








LIST OF AL QAEDA PLACE NAMES IN  
THE CITIES CATEGORY 
 
 Place Name Freq.  Place Name Freq. 
1 Guantanamo Prison 12 31 Baghdad, Iraq 2 
2 Sana'a, Yemen 12 32 Bagram, Afghanistan 2 
3 Kabul, Afghanistan 9 33 Dubai, UAE 2 
4 Mecca, Saudi Arabia 9 34 Granada, Spain 2 
5 Medina, Saudi Arabia 9 35 Hawtah Sudayr, Arabia 2 
6 Jerusalem/Quds 8 36 Jalalabad, Afghanistan 2 
7 Kandahar, Afghanistan 8 37 Kohat, Pakistan 2 
8 Masjid al-Aqsā, Jerusalem 7 38 London, England 2 
9 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 7 39 Sadah, Yemen 2 
10 Times Square, NYC 7 40 Suez Canal, Egypt 2 
11 Washington, DC 7 41 Vienna, Austria 2 
12 Battle of Badr, Arabia 6 42 Al Hair Prison, Saudi Arabia 1 
13 Lawdar, Yemen 6 43 Al Hawtah, Yemen 1 
14 New York City 6 44 Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia 1 
15 Fallujah, Iraq 5 45 Aleppo, Syria 1 
16 Mudiyah, Yemen 5 46 Alexandria, Egypt 1 
17 Tora Bora, Afghanistan 5 47 Amsterdam, Netherlands 1 
18 Beirut, Lebanon 4 48 Annapolis, Maryland 1 
19 Karabagh Afghanistan 4 49 Arlington, Virginia 1 
20 Marib, Yemen 4 50 Battle of Tabuk, Arabia 1 
21 Quetta, Pakistan 4 51 Battle of Uhud, Arabia 1 
22 Zinjibar, Yemen 4 52 Buraidah, Saudi Arabia 1 
23 Al Farouq Training Camp 3 53 Cairo, Egypt 1 
24 Detroit Michigan 3 54 Ceuta, Spain 1 
25 Karachi, Pakistan 3 55 Chicago, Illinois 1 
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